Economics and Search

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They say that economists are people who are good with numbers but don’t have the personality to become accountants. I want to belie that mild-mannered image by doing something rash and even downright dangerous: I want to talk to you about some work in my subject, economics, that I think might be relevant to the work in your subject, information retrieval.

I take this step with considerable trepidation, since I know that it is unlikely to be successful. It is rare that an outsider can really contribute anything useful to another subject, as I know from listening to innumerable speeches by the physicists, biologists, and mathematicians about what their subject has to say about economics.

However, it is also true that such cross-fertilization can be extremely stimulating. Economics has, in fact, learned a lot from physics, biology and mathematics. And even when such attempts at interdisciplinary communication fail, as they often do, it is often interesting to see how others approach the questions that are your main business.

Here are three areas in economics where I think there might be some fruitful cross-fertilization:

**Economic value of information.** How economists think about the value of information and how it might be relevant to IR.

**Estimating probability of relevance.** How some nonparametric econometrics analysis might help in determining functional relationships.

**Optimal search behavior.** How the theory of optimal search offers some surprising advice on ordering retrieved results.

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1 Economic value of information

Economists define the (economic) value of information in the context of an optimal choice problem. A consumer is making a choice to maximize expected utility or minimize expected cost. The value of information is the increment in expected utility resulting from the improved choice made possible by better information. Often this can be translated into some monetary equivalent representing how much someone would pay to acquire a given piece of information. (See Laffont [1989], page 61.)

To take a very simple example in an IR context, suppose that a user is given two sealed envelopes, one containing $100 the other containing $0. She is allowed to choose one, open it, and keep whatever is inside. To make things simple, suppose that she is risk-neutral, in the sense that she only cares about expected value.

In the absence of any information, she would choose an envelope at random, receiving an expected payoff of $50. If she had accurate information about which envelope contained the prize, she would, of course, choose it and receive $100. Hence the value of information about which envelope contains the prize is $50, the increment in value she would get by making the better choice. In this very simple case, it is also the upper bound on how much she would pay to acquire that information.

Now, the interesting thing about the economist’s notion of the value of information is that it is only new information that matters. If she reads a document that says “the prize is in envelope on your left” then another document with the same information has no incremental value. This is quite different from “relevance” as it is usually defined since duplicate documents may well be relevant to a choice problem, even though the second instance of the relevant document is certainly not valuable.

We see this effect at work in the stock market where it is only surprises that move markets. If everybody expects the Fed to raise interest rates by 1/4 point in their next meeting, the market doesn’t budge when this event actually occurs. But if they raise the interest rate by 1/2 point, the market may respond significantly.

How is this relevant to IR? The standard paradigm of “present documents in order of estimated relevance” doesn’t take account of the incremental value of the documents already viewed. To take a trivial example, almost everyone tries to remove duplicate documents from retrieved lists since it is obvious that they add no new information. However, the same logic suggests that documents that are similar to those earlier in the list probably add little value to those already
examine.

This in turn argues for strategies like post-retrieval clustering of results. Several researchers have advocated such an approach for a variety of reasons such as reduction of cognitive load, disambiguation, and so on. The reasoning may add another twist to this discussion, namely that clustering is good when it maximizes the difference (i.e., the incremental information content) across clusters.

2 Estimating probability of relevance

The next topic I want to discuss is the problem of estimating the probability of relevance. I approach this problem in the tradition of Cooper et al. [1992]: given a training set of documents, queries, and 0-1 relevance judgments, estimate the probability that a given document will be relevant to a given query.

Cooper used a number of explanatory variables such as terms-in-common, length-of-document, length-of-query, inverse document frequency, and so on. In general, given a vector of explanatory variables, \( X \), one can assume that the probability of relevance conditional on \( X \) is given by the logistic distribution

\[
p(X) = \frac{e^{X\beta}}{1 + e^{X\beta}}
\]

and then use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate the vector of parameters \( \beta \).

The logistic parametric form is, of course, only one functional form, and maximum likelihood is only one estimation technique. It is a particularly convenient choice in a data-poor environment since it doesn’t require a large training set and the likelihood function is concave, meaning that there is normally a unique maximum and standard optimization techniques work very well. These features made logistic estimation very attractive when Cooper did his work.

However, maximum likelihood does require assuming a particular functional form. In a data-rich environment, this may not be necessary or even desirable. In particular, it is possible to use nonparametric methods to examine how well any particular functional form performs in fitting the data.

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1 See, for example, Hearst and Pedersen [1996] for a literature review and an argument about the value of clustering for disambiguation.

2 An audience member told me that Carbonell and Goldstein [1998] have implemented a similar idea that they call “maximal marginal relevance.”

3 I’ve been told that Greiff [1998] also proposed using nonparametric methods for this end and conducted a more detailed analysis using related but different techniques.
To illustrate this, I chose two TREC samples of document-query pairs from the *Wall Street Journal*. The data for fitting consisted of 100,102 doc-query pairs; the data for extrapolation consisted of 173,330 doc-query pairs. The data were stemmed in the standard way.\footnote{Thanks for Aito Chen and Fred Gey for providing me with these data.} To keep things simple I used only one explanatory variable, $x =$ terms in common.

I then calculate the *frequencies of relevance* by looking at all document-query pairs that had $k$ terms in common, and calculated the fraction of these documents that were relevant. I then used these frequencies of relevance as inputs to a logistic regression and as inputs to a nonparametric regression, both of which will be explained in more detail below.

Figure 1 depicts the frequencies of relevance along with the maximum likelihood estimate of the probability of relevance, assuming a logistic functional form. Note that the frequencies-of-relevance and the maximum likelihood estimate have a somewhat different shape—in particular, the frequencies-of-relevance have a convex shape in the region involving 30-60 terms-in-common. This indicates that the logistic form isn’t a particularly good fit in that region.
The logistic distribution in equation (1) implies that

\[ \frac{p(x)}{1 - p(x)} = e^{x\beta}. \]

Taking logs of both sides of this expression gives us

\[ \log \frac{p(x)}{1 - p(x)} = x\beta. \]

If we apply this so-called “logit transform” to the frequencies we have a simple linear regression:

\[ \log \frac{f(x)}{1 - f(x)} = x\beta. \]

Note that the logit transformation makes no sense when \( f(x) \) equals 0 or 1, so we have to censor such observations. If we estimate this regression using ordinary least squares, we find the results in Figure 2.

Note that this provides a somewhat worse fit for low and high numbers of words-in-common, but fits much better over the middle range.\(^5\) However, note

\(^5\)Part of this is due to the fact that we have censored the observations with high number of terms-in-common.
that the curvature of the fitted function still seems to reverse of that implied by the data.

We can do somewhat better by using a nonparametric technique known as nonlinear regression. In this particular case, I used a technique known as PAV (pool adjacent violators) which finds the monotone function that minimizes the sum of squared residuals between the observed frequencies and the fitted function. (See Härdle [1989], page 218.) The results are depicted in Figure 3, along with a 4-term moving average of the fitted function.

We now have three candidates for the relationship between terms-in-common and probability of relevance: the maximum likelihood estimate, the logistic regression, and the nonparametric regression. These fits are compared to the second sample of Wall Street Journal doc-query pairs in Figure 4.

The reader can judge for him or herself which method performs better. To my eye the nonparametric regression performs very well, picking up the same convexity in the 30-60 terms-in-common range as appeared in the earlier dataset.\footnote{It is worth noting that the precision-recall measures for all three estimation techniques are the same since they are all monotone transformations of each other.}

Of course this is only a toy model. In a real application it would be important to add some extra explanatory variables such as document/query length, document...
3 Optimal search behavior

Economists have been interested in search behavior ever since Stigler [1961]. (See Kohn and Shavell [1974] for a general model and Lippman and McCall [1982] for a survey.) This interest has been motivated by interest in modeling consumer behavior such as searching for the lowest price or the highest wage.

In the economic context, it is of interest to find the best price or wage, while in a document search one would presumably be interested in a set of good documents. Despite this difference, I think that the economics literature suggests a few interesting models and contains at least one surprising insight.

Let us examine a slightly simplified version of Weitzman [1979]'s “Pandora Problem.”

Pandora has $n$ boxes to open. The reward in box $i$ is random with distribution function $F_i(x)$. It costs her $c_i$ to open a box and she has a time discount factor of $d < 1$. Her payoff is the maximum value found up to the point where she stops.
opening the boxes.

To fix ideas, consider the following practical interpretation of this abstract problem. You work in an airport bookstore selling travel books. People are in a hurry, they have a cost to examining the books, they can only take one book with them, and, due to your experience, you have a pretty good idea of the likely appeal of the books to potential customers. Your problem is to determine the order in which you show them the books.

One of my colleagues suggested “That’s easy—just show them the most expensive book first!” Somewhat surprisingly, this was a computer science colleague, not an economist colleague. But to avoid this possibility, we assume all books are the price and that your goal is to satisfy the consumer.

Weitzman shows that this problem can be solved by dynamic programming. In particular, there is a way to assign a score to each box that depends only on the characteristics of that box and is relatively easy to compute. Once these scores are assigned, the optimal search can then be completely characterized by the following rules:

**Selection rule:** if you open a box, open the box with the highest score.

**Stopping rule:** stop searching when the maximum sampled reward exceeds the score of every closed box.

The interesting thing is that the score is not the expected value of the box. In fact, the optimal search strategy can easily involve opening a box with a low expected value before a box with a higher expected value!

The reason is that opening a box with a very spread out or risky distribution first allows for the possibility of terminating the costly search. As Weitzman puts it: “Other things being equal, it is optimal to sample first from distributions that are more spread out or riskier in hopes of striking it rich early and ending the search.”

To see how this works, I have constructed a very simple example. Suppose that there are only two boxes. Box S gives a payoff of 6 for sure. Box R has an equal chance of 10 or 0. Note that S, the “safe” box, has a higher expected payoff than box R. If you were only going to choose one box, S would maximize expected payoff.

Let us consider the optimal search behavior. Suppose Pandora opens box S first; should she continue to open box R? Half of the time she will get $10d - c$, half of the time she will get 0. (The $d$ is the discount factor indicating that the payoff
comes next period; the $c$ is the cost of opening the next box.) The expected payoff from continuing her search is therefore $5d - c$ which is less than 6. Therefore, if she opens box S first she will have a payoff of 6 and will not continue.

Suppose Pandora opens box R first. Half of the time she will get 10. Since she can’t do any better than this, she will stop her search and go home happy. Half of the time she will get 0. She should continue if

$$6d - c \geq 0.$$  

If she does continue, she will have an expected payoff of $5 + 3d - c/2$. Hence opening R first is the best strategy if this expression is larger than 6, which, after simple algebra says

$$6d - c \geq 2.$$  

This inequality is stronger than (2), so if opening box R first is optimal, then it is always optimal to continue.

In conclusion, the optimal strategy is to open the risky box R first if $6d - c > 2$. If you get the high payoff stop, otherwise continue. This is true even though the safe box has a higher expected value. The reason is that the risky box has what economists call “option value.” Once you’ve seen the payoff, you have the option to continue, and this can be worth a lot.\(^7\)

Option value plays a big role in search. Indeed, if you didn’t have the option to truncate the search, it could hardly be called search. And option value is increasing in the riskiness of the choices—which means that it is better to look at risky choices early in the search process.

It follows that the standard practice of ordering retrieved documents by their expected relevance, or expected value, or any such expectation is not really right. The actual ordering should depend not only on the estimated first moment of the distribution, but on higher moments as well.

Let us return to our airport bookstore example. A patron rushes into your store and says “Quick, I need a guide to Borneo.” You have two in stock, one by Fodors which most people find adequate, and one by Lonely Planet, which some people love and some hate. Which do you show first? I claim that it makes sense to show the Lonely Planet guide first. If the person loves it, they don’t even have to look at Fodors. If they hate Lonely Planet, you can give them the Fodors. This example illustrates why a document that has a low expected payoff may still be presented earlier, if it has a chance of yielding a large payoff early in the search.

\(^7\)For more applications of option value, see Dixit and Pindyck [1994].
Whether this principle is of practical import at this stage of development of IR is hard to tell. We certainly don’t have very good estimates of any of the parameters—the discount factor, the cost of search, or the expected value of the alternatives. Until we can get better measurements of these key parameters, it will be hard to really apply the result.

4 Conclusion

At the beginning of the talk, I said that I was doing something dangerous in talking about what economics might contribute to your subject. Such interdisciplinary trespassing is, by it’s nature, a risky undertaking. But perhaps I have some justification with this last result—at least in some cases, an optimal search involves looking at the riskiest items first!

So thank you for your time and attention; it has been a privilege for me to talk with you this morning.
References


They say that economists are people who are good with numbers but don’t have the personality to become accountants. Economics (/ˌɪkəˈnɒmɪks, iˈkɒmɪks/) is the social science that studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. Economics focuses on the behaviour and interactions of economic agents and how economies work. Microeconomics analyzes basic elements in the economy, including individual agents and markets, their interactions, and the outcomes of interactions. Individual agents may include, for example, households, firms, buyers, and sellers. Macroeconomics analyzes the entire