THE G8 AND TERRORISM: WHAT ROLE CAN THE G8 PLAY IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

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Abstract
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The attacks of September 11, 2001 have made terrorism a top priority of all international institutions. Accordingly, terrorism is to be a priority of the upcoming Kananaskis summit in June 2002. This paper will seek to place the G8 in the future international fight against terrorism. The objective will be to begin to answer the question as to how effective the G8 can be in such a fight, and how positive its prospects for global governance and international leadership in the new millennium appear. In order to answer this question, this paper examines the history of terrorism at the summits, as well as the different factors that account for the G8’s past effectiveness on this issue. However, this paper will also attempt to link the subject of terrorism to the wider debate about the prospects for effective G8 global governance in the new millennium. Overall, it will be shown that the G8 has traditionally played a constructive role in international efforts against terrorism, and that such a role may well continue into the 21st century.

Biography
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Andre Belelieu is a graduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science completing a MSc in European Politics and Policy. He graduated with distinction from the International Relations program at the University of Toronto, also spending one year at the Humboldt University in Berlin as an exchange student in 1999-2000. He has been a policy analyst at the G8 Research Group since December 2000, attending the 2001 Genoa summit as an analyst for team Germany as well as the issue areas of conflict prevention and the environment. His current research interests include the study of terrorism, the extreme-right in Europe, and the European Union.

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“None of our countries is immune to the effects of terrorism. The problem is global and the solution must also be global.”

Introduction

The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated to the world the destructive and lethal capabilities of modern terrorism. Not only did the attacks highlight that terrorism isn’t something that happens ‘out there’ to ‘everyone else’, but also they reminded the international community that terrorism can’t be ignored, even by the world’s only superpower. As levels of economic and political interdependence between nations increase, and as the international system in which they interact is shaped by the process of globalization, transnational threats such as terrorism can strike anywhere, at any time, and in many different ways. Moreover, rapid advances in modern communications, the development of international networks facilitating the movement of people between states and the transfer of funds between financial markets, as well as the existence of safe havens in which terrorist groups train and organize, have resulted in highly motivated, organized, and adaptable terrorist networks. Taking into account these realities, governments must not only devise strategies that respond to this destructive and unpredictable phenomenon, but also fight an enemy who operate in a system in which terrorist activities are harder to track and prevent. Thus as the 21st century begins, terrorism is a global problem representing “the greatest threat to peace and stability in the 21st century” (Combs, 1997: 1).

Over the years numerous actors in the international community have undertaken efforts to both deter and prevent terrorist attacks. Among these actors is the G8. Comprising the world’s eight most influential democracies – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the participation of the European Union as an observer) – the G7/8 has a long history of dealing with terrorism. The topic first entered the summit agenda under the form of air hijacking at the 1978 Bonn summit, and since that time it has commanded an importance among summit participants that few other political issues can match. In fact, not only did terrorism earn the distinction of becoming the first non-economic issue to be included on the G7 agenda, but it has also been the dominant theme of the 1986 Tokyo and 1996 Lyon summits. Accordingly, over time G7/8 treatment of terrorism has become increasingly ambitious, comprehensive, and responsive to the complexities of the evolving terrorist threat, and the G7/8 has increasingly sought to become an international venue well equipped to deal with such an issue.

In addition, over the years the G8 has sought more generally to become an international forum both able and willing to play a leadership role in the international community on a wide range of economic and political issues. However, opinions remain divided as to the G8’s importance, as well as its capability of providing effective global governance in the new millennium. As a result, two opposing schools of thought have emerged. On the one side are scholars who see the G8 as an ineffective, unrepresentative, and illegitimate candidate for global governance, even on the issues it was created to solve (Jayawardena, 1989; Smyser, 1993; Ul Haq, 1994; Bergsten and Henning, 1996; Hajnal, 1999; Baker, 2000). On the other side are scholars who see the G8 as an emerging centre of global governance, capable of tackling problems and providing solutions in the complex world of the new millennium (Kirton, 1993 and 1998; Bayne, 2000). While this debate has been generally confined to economic issues, following the attacks of September 11 and the
designated as terrorism as a major topic of the upcoming 2002 Kananaskis summit, this paper will seek to expand this debate to the issue of terrorism, and to measure the G8’s past accomplishments, thereby placing the G8’s potential role in the future international fight against terrorism.

Falling between these two schools of thought, this paper argues that the G8 is neither the centre of global governance, nor an ineffective international institution on this issue, but rather a unique forum that has shown itself capable of playing an effective role against terrorism within the international community. The core argument centres around the thesis that the G8 can emerge as a potential international leader and key player on the terrorist issue in the 21st century, both in devising new policies as well as providing international leadership in promoting cooperation between states, coordination of national policies, as well as implementation of international counter-terrorist frameworks. However, above all this paper aims to be a critical analysis of the G8’s ability to emerge as an effective centre of global governance on this issue in the 21st century. Accordingly, it will also start from the assumption that the G8 is not there yet, will not be able to defeat terrorism alone, and may be unable to fulfill such a role.

To support the main argument of this paper, this study examines terrorism at the summits in five parts. Firstly, this paper explores the modern scholarly debate, both on the issue of terrorism itself, as well as on the G8’s role in providing global governance in the new millennium. Secondly, this study examines the history of terrorism at the summits, in order both to highlight past G7/8 achievements on this issue, as well as its prospects for contributing to future counter-terrorist efforts. Thirdly, a description of the G8 counter-terrorist machinery is provided with the objective of demonstrating both the capacity and the peculiarities of the G7/8 system. Fourthly, this paper looks at the attributes of the G7/8 structure that allow it to play an effective role in the fight against terrorism, in order to explain how and why it can emerge as a potential international leader on this issue. Finally, with the September 11 attacks fresh in the minds of the world, this paper argues that the Kananaskis summit represents a critical test of the G8’s ongoing commitment to fighting terrorism, and poses a formidable challenge to its ability to deal with the changing character of modern terrorism in the upcoming millennium. However, based on past achievements, this paper concludes that the G8 remains an effective international forum in which the international community can fight terrorism, and that it still possesses the potential to emerge as an important player in the international counter-terrorist fight in the 21st century.

MODERN TERRORISM AND THE G8: THE SCHOLARLY DEBATES

Terrorism has traditionally been a difficult concept to define. As a result, despite the high levels of media attention and general scholarship that it receives, a clear definition of the term can be said to still not exist today. However, numerous definitions have been formulated that attempt to offer a descriptive and objective definition of the phenomenon, as well as categorize the different types and forms of modern terrorism. For example, according to terrorism expert Brian Jenkins, terrorism can be defined as “the violence or threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm – in a word, to terrorize – and cause panic, disorder, and terror within an organized society, thereby bringing about some social or political change” (Jenkins, 1990: 28). For the United States State Department, terrorism can be characterized as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). However, while academics and terrorism experts have offered a wide range of definitions, it is worth noting that no general definition has ever been accepted by the international community. Despite efforts in the League of Nations as early as the 1930s, and more recently within the General Assembly of the United Nations, to achieve such a definition, differing opinions stemming from different cultural, economic, and political situations around the world (namely the notion that one man’s ‘freedom fighter’ is another man’s ‘terrorist’) have made such a task a difficult undertaking.

Moreover, another difficulty in defining terrorism is that modern terrorism is a phenomenon that can be carried out by a variety of different methods, and for a variety of different motives. Therefore, several scholars and terrorism experts have also attempted to extend their explanations of modern terrorism to include a categorization of the different types of terrorism, as well as offer the different motivations that lead to its use. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations has identified six types of terrorism: nationalist, religious, state-sponsored, left wing, right wing, and anarchist terrorism (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). While anarchist and left-wing terrorism are virtually non-existent in today’s world, nationalist terrorism (terrorism undertaken for struggles for ‘national liberation’) and religious terrorism (terrorism in the name of divinely commanded purposes) have been on the rise since the Second World War. For example, from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), nationalist terrorism has been a major feature of international politics in the era of self-determination. Moreover, according to Bruce Hoffman of the RAND think tank, nearly half of the 56 active international terrorist groups in 1995 were religiously motivated, including the Al-Qaeda organization of Osama Bin Laden (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).

Nevertheless, according to the former deputy chief of the CIA, Paul Pillar, all forms of modern terrorism contain four key elements (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). Firstly, terrorism is premeditated rather than an impulsive act of rage or revenge. Secondly, it is political, not criminal, meaning that its aim is to bring about a change in the political order rather than seek financial gain. Thirdly, it is aimed at civilians rather than military targets. Fourthly, it is not carried out by the army of a country, but rather by subnational groups (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). Therefore, in general, terrorism is a wide-ranging concept that has proven difficult to define in the international community. While all definitions can be subject to criticism as being incomplete or subjective, academics and terrorism experts have nonetheless offered several definitions that not only clearly characterize terrorism and its effects, but that also allow a categorization of the different types of modern terrorism, and the various motives and elements that describe its activities.

Accordingly, while terrorism itself may be hard to define, the impact of the activities that fall under the concept of terrorism is easy to see. According to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS), there were 273 international terrorist attacks in 1998, in which 741 persons lost their lives and 5952 were seriously injured (CSIS, 1999). Similar statistics for 1999 indicate that the number of terrorist attacks increased to 392, and that 233 persons were killed and 706 injured (US State Department, 2000). In 2001, the number of international terrorist attacks again declined to 346, but the death toll of 3,547 was the highest ever (90% of the victims perished in the attacks of September 11) (US State Department, 2002). Overall, these statistics reveal two major trends that are characteristic of modern terrorism. Firstly, past counter-terrorist strategies have often yielded positive results. Terrorist attacks
have become less frequent, and several forms of terrorism, such as diplomatic hostage taking and airline hijacking, have been virtually eradicated in many parts of the world over the past twenty years. In fact, not only were oil pipeline bombings in Colombia responsible for almost half of all international terrorist attacks in 2000 and 2001 (US State Department, 2002), but also the total number of terrorist attacks in 1998 was the lowest annual total since 1971 (CSIS, 1999).

However, what these statistics also reveal is that terrorism is an adaptable and increasingly lethal phenomenon. Even if the frequency of airline hijackings or embassy bombings has decreased, this has not reduced their ability to inflict much damage and cause massive casualties. On the contrary, statistics reveal that while the total number of attacks in 2002 was one of the lowest annual totals since 1971, the number of killed and wounded was the highest ever (US State Department, 2002). This had also been the case in 1998, when the lowest annual total of international terrorist attacks recorded since 1971 yielded the highest number of casualties ever recorded (CSIS, 1999).

New technologies, increased freedom of movement, as well as an increase of information through avenues such as the Internet, have all combined to provide terrorists with the know-how and motivation to carry out increasingly deadly attacks. As such, terrorism has increasingly become a sophisticated threat, with one attack possessing the potential to inflict damage and causalities far beyond what was possible 20 years ago. Accordingly, while past efforts have yielded results, several high profile attacks have reminded the international community of the difficulties of fighting modern terrorism, and overshadowed past achievements on this issue:

- The 1989 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (270 people lost their lives).
- The 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the doomsday Aum Shinrikyo cult (11 people died and over 5,500 others were injured).
- The 1998 bombings of US embassy buildings in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya (270 people were killed and 5,000 were injured).
- The attacks of September 11, 2001, which represent the deadliest terrorist attack in modern history. After hijacking four commercial airliners and crashing them into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, over 3000 people died, the World Trade Centre collapsed, and the Pentagon sustained significant structural damage.

Therefore over the years terrorism has proven to be an issue that resists fixed policies and simple solutions. Both the groups that engage in terrorist activities, as well as the methods they use, have constantly evolved, making the creation of new counter-terrorist strategies, as well as the actors that must engage in the fight against terrorists, a constant evolutionary process as well. Accordingly, from the airline hijackings of the early 1980s to the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995, through to the attacks of September 11, terrorism has commanded a high level of attention in both policy circles and with academics.

Modern Terrorism: Solutions and Strategies

The academic consensus before and following the September 11 attacks is that current strategies seeking to fight terrorism fail on many accounts (Garrett, 2001;
Homer-Dixon, 2002; Laquer, 1996 and 1999; Perry, 2002). These scholars argue that not only have we become increasingly vulnerable to modern terrorist networks, but also that our strategies have not kept up with the evolving character of modern terrorism. For example, Laquer and Homer-Dixon note that our societies have become increasingly vulnerable to a wide range of unconventional terrorist attacks. Especially since we increasingly place financial assets, information, and transportation networks in dense and interdependent networks, the fact that the destructive power of terrorism is on the rise facilitates the possibility of high profile attacks causing severe disruptions to our societies (Laquer, 1996; Homer-Dixon, 2002). They argue that our current strategies do not take into account our vulnerability to these modern realities, and thus for Laquer “the prospects for terrorism have improved” (Laquer, 1996: 26), while for Homer-Dixon “terrorists are winning the current war” (Homer-Dixon, 2001: 62). Therefore, Laquer argues that new definitions need to be developed to fight the new realities of modern terrorism, and this must come from increased cooperation between intelligence networks and policymakers around the world. For Homer-Dixon, western societies are wide-open targets for motivated terrorists, and thus any fight against modern terrorism must first involve an understanding of the complexity of the networks we have constructed, which will enable us to acquire the understanding of how terrorists can hurt us.

For these scholars, terrorists are becoming less ideological, more tolerant of risk, and harder to stop. Writing in 1996, Laquer already argued that while 99 out of 100 terrorist attacks may fail, the tools and weapons available to the modern terrorist ensure that “the single successful one could claim many more victims, do more material damage, and unleash far greater panic than anything the world has yet experienced” (Laquer, 1996: 36). After the attacks of September 11, it is hard to contradict such an analysis.

Moreover, following September 11 and the subsequent anthrax scares in the United States, other scholars have pointed to the inadequacy of past solutions in light of new threats such as bio-terrorism (Garrett, 2001; Perry, 2002). Garrett notes, for example, that biology is currently a “field of exponential discovery”, and that the Internet has given extremist groups the know-how to engage in the production of biological and chemical weapons. She argues that since current strategies ignore plans that deal with attacks once they have happened, our societies are prone to future situations of mass panic and disorder if policies do not change (Garrett, 2001: 89). Perry, who notes that past counter-terrorist policies have been too narrowly focused on the deterrence aspect of fighting terrorism, echoes such an argument. He argues that new strategies must be a balanced mix of deterrence, prevention, and defense of terrorist attacks (Perry, 2002: 43). Since terrorist attacks will never be completely eradicated, he advocates a new comprehensive strategy that prevents attacks by infiltrating terrorist networks, deters attacks through developed defense programs, but also that prepares society for the aftermath of attacks that could not be stopped.

However, an important aspect in counter-terrorist strategies not mentioned in the analysis of these predominately American scholars is international cooperation. As terrorists increasingly move unchecked across international borders, the notions of national sovereignty and national jurisdiction handicap governments. Therefore, over the years international cooperation has become a pivotal tool in winning the war against terrorism. On this subject, Michael Dartnell argues the construction of an elaborate international counter-terrorist framework to develop rules and norms for the management of politically motivated violence should be the most important facet of future international cooperation (Dartnell, 2000: 197). For Dartnell, globalization has
brought terrorism into an “inter-network paradigm of relationships”, requiring the coordination of national, regional, and international legal responses in the future. He argues that new governance must originate from decentralized national officials formed into networks for cooperation and coordination. He thus concludes that future enforcement, policy development, and implementation should be conceived within a supranational authority of pooled sovereignty, or within a global set of institutions (Dartnell, 2000: 208). In many ways, his description for the optimal counter-terrorist response puts the informal and flexible structure of the G7/8 summits in a positive light as an institution well equipped to further international cooperation.

The G8 and Terrorism: the Scholarly Debate

It remains a question as to whether the G8 can fulfil such a role. In the literature, views remain mixed as to the G8’s ability to act on transnational issues, and serve as an effective centre of global governance in the 21st century. In one camp are several scholars who believe the G7/8 is an unrepresentative, illegitimate and ineffective subset of the global community it attempts to lead (Jayawardena, 1989; Smyser, 1993; Ul Haq, 1994; Bergsten and Henning, 1996; Hodges, 1999; Baker, 2000). While focusing mainly on economic issues, these scholars characterize the G8 as a “ginger group” (Baker, 2000), incapable of providing any form of legitimate global governance in the 21st century due to declining performance, and the existence of a “false new consensus” preventing effective cooperation on important issues (Bergsten and Henning, 1996).

On the other side are scholars who see the G8 as a source of badly needed leadership in the international community (Kirton, 1993 and 1998; Bayne, 2000). Citing attributes such as the G8’s small size, selected membership, and common values, while simultaneously pointing to the G8’s flexible structure which allows it to involve other countries through bodies such as the G20, they argue that the G8 has the potential to emerge as an effective centre of global governance in the 21st century. In particular, Kirton sees the G8 emerging in place of the United Nations-Bretton Woods system to assume such a role (Kirton, 1993). Along with other scholars, he compares the G8 to a modern day concert similar to that of the 1815 Congress of Vienna (Wallace, 1984; Kirton, 1993; Schwegmann, 2001), and as such argues the G8 can provide leadership and a forum for collective management of international problems in the 21st century.

Since international economics remains the main focus of summit scholarship, no in-depth study exists to date on the issue of terrorism at the summits, and these opposing schools of thought do not mention the issue in their arguments. However, as early as 1987, in their seminal work on the G7, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict at the Seven Power Summits, Putnam and Bayne argued that the G7 had established a potential for effective action against terrorism that no other international body could match (Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 40). According to their analysis, terrorism involves a complex interaction of domestic and international factors that ideally suit the informal summit structure. Domestically, Bayne argues that public opinion reacts strongly to terrorist attacks, demanding action by the highest government officials, while at the same time they point to the fact that since international terrorists can move across borders unchecked, international cooperation within international institutions represents a vital strategy in defeating modern terrorism (Bayne, 2000: 39-40). For Bayne, the G8 succeeds at responding to both counts.
Additionally, Bayne argues that the G8 acts as an international pioneer on the issue, addressing new issues each year while simultaneously building up the capacity to effectively treat terrorism in all its complexity (Bayne, 2000: 40). Moreover, following the attacks of September 11 Bayne and Kirton remain optimistic as to the future prospects for G8 involvement on this issue. According to Kirton, the G8 is a ‘proven performer’ heading into the Kananaskis summit (Kirton, 2002), while for Bayne the G8 counter-terrorist machinery is well tested and capable of responding effectively to the September 11 attacks (Bayne, 2001). These arguments are grounded in the assumption that past efforts of the G8 on this issue have yielded positive results, and point to a G8 treatment of this issue that has progressively improved over the course of summitry.

**TERRORISM AT THE G8 SUMMITS: AN EVOLVING TREATMENT**

The treatment of terrorism within the G7/8 summit structure started as early as 1978. Since that time, the G7/8 has produced 12 declarations and statements specifically dealing with the issue, and overall terrorism has merited a mention in 17 of the 27 final communiqués. However, while terrorism has remained a mainstay on the summit agenda over the years, G7/8 treatment has been anything but constant. Firstly, the terrorist issue at the summits has tended to alternate between years of detailed treatment and years of considerable neglect. This has often resulted in a difficulty to build upon past successes. However, between terrorism’s first mention at the 1978 Bonn summit and the G8 reaction to the events of September 11, G7/8 strategy has also undergone a constant evolution. Due to the gradual construction of a counter-terrorist machinery, as well as the increased importance of political issues over the years of summitry, discussions on the topic have become more ambitious, detailed, and forward-looking. Accordingly, G7/8 treatment of the issue has evolved from a reactive to a more proactive strategy, aiming to lead international efforts against the modern terrorist threat (see Table 1). Such development in G7/8 activity, in turn, has often allowed the G8 to overcome its tendency to ignore terrorism for several summits on end. Evidence of the evolving nature of G7/8 activity on terrorism may be witnessed in the move away from mere political statements to the development of detailed action plans. Additionally, simple statements have now been replaced by comprehensive counter-terrorist strategies yielding concrete results, enabling the G8 to evolve from a forum interested purely in economic issues into a forum at the forefront of modern counter-terrorist activities. Overall, the treatment of terrorism at the summits and this evolution of G8 strategy can be traced as a progression through several different stages.
Table 1 – Terrorism in the G7/8 System: 1975-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Statement on Air Hijacking (Bonn)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages (Venice)</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Statement on Terrorism (Ottawa)</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Declaration on International Terrorism (London)</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Statement on International Terrorism (Tokyo) - Creation of the Terrorism Experts Group (Tokyo)</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Statement on Terrorism (Venice)</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Declaration on Terrorism (Paris)</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>Statement on Transnational Issues (Houston)</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Ottawa Ministerial Forum on Terrorism (December 12) - Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Terrorism Major Topic of Lyon Summit Agenda - Paris Ministerial Conference on Terrorism (July 30) - Agreement on 25 Measures for Combating Terrorism (Paris) - Creation of a Counterterrorist Directory of Skills and Competencies (Chaired by Great Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Statement by the Participants of the Moscow Conference of G-8 Ministers On Counteracting Terrorism - G8 Counterterrorism Experts Meeting – Berlin, Germany (February 15-17) - G8 Counterterrorism Conference – Berlin, Germany (November 17-18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>G8 Counterterrorism Experts Meeting – Rome, Italy (March 7-9) - G8 Statement on the Attacks of September 11 (September 19) - G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Action Plan to Combat the Financing of Terrorism (October 6) - G8 Foreign Ministers Statement on Afghanistan (November 26) - G8 Foreign Ministers Statement on India and Pakistan (December 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Progress Report on Action Plan to Combat the Financing of Terrorism (February 9) - Kananaskis Summit: Terrorism Identified as Major Topic of the Agenda (June 26-27)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The First Stage: Bonn 1978 to Venice 1980 – Terrorism Enters the G7 Agenda

The introduction of terrorism onto the summit agenda characterizes the first stage. However, it is worth noting that this was an unexpected occurrence. Originally intended as informal gatherings of heads of state to discuss issues of international economics (Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 86), political matters such as terrorism were not intended to be topics of discussion for the G7 summits. However, despite French and Japanese reservations to including political matters on the agenda, terrorism became the first political issue to figure in summit discussions at the 1978 Bonn Summit. Under domestic pressure after a series of airline hijackings by the extreme left-wing Baader-Meinhof Gang, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt mentioned air hijacking to the other leaders over discussions at lunch, which ultimately resulted in the Bonn Statement on Air Hijacking. This initial G7 terrorist document represented no more than a short statement expressing the concern of the summit participants over recent air hijackings. It expressed only a vague commitment to cooperate against terrorism, and pledged to suspend air traffic with any country that offered sanctuary to hijackers and terrorists. According to Putnam and Bayne, the drafting of this document was a
“unique example of unscripted summitry” (Putnam and Bayne, 1987, p.87). However, it represented no more than a political statement, and no concrete future action was planned.

Two years later at the Venice Summit, the G7 members issued their second document dealing with terrorism, entitled “The Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages”. This statement was the product of American pressure on G7 members to condemn Iran in light of the hostage situation at the American embassy in Tehran in 1979. However, like the Statement on Air Hijacking, this G7 statement was merely a joint condemnation of terrorist activities, and did not offer any concrete commitments or strategies. Thus the initial treatment of terrorism at the summits took the form of simple political statements. These agreements represented no more than ad hoc reactions by the G7 to specific terrorist events, as well as a desire of G7 leaders to simply condemn international terrorism in specific forms. At this early stage of summitry, the G7 did not envisage playing a leading international role on the issue of terrorism, nor did it seek to devote a considerable amount of time to the subject. Economic issues represented the raison d’etre of the summits, and terrorism remained only a small preoccupation of the summit leaders, most of whom were former finance ministers. Thus no overall strategy emerged, treatment remained sporadic and reactive, and the issue was often activated only by specific events. Overall, the G7 sought to take no concrete action on the issue.


By 1981, the first signs of an evolving G7 strategy against terrorism were evident. Simple statements became more detailed counter-terrorist documents, and due to the early success of the summits, economic issues slipped down the summit agenda as the G7 realized in could play a role on a wide range of political issues. As a result, the increasing amount of time spent dealing with political issues meant that the G7 could seek to build upon past efforts, and that new efforts could become more ambitious and detailed. This second stage thus witnessed a more concerted G7 treatment of terrorism, characterized by a proactive instead of reactive strategy, and laid the groundwork for future G7 achievements on the issue.

It was at the 1981 Ottawa Summit that the G7 appeared no longer content to issue simple statements condemning terrorism, and instead started to take action against the problem by specifically referring to the many sources that enable air hijacking and the taking of diplomatic hostages: the supply of arms and money to terrorist groups, and training facilities in which they planned their activities (G7, 1981: 1). The Ottawa Declaration specifically singled out the Babrak Karmal government of Afghanistan as being in breach of the Hague Convention, and thus also confirmed for the first time the G7’s goal of fighting state-sponsored terrorism. This development continued at the 1984 London Summit, where the G7 highlighted several other techniques at the disposition of terrorists: the raising of funds through drug trafficking, easy access to weapons and explosives, and the ease at which terrorists can move across international borders (G7, 1984: 6). While building upon past declarations, the London Declaration also set a more specific action plan calling for several measures including “closer cooperation and coordination between policy and security organizations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchange of information, intelligence, and technical knowledge”, as well as “scrutiny by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might be exploited by terrorists” (G7, 1984: 6). This declaration thus signalled not only a major extension of G7 efforts on
the issue, but also the first recognition of the transnational character of the terrorist threat. As a result, the groundwork was in place to reach an even more ambitious statement.

This was achieved two years later at the 1986 Tokyo Summit, which according to Bayne represented “the main test of the summits’ effectiveness in this field” (Bayne, 2000: 40). Not only did Tokyo become a virtual ‘terrorism summit’, with the majority of the summit discussions devoted to the issue, but the result of these discussions was impressive and thus Tokyo remains important for several different reasons. Firstly, the summits proved to be the forum that achieved transatlantic unity over the issue of US air raids on Libya. As Adrian Guelke notes, the Tokyo summit was able to bridge the gap between the Americans and Europeans on the issue of economic sanctions and American retaliatory strikes against the Libyan government (Guelke, 1995: 63). Thus, the summits proved to be a forum through which traditional differences on the issue could be solved, and an international consensus between the world’s leading democracies could be achieved. Secondly, the Tokyo Declaration was the first G7 document expressing a vague commitment from the summits to lead international efforts against terrorism. As the statement concludes, “we are ready to promote bilaterally and multilaterally further actions to be taken in international organizations or fora competent to fight against international terrorism in any of its forms” (G7, 1986: 5).

Thus the Tokyo Declaration, in both its scope and direction, signalled a new departure for the G7, as well as recognition by the G7 that it could play a leading international role on this issue. However, it is also worth noting that the Tokyo Declaration established the first network of expert groups on terrorism. This proved to be a key contribution to the G7’s ability to deal with terrorism, and for the success of its increasingly ambitious counter-terrorist strategies. By establishing networks of expert groups that could concentrate on tackling terrorism on a year round basis, not only was the G7 bringing highly qualified counter-terrorist experts into the G7 structure, but also it was providing itself with a capacity for effective preparation and follow-up of its counter-terrorist agreements. As such, the G7 possessed the capability to issue more than vague political statements, and instead devise solutions and provide concrete action to achieve its goals.

In the next few years, the G7 issued two more statements on terrorism: Venice 1987 and Paris 1989 (a reaction to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland). However, the evolution of G7 strategy during the second stage was already evident. During the 1980s, the G7 moved from simple statements to the adoption of comprehensive counter-terrorist documents, and it also started to seek out a leadership role in the international community. Overall, G7 counter-terrorist strategy became more ambitious and detailed while simultaneously evolving from a reactive into a proactive strategy. As a result, after the watershed ‘terrorism summit’ of Tokyo in 1986, the G7 could start to set its sights on developing an even more ambitious counter-terrorist strategy in the future cycles of summitry.

The Third Stage: Houston 1990 – Genoa 2001: Development of the G8 Counter-Terrorist Machinery

However, the G7 initially failed to build upon its first successes from the mid-1980s. From 1990 until 1995, terrorism was mentioned only once at the summits, which came in the form of the 1990 Statement on Transnational Issues at the Houston summit. This occurred as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which overnight
made the consolidation of democracy and a free market economy in Russia the major challenge facing the G7 at the time. Moreover, in light of the pending accession of the newly democratic Russia into the G7, issues such as terrorism were perceived as only minor topics compared to the G7’s first possible expansion in over 15 years. Furthermore, as G7 members by and large escaped major terrorist attacks during the early 1990s (with the notable exception of the World Trade Centre bombing in 1993), the impetus for terrorism to re-enter the agenda did not exist. As such, terrorism did not reappear until 1995. However, after 1995 one major development occurred that ensured the G7 continued to contribute to international efforts against terrorism, and could envisage playing an increasingly important role in the near future. This was the gradual construction of a multi-level counter-terrorist machinery involving ministers and terrorism experts capable of devising new strategies and implementing complex agreements. As a result, the mid-1990s produced the most impressive G7/8 results on the question of terrorism in the history of summity, and the G8 continued to possess increasing capabilities to act effectively against terrorism.

Terrorism re-appeared on the G7 summit agenda at the Halifax summit of 1995, which initiated a process resulting in the Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism. Growing out of the 1995 Ottawa Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, this declaration represented the most impressive G7 action plan to date. Based in large part on the work of G7 terrorism experts, the declaration covered a series of measures dealing with the prevention, deterrence, and investigation of terrorist attacks, and it enabled the G7 to adopt a double strategy that has remained in place to this day. On the one hand were several provisions that attempted to devise new approaches and reinforce existing counter-terrorist strategies. These included the promotion of mutual legal assistance, easier extradition procedures, the prevention of the falsification of travel documents, and increased protection of aviation and maritime transport systems (G7, 1995: 6-13). On the other hand was a firm commitment by the G7 to further international cooperation, and lead effectively against the terrorist threat. As the declaration clearly notes, “we are determined as a group to continue to provide leadership on this issue to the international community, using bilateral and multilateral measures and agreements to counter terrorism” (G7, 1995: 13). This strategy included a call on all nations to adhere to the 11 United Nations Counter-Terrorism conventions and urged all states to share increased levels of intelligence gathering and information in order to prevent the movement of international terrorists across borders (G7, 1995: 9). Moreover, in light of the March 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, this document was the first G7 recognition of the dangers of bioterrorism.

With the foreign ministers engaged in a process in which they participated in annual meetings every year before the summits themselves, a course was set through which the G7 could deal with terrorism even more effectively, and where terrorism could be discussed without the need to devote considerable time at the summits themselves. This was demonstrated the following year during and after the 1996 ‘terrorism’ summit of Lyon. At the Paris Ministerial Conference on Terrorism in July, the foreign ministers produced what remains the most comprehensive G7 counter-terrorist document to date: the Agreement on 25 Measures on Combating Terrorism. Both ambitious and comprehensive, this document represents not only a firm commitment by the G7 to develop strategies that deter, prevent, and investigate terrorist activities, but it also signalled the confirmation of the G7 desire to be at the forefront of international counter-terrorist efforts (G7, 1996: 1). Among the 25 provisions dealing with terrorism, the document is separated into two distinct parts
outlining the G7’s comprehensive strategy: one part deals with improving counter-terrorism cooperation and capabilities, which includes measures aimed at the deterrence, prosecution and punishment of terrorists (arms export controls, amendments to domestic anti-terror legislation), as well as measures on asylum, borders, and travel documents (identity papers, review of refugee and asylum policies). The remaining section deals with measures aimed at strengthening international cooperation against terrorism, which include fighting terrorist fund raising, improving information exchange, and expanding international treaties and other arrangements (G7, 1996: 5-25). Along with the 1995 Ottawa Ministerial Declaration, the Agreement on 25 Measures also contains provisions aimed at the acceleration of research and development techniques, as well as against the international movement of terrorist funds through financial networks.

Overall, the Ottawa and Paris ministerial conferences proved terrorism had once again become a significant issue-area at the summits, that the G7 wished to stay at the forefront of international counter-terrorist efforts, and that the G7 possessed the capabilities to harbour such aspirations. Moreover, they showed that despite the virtual disappearance of terrorism since the mid-1990s as a priority at the summit level itself, ministerial meetings could serve as an effective basis for G8 counter-terrorist efforts in the future. This development was confirmed at the subsequent summits, where the increasingly developed G8 summit structure yielded additional results on terrorism. At both the Denver and Birmingham foreign ministers meetings in 1997 and 1998 respectively, the G8 foreign ministers reaffirmed the principles of the Ottawa and Paris declarations, in the case of the Denver meeting adding six additional measures to the 25 measures adopted in Paris. Among these measures was a call for negotiations that led to the twelfth United Nations Counter-Terrorism Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (on a French initiative), the initiation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Asylum to prevent terrorists from exploiting asylum policies, as well as the creation of a Directory of Counter-Terrorist Competencies and Skills chaired by Great Britain (G8 foreign ministers, 1997).

Thus as the G8 convened for its first meetings of the 21st century, terrorism had become a regular topic on the G8 agenda, whether this was at the official or ministerial level. Overall, G8 treatment of this subject increasingly benefited from an emerging multi-level summit structure capable of treating issues uninterrupted during the year. Thus while other issues such as debt relief dominated the ever-expanding G8 agenda, the work of the overall summit structure in the mid-1990s laid the groundwork for substantial counter-terrorist results, and this period remains the most productive period in the G8’s short history.

The Fourth Stage: Kananaskis 2002 - ??? – Response to the Attacks of September 11

However, after substantial results in the mid-1990s, the G8 once again failed to build upon these efforts at the subsequent summits. From 1998 to 2001, terrorism became relegated to simple statements in the foreign ministers communiqués at London, Cologne, Miyazaki, and Rome. These references to terrorism yielded no new strategies, and terrorism became even a minor concern for the foreign, finance, and interior and justice ministers. However, events after the 2001 Genoa summit have brought terrorism firmly back as a key issue area in the upcoming cycle of summity, and mobilized a new round of preliminary G8 efforts on terrorism. Responsible for this re-emergence of terrorism is the attacks of September 11. Already identified as a major topic of the upcoming Kananaskis summit, the G8 was quick to respond to the
attacks, and its initial efforts have already yielded positive results. Moreover, based on initial efforts, terrorism is once again likely to figure not only at the ministerial level discussions for years to come, but also at the summits themselves.

With regards to September 11, the G8 reaction was rapid and firm. It issued its first statement dealing with the attacks on September 19, 2001, the Statement by the Leaders of the G8 on the Attacks of September 11. This statement reiterated the G8’s pledge to fight terrorism not only in conjunction with international law, but also in a relationship of mutual reinforcement with other international institutions such as the United Nations (G8, 2001). However, it is also worth noting that the G8 sets a new course of action to fight terrorism heavily drawing on familiar themes, such as aviation security and economic sanctions. In part, the statement notes:

We have asked our foreign, finance, justice, and other relevant ministers, as appropriate, to draw up a list of specific measures to enhance our counter terrorism cooperation, including: Expanded use of financial measures and sanctions to stop the flow of funds to terrorists, aviation security, the control of arms exports, security and other services cooperation, the denial of all means of support to terrorism and the identification and removal of terrorist threats (G8, 2001).

In general, the G8 has consistently monitored terrorism since September 11. Since that time, the G8 has issued additional statements on the war against terror in Afghanistan (November 26) as well as the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament (December 28). However, the G8’s first major efforts at defeating terrorism since September 11 have been through the G7 finance ministers. These efforts have centred on attacking terrorism at its roots, in particular the financing of terrorist activities. In October 2001, the finance ministers submitted the Action Plan to Combat the Financing of Terrorism. In this plan, they identify several measures in need of instant implementation. These include the vigorous application of international sanctions, including the freezing of terrorist assets, increased information sharing among countries, and enhanced efforts by financial supervisors to guard against the abuse of the financial sector by terrorists (G7 Finance Ministers, 2001). Moreover, they call on all G7 members to create bodies to immediately implement such procedures. These include the creation of national Financial Intelligence Units (FIU), the creation of a terrorist asset tracking centre, and a call to join the Egmont Group, which is a body promoting cooperation between national FIU’s. Additionally, these efforts were to be implemented in conjunction with efforts by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a body created at the 1989 Paris summit to combat money laundering, to review its strategy, including a revision of the 40 FATF recommendations aimed at fighting terrorist financing (G7, 2001).

However, while the counter-terrorist methods remain the same in the post-September 11 G8 statements, they have not represented empty promises. In February 2002, the G7 finance ministers established their first progress report on the action plan, and the preliminary results were impressive. The report noted that over 200 countries and jurisdictions expressed a willingness to fight terrorism financing since September 11, and that 150 of those countries had already issued orders to freeze terrorist assets, resulting in the freezing of over US $100 million in assets (G7 Finance Ministers, 2002). Moreover, the progress report also noted that all members of the G7 were in the process of creating FIU’s, that the FATF had agreed on a set of recommendations on terrorist financing, and that the G8 was planning the creation of a collaborative framework for assessing compliance with international standards between the FATF, IMF, the World Bank (G7 Finance Ministers, 2002). This report remains to date the
G8’s most impressive achievement in the post-September 11 era. It remains important not only since it contributes to the current US-led war on terror, but also because its goals are long-term in nature, and not simply a quick fix response to this specific attack.

Overall, G7 treatment of terrorism has evolved dramatically from the 1978 Statement on Air Hijacking, which resulted from informal discussions between heads of state, to the G7 finance ministers 2001 Action Plan on the Combating of Terrorist Financing, which was created by finance ministers operating within an established G8 counter-terrorist machinery. Simple statements have become detailed declarations outlining various counter-terrorist strategies, and G8 counter-terrorism efforts have clearly shifted from a reactive to a proactive strategy aiming at the deterrence, prevention, and investigation of terrorist activities around the world. Finally, the G8 has moved from the fringes of the international fight against terrorism to the centre, aiming to provide the world with international leadership. Naturally, such evolutions in the treatment of terrorism, in a forum that was not conceived for such purposes, has created the need for the G8 to adapt, not only creating structures in which its discussions can become more ambitious and detailed, but also frameworks which can accommodate an increasing amount of actors and experts with the authority and expertise to devise efficient strategies.

G8 COUNTER-TERRORIST MACHINERY: A MULTI-LEVEL STRUCTURE

Traditionally, certain scholars have been hesitant to refer to the G7/8 summits as an international institution, as it lacks several of the key features which define modern day international institutions: a central secretariat, a central headquarters, and a constitution or formal agreement between international states (Hajnal, 1999: 1). However, while the summits began as informal gatherings of heads of state with no institutional structure and no apparatus to codify its agreements, over the years the G7/8 system has been gradually institutionalised, evolving into an elaborate multi-level system of meetings and conferences revolving around the summits themselves. The first level, representing the zenith of this system, is the summits themselves. The second level consists of a series of ministerial meetings. Finally, the third level is made up of the meetings between personal representatives and sherpas (Hajnal, 1999: 35). Terrorism has been no exception to this trend, and the G8 counter-terrorist machinery that has evolved closely resembles that of the overall three-tier summit structure itself.

The First Level: The Summits

Since 1978, informal discussions between heads of state have given away into year round discussions undertaken by experts, ministers, and the leaders themselves. As such, a web of actors with different levels of authority and expertise increasingly treats what began as an issue discussed by the leaders themselves. However, the summits remain at the apex of the G8 counter-terrorist machinery. While the G8 counter-terrorist machinery has gradually expanded into a multi-level structure, this evolution has been a top down process, in which the levels below the summits undertake the preparation and follow-up work of the official summit level. As the G8 increasingly deals with terrorism in all its complexity, and as the G8 fights international terrorism through a proactive strategy, commitments and agreements have become more technical and difficult to prepare, and as such the transfer of the
bulk of the work on terrorism to the lower levels of the G7/8 system can be seen a logical development. Nevertheless, the summits continue to play two key roles.

Firstly, the summits provide counter-terrorist statements and declarations with worldwide publicity, and provide the leaders with an opportunity to show solidarity and consensus on important issues. Increasingly followed in detail by the world’s media, the summits thus provide the G8 with a venue in which the world can take notice of its efforts. Furthermore, since terrorism thrives on the issue of publicity, and terrorist attacks make the headlines on a constant basis, it is important that the leaders themselves generate publicity and strongly state their desire to combat this threat publicly. Thus over the years the publicity generated by the summits has also been a perfect incentive to work out differences between states, and show the world that all members are united toward the same cause. In fact, since the early 1980s the G7 summits have been a forum in which the leaders have sought to achieve such a result, and they have often succeeded. The 1986 Tokyo declaration on terrorism was the culmination of months of preparations to forge a consensus between the Americans and the Europeans. The 1989 Paris Summit was a strong condemnation of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Additionally, the 1996 Lyon Summit became a terrorism summit as a result of an attack on US servicemen just weeks beforehand, and the subsequent desire of US President Bill Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac to use the summits as a platform for a strong and swift condemnation of the attack.

Secondly, the summits themselves unite heads of state that may not possess the expertise to fight terrorism, but who have the authority to ensure such agreements are implemented. As the G8 increasingly seeks to play a leadership role within the international community, and to find complicated and effective solutions to the threat of terrorism, such a role is vital. It is the heads of state that bring G8 commitments and agreements home, who sell the agreements to the public, and who ultimately decide whether the national governments will adhere to, and implement, international agreements that have been reached. Therefore, unlike the United Nations system, the G8 structure involves actors who ultimately decide on the success of the agreements, and who have the authority to influence both national governments and public opinion. Since they have attended the summits, and the work is thus a product of their efforts, they will moreover be more likely to want to see such agreements succeed.

Finally, the G8 possesses a unique advantage as opposed to other international institutions. This is the presence of heads of state at the apex of the summit structure. As such, while the G8 cannot command the same level of legitimacy as the United Nations, it is one of the only institutions in which the heads of state meet regularly, and directly influence the outcome of the discussions. It thus includes actors with both the authority and expertise to draft effective strategies, secure their implementation, and give an overall legitimacy to the organization’s efforts. Such characteristics are vital for any institution hoping to provide leadership in the international community.

*The Second Level: The Ministerial Meetings*

Since the technical nature of modern terrorism and its rapidly evolving nature are often beyond the grasp of heads of state, expertise within the G8 system has increasingly moved to the lower levels of the summit structure. Since 1995, the second level of this system has united finance, foreign, and interior and justice ministers in a series of preparatory meetings, culminating in annual ministerial meetings that meet a few weeks before the summits themselves. Increasingly, this
level is where the bulk of discussion on the issue of terrorism takes place, and where the comprehensive agreements and declarations are drafted. It is also the level where much of the preparatory work by the sherpa’s is discussed and adopted. However, in addition this level also serves as a bridge between the first and third levels of the G8 structure, taking the recommendations of the experts and translating these into statements and declarations that are subsequently adopted by the heads of state. Accordingly, the recent major advances of the G8 on terrorism, and the most detailed discussions, have occurred on the second level.

Because of the complexity of modern terrorism, finance and interior and justice ministers have joined the foreign ministers in fighting the terrorist threat. Since 1995 they have been responsible for several counter-terrorist documents, including the Ottawa Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, the Agreement on 25 Measures for Combating Terrorism, and more recently the Action Plan on Combating Terrorist Financing. Furthermore, while terrorism disappeared from the summit level itself between the 1999 Cologne Summit and the 2001 Genoa Summit, discussions on the issue of terrorism, as well as a review of the success of past initiatives, has been both constant and possible because of the ministerial meetings, where annual meetings have enabled the ministers to discuss several political issues at length, instead of narrowly focusing on one or two issues per year.

Since G8 strategy involves a wide range of deterrent and preventive measures, each of the ministers have helped draft comprehensive documents in specific roles. The foreign ministers, for example, have dealt with the political aspects of terrorism, as well as issues of international cooperation such as with the United Nations. For their part, finance ministers have been active in attacking terrorist financing, as evidenced by the Action Plan on Combating Terrorist Financing from October 2001. Finally, since the G8 fights terrorism within the framework of international law, and since the international community has needed over the years to harmonize national legislation on such issues as extradition, interior and justice ministers have increasingly played an important role on the legal aspects of fighting terrorism.

**The Third Level: G8 Experts and Conferences**

On the third level of the G8 system are a series of experts meetings and counter-terrorist conferences uniting some of the world’s top counter-terrorist experts. While these meetings and conferences issue no press releases, hold no press conferences, and result in no official documents, their work occurs in close relation to the summit cycle, with meetings usually taking place before the foreign, finance, and interior and justice ministerial meetings. Since 1997, these meetings have been occurring on a regular annual basis, but their history goes back much farther.

In 1986 the Tokyo Summit created the first G7 Counter-Terrorist expert group, which subsequently became the G8 Counter-Terrorism Expert Meetings after the 1996 Paris Ministerial conference. Since 1996, this Counter-Terrorism group has met four times: Washington D.C (April 14-15, 1997), London (March 5-6, 1998), Berlin (November 17-18, 1999), and Rome (March 7-9, 2001). At these meetings, experts provide the summits with a wide range of services, including developing new strategies, identifying past policy failures, and working out the feasibility of potential initiatives. As the complex causes behind modern terrorism increase, and as threats such as bioterrorism and cyberterrorism increase, such expertise is a vital addition to the G8 counter-terrorist structure.
However, besides the Counter-Terrorist group, there are several other conferences and meetings that round out this level of the G8 machinery, and provide the G8 with more expertise as well as the chance to enter into even more detailed discussions. In 1996, the G8 created a Counter-Terrorist Directory of Skills and Competencies, chaired by Great Britain, which still exists today (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2000). In the same year, the G7 and Russia met in Washington D.C. to discuss matters of land transportation security, with Russia hosting a conference on nuclear safety issues later that year. This was followed in 1998 with Britain hosting a workshop on the prevention of hostage-taking, which had the task of establishing several ‘best practice’ techniques to combat hostage-taking in line with G8 principles – saving the lives of all hostages, opposing concessions to terrorists, and upholding the rule of law (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2000). Finally, in 1999 the G8 held a comprehensive G8 Counter-Terrorist Conference in Berlin.

Overall, this top-down multi-level counter-terrorist structure does not resemble the elaborate United Nations counter-terrorist machinery. However, it has gradually evolved into a unique structure involving actors with both the authority to get agreements implemented and the power to win publicity for the issues, as well as experts with the expertise to draft documents at the forefront of current international counter-terrorist efforts. On the whole this has allowed the G8 to evolve into a forum producing ambitious, comprehensive, and detailed counter-terrorist agreements that have produced effective results such as the Ottawa and Paris ministerial declarations on terrorism. It has also allowed the G8 to engage in year round efforts against terrorist threats, as well as to explore a series of issues that attempt to defeat terrorism at its roots. Along with the characteristics of the summits themselves, this has had important impacts on the effectiveness of the G8 on this issue.

THE CAUSES OF G8 EFFECTIVENESS

Common criticisms of the G8 include its limited membership (Jayawardena, 1989; Ul Haq, 1994), its inability to lead on the issues it was created to solve (Smyser, 1993; Bergsten and Henning, 1996; Baker, 2000), and its inability to codify agreements and discussions that deprive its achievements of a legal basis (Baker, 2000). While all these criticisms are valid, and must be taken into account when assessing the prospects for effective G8 governance on all economic and political issues, none of them, however, have prevented the G8 from playing an important role in past international efforts at fighting terrorism. In fact, the G8 has also shown that it possesses certain attributes and structural features that allow it to act as effectively, if not more effectively, than other international institutions such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As Antholis notes, ‘(the G8’s) small size and the homogenous nature of its members’ political and economic systems makes it significantly more likely to lead on global issues than most international gatherings” (Antholis, 2001: 22). Accordingly, having traced the history of terrorism at the summits, as well as the gradual development of an extensive G8 counter-terrorist machinery, this section will demonstrate the factors that have enabled the G8 to contribute and occasionally lead international efforts against terrorism.
Mutual Vulnerability

The main cause for effective and sustained G8 action on this issue has been the mutual vulnerability of G8 members to international terrorism. The G8 is unique in the fact that it is a grouping of influential democracies that for the most part remain the main targets of international terrorism. For example, the United States State department reports that in 1999 US interests were attacked 169 times alone (US State Department, 1999), while for their part Japan was the victim of not only a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, but also of a hostage situation at its embassy in Lima, Peru in 1996. Such incidents of domestic and international terrorist attacks have directly affected all the nations involved in the summits, and as such all G8 members have found that discussing terrorism at the summits, and fostering high levels of international cooperation on an issue that threatens them all, is in their national interest.

This mutual vulnerability to a transnational threat that can exploit the open and democratic nature of their societies has thus given the G8 a large incentive to prevent terrorism, and accordingly the summits have often served as the venue to engage in such efforts. In fact, since 1975 the G7/8 have produced 31 commitments relating to terrorism. This can be attributed to the fact that as a grouping of nations sharing common principles and similar national interests, the G7/8 has often proven to be one of the most effective international bodies through which to overcome small differences, engage in productive discussions on developing new strategies, and start the process of forging an international consensus. As Kirton notes, common principles facilitate a large number of factors that allow the G8 to act effectively and rapidly including: 1) ease of communication; 2) rapid consensus formation and cooperation; and 3) core reference points and theories that point to specific forms coordination policies should take (Kirton, 1998: 65). Overall, many factors point to effective G8 action in light of this mutual vulnerability.

One measure of its importance has been the willingness of all G8 members to lead on this issue. As the main target of international terrorism, the United States has actively sought to fight terrorism within the G8. Traditionally sceptical of international institutions, and especially the United Nations, the United States has often found the summits, however, as the forum in which to settle differences with allies, and build international consensus on fighting international terrorism. This has been most often the case in times of crisis response and after high profile attacks against United States nationals or interests, especially in 1986 against Libya, and after the 1996 attack on United States servicemen in Saudi Arabia that left 19 Americans dead. As such, the Americans were instrumental in making terrorism a major concern of the two summits in which it figured prominently: Tokyo 1986 and Lyon 1996. However, other G8 members have also been keen to lead. It was Germany that originally brought terrorism to the agenda in 1978, and sought to use the summits to build an international coalition against air hijacking. Moreover, it is interesting to note that German leadership on this issue succeeded because in light of their respective troubles with domestic terrorist incidents in the 1970s, all G7 members all found it in their interest to act on this issue (Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 87). Thus it is no surprise that initiatives have also come from the weaker members. Under Margaret Thatcher, the United Kingdom was instrumental in drafting the 1984 London declaration on terrorism, and it was a British initiative in 1996 that created the G7/8 Counter-Terrorist Directory of Skills and Competencies. Canada, for their part, was the first
G7 member to bring experts to the summits to help draft more comprehensive documents on this issue. This was the case as early as 1978.

An additional measure of such G8 commitment has been the annual compliance reports that have been undertaken since the mid-1990s by the G8 Research Group. Compliance scores quantify commitments made at the summits, and measure the extent to which such commitments are fulfilled (Kokotsis and Daniels, 1998: 77). G8 members score +1 for full compliance with a commitment, 0 for no action taken on a commitment, and –1 for implementing policies that contradict the commitment in question. In recent years, compliance scores have proven to be a vital source of information measuring the extent to which G8 action has mattered, and how effectively G8 members have implemented commitments. On the issue of terrorism, it is interesting to note that while commitments in the communiqués have become more ambitious, compliance scores have not decreased. On the contrary, when terrorism has been an issue area at the summits, its compliance scores have consistently been above average. In a 1996 study undertaken after the Lyon ‘terrorism’ Summit, all the G7 members with the exception of the United Kingdom scored +1 on terrorism, indicating their full compliance with the previous years commitments (G8 Research Group, 1996). The following year, after the adoption of six measures against terrorism by the foreign ministers, as an issue area terrorism performed extremely well at the Denver Summit, scoring above the average issue score of 0.36 with a score of 0.71 (out of a scale of 1), with only the issue areas of conflict in Europe and human rights scoring better (G8 Research Group, 1998). This trend continued in a study before the Cologne Summit in 1999, where all G8 members scored +1 (G8 Research Group, 1999). Overall from 1996 to 2000, terrorism receives an average score of 0.71 in compliance reports, which is twice the average score of 0.36 for all issues areas (Kokotsis and Daniels, 1998: 77). Moreover, when one looks at the results of the Von Furstenburg/Daniels compliance study that scored 209 commitments from the first 15 summits, terrorism scores twice as well as the average once again. In the Von Furstenburg/Daniels study, the average score for an issue area was 0.317, indicating that only one third of the commitments on all issues were respected by G7 members (Kokotsis and Daniels, 1998: 77). Therefore in a comparative perspective, terrorism appears to be one of the issue areas which have mattered most to the summit participants, and which has yielded impressive results.

The scale of G7 summit achievements originally compiled by Putnam and Bayne confirms such an analysis. According to their analysis as well as Bayne’s revised scores in his most recent work on the G8, Hanging in There: The G7 and G8 Summits in Maturity and Renewal, terrorism once again performs well. On these scales, where summits are graded from A to F (A indicating a very successful summit, and F indicating a total failure), and where the grades measure the overall success of the summits and the scale of their achievements, terrorism once again scores well. When one looks at summits where terrorism figured prominently, the scores remain above average for the G8 as a whole. For example the two major terrorism summits, Tokyo 1986 and Lyon 1996, score B+ and B respectively (Bayne, 2000: 195). Other summits where terrorism figured in the discussions, and where terrorism declarations were issued, generally follow this trend as well. Bonn 1978, where terrorism broke onto the agenda, is the only summit to score an A (albeit for the most part due to economic issues), while the 1989 Paris summit scores a B+. In fact, the only summits which score below average where a terrorism declaration or statement was issued are Venice 1987 and Houston 1990, which due to their overall ineffectiveness both score a D. Overall out of the 25 summits scored on this scale, 11 summits score below or at
a C. As keen observers of all the summits since their inception, Putnam and Bayne’s grading scales of summit achievements are a good measuring tool for the overall effectiveness of each summit. Therefore the fact that summits that include terrorism are generally deemed to be summits having achieved a degree of success indicates that when the summits tackle the issue of terrorism, the results are generally positive.

Therefore an analysis of various grading scales of summit achievements and G8 member actions point to an association between successful summits and those where terrorism figured on the agenda. While terrorism is not the only reason for the success of summits such as Tokyo 1986 and Lyon 1996, it was nonetheless a contributing factor. Therefore, this partially confirms that mutual vulnerability to the terrorist threat has enabled the G8 to act effectively on this issue. However, besides past G8 efforts leading to the adoption of UN international conventions on terrorism and other notable international achievements, this can also be demonstrated by the impetus to act shown by all G8 members, and their commitment to seeing such actions result in more than mere political statements. As such, the G8 has been effective since all nations have found it useful to not only bring terrorism to the G8 agenda, but also to implement the commitments resulting from these discussions.

G8 Summit Structure: Comprehensive but Flexible

G8 summits are also characterized by a flexible but developed institutional structure, which has often proven to enable major initiatives against terrorism to emerge. While the summits can be still be characterized by light levels of institutionalisation vis-à-vis other international institutions, the G8 has also developed a comprehensive counter-terrorist structure. Along with an expanding agenda, these structural features have allowed not only for effective and rapid response, but also to establish cross-issue linkages vital to fighting a complex phenomenon such as terrorism. Since the summits have no fixed agenda, terrorism has often benefited from discussions on a wide range of topics with direct relevance to terrorist activities: drug trafficking, international crime, and money laundering to name a few. Moreover, a flexible summit agenda has allowed for shifts in direction, often enabling terrorism to unexpectedly break onto the agenda. In fact, the two summits in which terrorism figured most prominently, Tokyo 1986 and Lyon 1996, terrorism was not originally expected to figure significantly in summit discussions. However, in light of terrorist attacks before these summits, terrorism became a late addition to the agenda. In fact, the two summits in which terrorism figured most prominently, Tokyo 1986 and Lyon 1996, terrorism was not originally expected to figure significantly in summit discussions. However, in light of terrorist attacks before these summits, terrorism became a late addition to the agenda, and the G7 was able to produce impressive results such as the creation of the first G7 terrorist experts group, and the Agreement on 25 Measures against terrorism from the Paris ministerial conference. On an issue such as terrorism, where major attacks are unexpected, this has both improved G8 response time, and resulted in unexpected advances on the issue. As Joe Clark, former summit participant and Prime Minister of Canada, noted about the structure of the summits:

Summits are extremely constructive. They focus the attention of governments and leaders and often allow breakthroughs that would not occur in a more cumbersome traditional system. Precisely because heads of government are so busy now, they can become locked into patterns of dealing with the most urgent issues and with the most familiar allies. Summits free leaders of those patterns and allow a wider experience of international issues and a real opportunity for initiative and cooperation. They rescue multilateralism from its inherent bureaucracy and caution (Hajnal, 1999: 6).
Scholars and leaders have often criticized this flexible yet developed summit structure as going against the unique informal character of the G8. However, on the issue of terrorism this has also allowed for a constant review of G8 strategy, especially through an increasing capability to establish cross-issue linkages (Kirton, 1998: 65). Since terrorism is a constantly evolving threat, and as such counter-terrorist methods are only as good as the next development in terrorist methods, the developed G8 system with multiple actors treating multiple issues in an informal structure has proven beneficial. Here one can compare G7 treatment in 1978 and 1996. In 1978, the summits only dealt with economic issues and discussions remained with heads of state. As such, Putnam and Bayne note that it took the G7 three years to implement the provisions of the Statement on Air Hijacking, since meetings had to be convened through representatives and sherpas to work out the details of the document (Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 87). However, by 1996 a developed G7 structure was in place and able to respond and condemn a terrorist attack one month after it happened. At the Lyon summit, the leaders not only condemned the attack, but convened an additional meeting a mere month later to deal with the issue at length. The result of this meeting, which involved the foreign ministers, was the Agreement on 25 Measures for Combating Terrorism. Therefore in two months, the G7 was able to act both effectively and forcefully, and thus proved it possessed a capability it hadn’t developed 18 years earlier.

Moreover, analysis of this document, as well as all recent G8 counter-terrorist efforts, reveals notable contributions of several actors in the G8 system dealing with different issues. For example, the Paris ministerial declaration contains a variety of provisions ranging from national legal loopholes to methods of terrorist financing (G7, 1996). Benefiting from the treatment of terrorism through finance, foreign, and interior and justice ministers, the G8 has thus been able to link actors and issues. This has proven especially beneficial as terrorists have become increasing apt at devising new methods to carry out their attacks, as well as new avenues through which to prepare such attacks.

The G8 reaction to the September 11 attacks is another case in point of this ability to combine efforts on several issues. Since September, the G8 has adopted a strategy attacking terrorism at its roots, with the issue of terrorist financing being the first topic. By summoning the G7 finance ministers to the task of fighting terrorist financing, as well as bodies not created to deal with terrorism such as the FATF, the G8 has successfully incorporated actors into its counter-terrorist efforts who bring knowledge and expertise from other fields. In 1978, the G7 would have been hard pressed to make cross-issue linkages of this sort. As such the G8 can now adopt a more balanced and comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy thanks to a structure that is both developed and flexible, involving a multitude of actors allowing cross-issue linkages. When one examines other international institutions, with the exception of the United Nations, it is not possible to establish cross-issue linkages with as much ease as within the G8 summit structure.

Mutual Reinforcement with International and Regional Institutions

However, if the G8 has been effective against terrorism this is also due in no small part to its insistence on a relationship of mutual reinforcement with other international and regional institutions, most notably the United Nations. As has already been noted, a limited membership and no bureaucratic apparatus to codify its agreements handicap the G8. However, the G8 has been able to overcome such a
hurdle through sustained international cooperation with many institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations, combining G8 uniqueness with their expertise and resources to engage in a mutually beneficial relationship. Since consensus formation has often been the weak point of the UN, the G8 has often been successful at what Putnam and Bayne call a “parallel treatment” of issues. They argue that the G8 is a venue well suited to act in the “administrative discretion in collective management”, or put otherwise the summits are great venues for information exchange by a small grouping acting in the core of a larger grouping of institutions. This allows it to act as a catalyst for international efforts, and pass the subsequent efforts down to competent international institutions (Putnam and Bayne, 1987: 157). As Bayne notes, “one vision of the summits is making a unique contribution each year by providing leadership and agreed decisions, and then handing down decisions and recommendations to competent international institutions” (Bayne, 2000: 200).

Most prominent in such a relationship has been the United Nations. Dating back to 1963, the United Nations has built up the most comprehensive counter-terrorism network of any international institution, with the UN Security Council (UNSC), the General Assembly, and a series of specialized agencies ranging from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to the Counter-Terrorism Office in Vienna engaged in such efforts. The UN system helps G8 efforts in several ways. Not only does it have more experience than any other institution, but also its developed system has been most capable of implementing international counter-terrorist directives. Unfortunately, two major features have traditionally handicapped the UN: its universal membership, which has made even defining the term in the General Assembly an impossible task, and the Cold War, which froze the Security Council for several decades, prompting a few scholars to argue that “the United Nations is not the best form for cooperation against terrorism” (Crenshaw, 1989: 27).

However, such is not the case in today’s world, and both the G8 and the UN possess the capabilities to lead international efforts against terrorism. With both institutions recognizing such a reality, G8/UN cooperation already has a long history. Dating back to G7 statements on air hijacking in the late 1970s, the G7 was already calling on the ICAO to implement its directives by the early 1980s, especially in the declarations on terrorism in 1984 and 1987. Initially such cooperation proved very positive. As Cindy Combs notes, in 1984 such international cooperation brought air and sea hijackings from one of the most favoured forms of terrorist activity to only 0.7% of all terrorist attacks in 1993 (Combs, 1997: 225). Moreover, the UN has been vital in adopting international frameworks against terrorism, most notably the 12 international counter-terrorism conventions, which have been open to signature and ratification by all members of the UN. The 12th convention, the UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, grew out of a French initiative at the summits, and is a perfect case in point of G8/UN cooperation. While the G8 was the form in which the discussions yielded the initiative, it was able to pass the recommendation down to the UN, whose ability to codify the agreement was instrumental in making this G8 initiative an integral part of international law.

G8 members remain members of regional organizations as well, and are often the most powerful members within those groupings. As such, their efforts and recommendations have also been passed along to these institutions. While the European Union is an observer at the summits, and thus is directly involved in the discussions and meetings of the G8 system, other organizations have used G8 initiatives to establish their own counter-terrorist standards. The most notable example of this is the Organization of American States (OAS). In 1995 the OAS
built upon the measures of the Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Terrorism to establish the creation of an Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) (CSIS, 1998), as well as fight terrorism in the western hemisphere through the Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism. This document adopted several measures ranging from extradition treaties to international legal exchange of information. Such a relationship of reinforcement has also been present in Asia, where Japan has worked closely with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the mid-1990s. In 1997, Japan discussed counter-terrorism measures in Asia in the joint Japan-ASEAN counter-terrorist conference in October, which explored ways of strengthening cooperation between the regional bloc and the Asian superpower. These efforts were followed up by an Asia-Latin America Counterterrorism conference in 1998 and a Asia-Middle East counter-terrorist conference in 1999 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2000). At these conferences participants exchanged information on counter-terrorism measures, and pledged to enhance regional efforts. Most recently, the G8’s newest member, Russia, has also been keen to discuss terrorism at the regional level, recently calling for “an effective dialogue and cooperation by countries in the Asia-Pacific region in the bilateral format, or within the framework of organizations such as ASEAN” (Itar-Tass, 2002).

Thus the G8 fight against terrorism has not proceeded in isolation from other potential allies on the international stage. On the contrary, the G8 has successfully combined its desire to lead international efforts with a realism that such a task can only be achieved by cooperating with other international fora such as the United Nations and regional organizations such as the OAS and ASEAN. The result has been a parallel treatment of terrorism, with the G8 often serving as the catalyst for new international agreements, and the United Nations and the IMF serving as the bodies that implement such strategies. As such, each international actor has been able to mutually reinforce other institutions at the international level, and the result has been the adoption of new initiatives through strong international cooperation. Along with the mutual vulnerability of the G8 members to international terrorism, and the comprehensive but flexible G8 summit structure, this has been a major reason behind an overall positive treatment of terrorism by the G8 since the 1978 Bonn summit.

CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of summitry, the fight against terrorism has required a constant evolution in counter-terrorist methods, a constant evaluation of new emerging threats, and increasing amounts of cooperation in previously unrelated fields. It has been a battle that has required action at the national and international levels, as well as a fight requiring cooperation and coordination between diverse actors and institutions. Overall, the task of fighting terrorism has been a virtual non-stop exercise in testing the capability of the G7/8 in contributing to global governance on a transnational issue. However, the G7/8 has not shied away from this task, and in the face of such a challenge has generally proven to be an effective international performer.

Despite an early treatment of terrorism that was initially reactive and not overly ambitious, G7/8 effectiveness was evident by the 1980s, which saw the G7 move from a reactive to a proactive policy toward terrorism, and the first signs of an evolving G7 counter-terrorist machinery started to take form. It was in the 1990s that such an evolution was confirmed, as the expansion of the agenda and the increasing
number of G8 actors involved in the fight against terrorism allowed the G8 to treat the issue in all its complexity. Overall, G7/8 performance progressed through several stages, and G8 treatment progressively became more ambitious and effective.

This was achieved through a double strategy. On the one hand, the G8 has consistently looked to create new strategies and frameworks through which to fight the evolving terrorist threat. Examples of such achievements include the Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Terrorism (1995) and the Agreement on 25 Measures for Combating Terrorism (1996), two of the most comprehensive counter-terrorist documents in the world today. On the other hand, G8 efforts have focused on forging an international consensus and cooperating with other international institutions. Accordingly, over the years the G8 has forged important relationships with the United Nations and other international institutions, and this cooperation has often served as a catalyst for effective international action against terrorism. A recent case in point was the adoption by the United Nations of a 12th international counter-terrorism convention against terrorist financing, which was the result of a French initiative at the Denver Summit.

However, the G8 has also been able to act effectively because of the construction of a G8 counter-terrorist machinery that has allowed the G8 to treat terrorism year-round, involve a multitude of actors functioning on different levels of the multi-level structure, and enter into more ambitious and detailed discussions. At the top of this structure are the summits themselves, where leaders provide the publicity and authority to make agreements succeed. In the middle are the various ministerial meetings, where the foreign, finance, and interior and justice ministers meet annually before the summits to engage in the most detailed discussions and come up with the most important counter-terrorist agreements. Finally, at the base of the G8 counter-terrorist machinery is a growing web of expert meetings and counter-terrorist conferences, uniting some of the world’s top experts to deal with a threat increasingly too complicated for the heads of state themselves. Together, this multi-level structure affords the G8 stronger capabilities for effective preparation and follow-up work. As such, it has been another source of G7/8 effectiveness over the years.

Finally, G8 effectiveness is also due to a variety of additional attributes of the G8 structure, and to characteristics of the G8 counter-terrorist strategy that have been able to overshadow some of the G8’s inherent weaknesses. Able to overcome a limited membership and inability to codify its documents, the G8 has acted effectively due to three major factors: 1) the mutual vulnerability to international terrorism of all its members, which incites the G8 to constantly bring terrorism to the agenda and find solutions that can build an international consensus; 2) the developed but flexible G8 summit structure, that allows the G8 to treat terrorism rapidly and effectively, while simultaneously to include a multitude of actors with expertise on a multitude of issues; and 3) a relationship of mutual reinforcement with international institutions such as the UN and regional institutions such as the OAS, that has allowed the G8 to engage in high levels of international cooperation, and exploit the advantages that each institution brings to the international fight against terrorism. Along with the evolving strategy of the summits and the evolving counter-terrorist machinery, these structural features have equipped the G8 with the necessary tools to act effectively on the terrorist issue. As such, the overall prospects for future effective action by the G8 in the new millennium appear positive.

However, if the G8 has failed in one major respect, this would be its tendency to follow up years of impressive results with complete inactivity on this issue.
Whether it was during the late 1980s or the late 1990s, the G8 has often reverted back to simple statements instead of devoting energy to the creation of new action plans. This has often prevented the G8 from building on past efforts, and contradicts the key to a successful counter-terrorist strategy, which is the recurrent treatment of an ever-evolving threat existing in all corners of the world at all times. However, for the first time since the Lyon Summit in 1996, terrorism has already been identified as a key topic of the Kananaskis summit agenda (Government of Canada, 2002). Therefore as Kananaskis looms, the G8 stands at a new crossroads. Over the next decade it will be imperative to review past counter-terrorist strategies while simultaneously devising new ways of fighting the modern terrorist threat. The G8 will have to devote much time in achieving such a task. As such, Kananaskis will most likely represent the first summit in a series of summits in which the G8 tackles terrorism in all its forms.

Moreover, it will also most likely represent the start of a new test of the G8’s effectiveness on this issue, and its ability to devise new strategies that provide effective global governance. Therefore, with the events of September 11 fresh in the minds of the world, it is likely that Kananaskis represents the most pivotal terrorism summit in the history of the G8. It is here that the G8 will not only have to show the world once again that it is committed to fighting terrorism in all its forms, but also where it must show that such a commitment can be both innovative and consistent. Thus the question remains how devoted the G8 will remain to defeating the terrorist threat in the upcoming decades. In the post September 11 climate Kananaskis represents a golden opportunity for the G8 to start a process in which it continues to play a leading international role on this issue for decades to come. Kananaskis will be our first indication if the G8 is willing to seize this opportunity or not.
Notes

2 When terrorism first entered the summit agenda, the summits were referred to as the G7. However since that time Russia has become a full member, and the name has been changed to the G8. Therefore this paper will refer to the summits as the G7 before Russia’s achievement of full membership (Denver 1997), and to the G8 since that time.
3 It is worth noting that 51% of these attacks, or 178 attacks, occurred in Colombia, and were bombings of multinational oil pipelines. In the year 2000, 40% of the 426 terrorist attacks were also oil pipeline bombings in Colombia. For more information, see ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001’. 2002a. Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html> Accessed May 26, 2002.
4 The G20 is a forum for consensus building and dialogue on economic and financial policy issues. It was formally created at the 1999 G7 finance ministers meeting, and consists of finance ministers and central bank governors from 20 countries. These include the G7 members plus a wide range of developed and developing economies from around the world. These members are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. For more information on the G20, see John Kirton, ‘What is the G20?’. 1999a. Available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g7/g20/g20whatisit.html> Accessed February 20, 2002.
5 The United States maintained economic sanctions against Libya for their suspected involvement in the series of airport bombings in Rome and Vienna that killed four American civilians, and conducted a series of retaliatory strikes after the bombing of a Berlin discotheque in which an American serviceman was killed. Libya was once again suspected of involvement in that attack.
6 Since 1963 the UN has developed a wide range of international legal agreements that enable the international community to take action to suppress terrorism, forge an international united front, and bring terrorist groups to justice. The most prominent of these are the 12 International Conventions Against Terrorism. For a full list of these conventions, see United Nations. “United Nations Treaty Collection: Conventions on Terrorism”. 2002a. Available at <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp> Accessed April 17, 2002.
7 Bill Clinton made terrorism a major topic of the Lyon summit after 19 US servicemen were killed in a terrorist attack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia two weeks before the summit began.
8 While a full member of the summits, and of foreign and interior and justice minister meetings, Russia has yet to become a member of the finance ministers meetings, and as such it is still referred to as the G7 finance ministers.
9 The complete list of meetings is available at <www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/terrorism>. Accessed February 26, 2002.
11 For example France suffered a series of air hijackings and bombings on suburban Paris trains in the mid-1990s at the hands of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Canada was a victim of kidnappings and bombings from the separatist Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) in the 1970s, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has often resorted to bombings on British soil to express their goal of separating Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom.
13 The original scale of G7 summit achievements appeared in the 1987 work by Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict at the Seven Power Summits, p.270. For his 1999 book, Bayne revised the scores, taking into account summit achievements that were not evident at the time of the original study.
14 An in-depth explanation of John Kirton’s ‘Concert Equality Model’ of G8 governance can be found in Kirton, John J., ‘Explaining G8 Effectiveness’ in Kirton, John J., and Joseph P. Daniels (eds), The Role of the G8 in the New Millennium, Ashgate (Aldershot, 1998), pp.45-69
15 Of the G8 members, Canada and the United States are members of the OAS, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are members of the European Union, and Canada, Japan, and the United States are members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). Japan is also a close observer of the Association of South Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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Thus as the 21st century begins, terrorism is a global problem representing “the greatest threat to peace and stability in the 21st century” (Combs, 1997: 1). Over the years numerous actors in the international community have undertaken efforts to both deter and prevent terrorist attacks. As Cindy Combs notes, in 1984 such international cooperation brought air and sea hijackings from one of the most favoured forms of terrorist activity to only 0.7% of all terrorist attacks in 1993 (Combs, 1997: 225). Overall, it will be shown that the G8 has traditionally played a constructive role in international efforts against terrorism, and that such a role may well continue into the 21st century. View. Show abstract. No nation can disengage itself from the efforts to combat terrorism. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Start by marking “Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century” as Want to Read: Want to Read saving… Want to Read. In essence, this study reviews a full G8 cycle. The analytical framework rests on three general summit objectives: political leadership, reconciling international/domestic and collective management, and six subjec Following on from Hanging in There, this comprehensive volume empirically covers the summits from the UK meeting in Birmingham in 1998 to the UK meeting in 2005. In essence, this study reviews a full G8 cycle. Furthermore, terrorism was to some extent a last resort for Algerians who were consistently refused real political influence or power over their country. Their aim was clear and their methods “while highly objectionable” were coherent and connected to their aim. In the second case I will examine the conflict in Afghanistan from 1979, what many analysts believe is the genesis of the new terrorism. While issues raised by this very long conflict began with the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, which provoked a somewhat traditional form of terrorism in the form of freedom fighters and guerrillas, as in the Algerian in the 1950s, the form of resistance morphed dramatically by the 1990s and into the 2000s.