

The Social Genesis of ANZAC Nationalism

Barry Morris

School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Newcastle University

In *Legends of People, Myths of State (Legends)*, Kapferer describes ANZAC Day ceremonies as expressing a People versus State dynamic. The ethnography is based on the rites performed at the state capitals. My concern here is with the socio-historical evolution of the rite especially in the contexts of the small communities and the processes whereby it became systematized into the kind of state ceremonial upon which Kapferer concentrates. I will take up the matter of the internal structure of the rite that Kapferer outlines and explore its changing significance. In particular I discuss the rite as one in which the People/State dynamic that Kapferer explores has become increasingly a device of what Deleuze and Guattari describe as an “apparatus of capture” of state control. The intimations of popular opposition, if not resistance, to the state and certainly a critique of the authority and orders of the state – indicated in the differentiated historical evolution of ANZAC ceremonial – is not only progressively suppressed in the rites at the state capitals but is converted into an artifice for the celebration of state power. In other words, dimensions of the dynamic that Kapferer explores are in part a product of the increasingly state ceremonialization of the rite, which has the effect of subduing the critique of the state that was once more integral to the rites. In this a vital playful and subversive element of ANZAC ritual, for example, the gambling game Two-Up, once deemed illegal, is now officially authorized and condoned by state sanction. Furthermore, the formal military presence of the state is now overwhelmingly marked. This is in contrast to the emphasis in the rite which until recently expressed the informality of an essentially citizen volunteer force which could act effectively independently of the hierarchy and rule of the formal state/military order. This has intensified in the twenty years since the first publication of *Legends*.

Central in Kapferer’s argument is that ANZAC ceremonial is a particular historically developed expression of what he describes as egalitarian/individualist ideology. In this regard, ANZAC has significance as a specific variant in the broader sweep of nationalism as this was especially evident in Europe and North America and is important for a discussion of contemporary developments in individualist thought

* I would like to acknowledge the assistance and inspiration Bruce Kapferer provided me in the development of this study.

and practice. A key thesis of Kapferer's argument is that inherent in individualist/egalitarianism is a tension towards its opposite, inegalitarian hierarchy, which is a dimension of the people versus state dynamic of ANZAC ceremonial that he detects. While this may be a potential its realization is through historical processes which I address. His analysis extends from the work of the anthropologist Louis Dumont, who discusses the historical development in largely European and North American contexts of the centrality of the *individual as value* (Dumont, 1977). By this he argues that the idea of the individual receives socio-cultural value as the fundamental unit and generative root of the social.

Dumont's key point is that the empirical fact that societies are made up of individuals should not be confused with notions of the individual as value which is a thoroughgoing historically produced cultural and social construction. It is trivially true to state that groups and societies are composed of individuals. This is empirically observable everywhere. But it is something else to give the individual human being foundational value and to encompass it with other values of worth such as autonomy, generative potency, independence. It is as a value that individualism has social consequence and effect and for this reason it and the other values that frequently surround it, particularly notions of autonomy, independence, require detailed investigation. For Dumont, this is relatively recent historically and there are major human populations elsewhere who do not cleave to such views insisting on other values as integral to the formation and production of social relations and orders. ANZAC achieves significance in Kapferer's analysis in this sense, the domain of ANZAC ceremonial giving heightened attention to the individual as value and in its nationalism achieving significance in relation to a variety of other modern nationalist movements where individualism also plays a major role, if often distinctive. Dumont's argument stresses the assumption of the universality of such value is itself a social and cultural value that is historically recent and emerges where an ideological worth is placed on the individual as being at the generative core of the social. An intense commitment to such a value, especially in the religiosity of much contemporary nationalism, is more than ideological in Kapferer's understanding and is virtually ontological.

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ANZAC Revisited

Following the Great War, ANZAC Day commemorations provided a focal point for Australian nationalism rather than the day of the formal Independence of Australia from Britain at the time of the Federation of Australian states in 1901. The Citizen rather than the State receives ceremonial attention.¹ It was propelled in the outburst of nationalist sentiment following the catastrophe of loss and suffering born of the Great War as a whole, which found its most poignant expression in a singular event, that of the Gallipoli landings in the Dardanelles, the first major engagement of Australian troops in the First World War. ANZAC Day commemorates the landing of the combined Australian and New Zealand troops at Gallipoli on April 25th, 1915 at 4.30am.

My focus here on *Legends* is concerned with ANZAC nationalism and its commemorations and to follow Kapferer's argument that is far more than a rite of commemoration. Kapferer has stressed the sacrificial structure of the rite and through the suffering of death the nation is born. In effect, each event of commemoration is dynamic and in this it is not a stable structure. The narratives of ANZAC are explored here in terms of a commemorative ritual. In this respect, I am interested in the parallels ANZAC nationalism has with religious thought. As Kapferer has put it, 'nationalism makes the political religious and places the nation above politics (1988:1). In effect, he argues that what is revealed in nationalism is the passionate nature of secularism that is religious in its intensity. *Legend's* situates itself as an anthropological study of nations and nationalism and the vital importance of notions of culture to nationalism, or perhaps, more accurately, the ideological force of culture in nationalism. It is in part, a cultural process of collective identity formation. Kapferer's analysis renders culture problematic rather than 'natural'. The force of nationalist cultural constructions as ideology is in their naturalization of ideas that are rooted in particular historical processes. Thus the nationalist ideology of ANZAC as cultural/historical construct asserts that individualist egalitarian value is grounded in nature. This ideological value is a specific historical example of similar if variant arguments of nationalism elsewhere and broadly associated with modernist ideologies largely emergent in Europe and America. For Kapferer (1988) the myths of ANZAC

¹ The *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act* (UK) passed by the British Parliament on 5th July, 1900, provided the guidelines for Australian Federation. On the 1st January, 1901, Australia officially became a nation and the first Commonwealth Parliament met in Melbourne on 9th May, 1901.

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were analysed as extolling an egalitarian/individualist thesis. The rite was structured in the state/people opposition.

My specific aim here is to consider aspects of the social scaffolding of ANZAC nationalism as well as the social meanings that sustained it as a major commemorative ceremony in Australia becoming the central rite of Australian national identity. ANZAC draws from its social and political contexts and simultaneously transcends them or turns back on them overcoming dimensions of its local world that could always be threatening of the state. ANZAC occurred as an historical event, but does not have, as many historical accounts assume, some fixed interior meaning to be discovered. It does have an internal logic that is always capable of achieving new meaning or at particular moments becoming suppressed. In this, I expand on Kaferer's notion of the ontological as a particular schema of orientation that realizes new meaning in the course of historical processes. ANZAC, of course, is not one thing as it develops in various state capitals, it develops one way in Melbourne as distinct from Sydney along with its local variations in the country towns. ANZAC emerges from changing assemblages of social practices that connect to give it meaning and social force. There is, in effect, a continual reinvention of ANZAC and new directions of its logic. ANZAC is far more than a commemorative ritual, it is a creative and generative space: an event always opening up to new potential.

The current social analysis is critically informed by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *a thousand plateaus* (1987), which asserts that meaning and value are constituted through assemblages, that is, through the contingent and non-centred arrangements of social elements. The component parts of such assemblages retain degrees of autonomy and may detach from them to become part of other assemblages or become incorporated into larger assemblages. More importantly, the emphasis is upon the intertwining of processes that stabilise emerging identities, focussing on unification and homogenisation, while others may destabilise them, opening up the assemblage to change. It is what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have characterised as rhizomic and open ended in an approach that 'stresses dynamics over form' (see Kapferer, 2010). In their work, it remains possible to recognise the potential ambiguity of signification without reducing the social world to texts through an over-emphasis on signifying practices as fundamental to culture independent of practice.

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The evolving of ANZAC reflects the convergence of non-homogenous social elements and their functioning together. For Deleuze and Parnet, ‘the assemblage is a co-functioning, it is ‘sympathy’, symbiosis’ (2002:52). Such unstable ‘symbiosis’ occurs within and across the changing composition of assemblages. For Deleuze, the ‘states of ‘things’ are neither unities or totalities, but *multiplicities*’ (2002: vii, original emphasis). The emphasis is on relations between the entities rather than the entities themselves. It is not so much the elements, but the ‘the between, a set of relations that are inseparable from each other’ ((2002: viii). For Deleuze and Parnet, ‘relations are external to their terms... [and] a relation may change without the terms changing’ (2002: 55). It is the intertwining of elements that stabilise and destabilise assemblages that open them to change. The meaning and structure of the ANZAC rite has changed profoundly at the same time as it asserts its relation to nationalism appears unchanged. In the contemporary context, ANZAC has been recoded as a ‘tradition’, as part of an historical claim to its authenticity. This is also a consequence of broader processes of state retraction relating to neo-liberal global forces whereby ANZAC, as a national rite of Australian identity, assumes a more critical hegemonic role as Australia comes to rearticulate its identity in a new global environment. Nevertheless, in this ‘stabilising’ of identity, there is a purging of anti-state and anti-authority elements of the rite and an increasing inclusion of elements affirming a more homologous relation between People and State.

The historical debates about Gallipoli and the Great War (1914-1918) are not the subject of this analysis. The books written are numerous and unending, which is indicative of a public fascination with Gallipoli and the Great War² and that it is constantly open to new interpretations. My focus will be on the social genesis of ANZAC and its embeddedness in Australian life. ANZAC has a political force that politicians cannot ignore. It can be made to work for the State, especially in the contemporary period, to bolster and expand its credentials in support of particular forms of Australian sovereignty. However, what is integral to Kapferer’s original argument is that it expresses anti-state sentiment. The characterisation of Australia’s involvement in the Great War continually celebrated the general anti-authority temperament of Australian troops. Indeed, ANZAC can be seen to express an initial opposition between state and people that the history of the rite shows is progressively

² McKernan and Browne (eds) provide an important contribution to the social aspects of ANZAC in their book, *Australia Two Centuries of War & Peace* (1988).

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captured by the state. Throughout the 20th century, ANZAC nationalism and the social creation of war memorials across Australia fulfilled an immediate function. In the post-war years of the Great War and World War II, the ANZAC memorials were sites of commemoration and remembrance, but also a principal locus of mourning for those directly affected by the tragedies of war (see Inglis, 2005, Damousi, 1999). From the 1980s, the public, politicians and media began to take a renewed interest in Gallipoli and ANZAC, which has reshaped its meaning and ceremonial structure. In the following, we will explore the contemporary practices, values and meanings of ANZAC with those of the past.

Egalitarianism and Mateship.³

Egalitarianism, as it is expressed in the ANZAC myth, defines the nationalist character of a people, their virtues and orientation. The understanding of egalitarianism here is as an ideology, something that exercises compelling cultural authority. As an ideology, it has not acquired closure in a political or social sense, but, more, as discussed below, provides a diversity of interpretive frameworks that is indicative of its utility within Australian nationalism. The major work that frames ANZAC mythology emerges from C.E.W. Bean, the official war chronicler. His coverage of Australia's military campaign in the Great War was not simply to record the battles, but to record how the Australians carried themselves in war. Indeed, Bean was consciously engaged in the construction of history as myth, or myth out of historical fact. C.E.W. Bean's writings, as Kapferer (1988) points out, assert that the hostile environment of war heightens and refines these virtues and qualities of mateship.⁴ For Kapferer (1988) Bean's construction of the war history portrays the Australian character as emerging out of a hostile environment, naturally tested in the field of battle.

Kapferer stresses the positivist objectivism of Bean's work and the egalitarian ideology that imbued both his setting out of the facts and the significance he attached to them. As Bean states,

³ Thompson (1994) has given a broad rendering of the different uses of the notion of egalitarianism that is quite useful in breaking up the universalising treatments that often homogenise distinct and varied historical usages.

⁴ Such a view is reiterated in Clark's assertion that 'man had in him a vision of mateship as a comforter against a harsh, indifferent environment' (1963: 169).

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‘It lay in the mettle of the men themselves. To be the sort of man who would give way when his mates were trusting to his firmness, to be the sort of man who would fail when the whole line, the whole force, and the allied cause required his endurance... was the prospect which these men could not face.’ (1981:607, cited Kapferer, 1988:00)

For Kapferer (1988) Bean describes the Australian male belief in autonomy associated with individual egalitarianism— a belief in individual self-reliance combined with a belief in the competence of oneself and one’s peers. These qualities distinguish the Australian soldier from others. Whereas, in other armies the weaker may be dependent on the resolve of the strongest, for Bean, the ‘Australian Force contained more than its share of men who were masters of their own minds and decisions’ (1935:606). These were men who carried the belief that ‘Jack was as good as his master’, characterised in the popular image of the larrikin. This egalitarian ideology carried a reconfiguring of pre-existing relations towards social hierarchy, played out in acts of resistance to the etiquettes of social deference to superiors, especially the British.

The literature on ANZAC does much to affirm the ideological embeddedness of mateship (Gammage, 1974, 1988, Inglis, 1965, Serle, 1965, 1974, Adam-Smith, 1978, Clark, 2005). In keeping with Bean, Gammage has echoed the same egalitarian sensibility that ‘they fought because their mates relied on them’ (1974:102). Kapferer (1988) moves beyond ideological description to analyse mateship in relation to egalitarianism. He too considers mateship as an Australian male belief. For Kapferer, the facts of mateship are thoroughly ideological facts; that is, they were selected to secure an egalitarian affirmation of the values of Australian society; ‘mateship is germane with egalitarianism, at once expressive of its ethos and a central principle of social coherence’ (1988:158). Egalitarianism is the basis of a social idea that expresses a fundamental principle of social relatedness. Mateship is more than friendship for it extends beyond positive regard and affection. It assumes a level of mutual interdependence beyond friendship. Mateship, as Kapferer puts it, is

‘...an egalitarian principle of natural sociality and reciprocity between equals. It is the basis of natural society, the way society forms, independent of artificial mediating institutions such as those implicit in the concept of the state. The force of mateship, of natural sociality intrinsic to human beings, is most powerful between those identical in nature and acts cohesively upon them. To reduce the idea of mateship to friendship is not to comprehend its meaning fully...’ (1988:158)

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Egalitarianism is to be distinguished from objective social equality. Kapferer argues that it is based upon the premise of an essential similarity, as it works most powerfully on those identical in nature. The logic of construction is laden with ideological value. In this sense, mateship has operated as a tool of exclusion as much as inclusion, if group identity is to be sustained. Those regarded as ‘naturally different’ are excluded or restricted in their participation in Australian egalitarian society.⁵ Australian egalitarianism emphasises both the ‘natural differences’ of those deemed to be essentially other and homogenises the social differences of those deemed to be essentially the same.

Egalitarian individualism has multiple dimensions of expression. There is an over riding emphasis placed on the importance of a self-worth asserted in being self sufficient and self determining even when confronted with defeat. In ANZAC, these ideals are corrupted by the orders of an inept ‘unnatural’ military hierarchy. In the more liberal strain of egalitarianism, mateship is often more highly individualist and liberal in sentiment and shows principally how mateship can overcome differences in backgrounds, values and beliefs. In the more leftist strains of mateship, it emerges out of the conflictual world of capitalist social and economic relations (Ward, 1956). Mateship is grounded in the working life of the bush and owed its origins to the convicts and working class and the struggles of labour for better conditions for the working man through Unionism. This leftist strain of egalitarian individualism emphasises collective social action, namely Unionism, and solidarity in a hostile political and economic world. Mateship has a fundamentally social character, which operates, as Lohrey has put it, ‘as a defensive formation against a hostile world’ (1982:32) and is more suspicious of social difference and contemptuous of social hierarchy. The power of egalitarian individualism is in its multiple expressions to accommodate both collectivist and individualist politics, which is indicative of its utility within Australian nationalism.

The contemporary assumption that an egalitarian ethos was universally accepted in Australia, however, passes over one of the major tensions of colonial

⁵ Women occupy an ambivalent place located outside of mateship, as they are not excluded like racial or ethnic others have been. Marilyn Lake argues that women are marginalised and trivialised when their sexuality threatens to constrain man’s autonomy or their activities overshadow his social achievements (1992: 4).

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settler Australia.⁶ This division, as Smith (2001) observes, arose between ‘Imperialist’ and ‘Nativist’ conceptions of a foundational nationalism. The former associated national identity with being an exemplary outpost of Britain society, which emphasised being British, Anglican, upper class and steadfast for Empire.⁷ Respectability and status depended on, as Hughes put it, ‘the assertion of their Britishness’ (1996:xi) and, for Thompson, a ‘natural’ position of deference (1994: 14-22). The nativist position desired the creation of a distinctive nationalist culture and identified with essentially Irish, republican, Roman Catholic and working class origins (Smith, 2001:635). The social class divisions and tensions that emerged in Australia took on a particular colonial dimension that emerged from different immigrant and religious backgrounds, which solidified into distinctive social cleavages in the settler colonies and beyond Federation (see Campion, 1982, 1987).

The Social Genesis of ANZAC

Commemorative rituals emerged out of contemporary forms of citizen sacrifice and the capacity of the modern nation state for mass destruction through war. Through such sacrifice, soldiers’ deaths, the willing death in the service of the nation, find social significance beyond individual meaning. There is a strong convergence between what Aries has called the ‘cult of the dead’, commemorative rituals of the war, and the consolidation of nationalism in the modern state of the 20th century. The Australian State’s commemoration of its war dead has given rise to a modern form of consecrated ground in Australia. Significant events did not occur in these places nor do they contain power and agency in themselves as do indigenous sites that contain ancestral potency. ANZAC gained its social agency and political

⁶ The dispossession of indigenous Australians is not addressed at all.

⁷ For Peter Coleman, former Liberal party politician and Minister of the Crown, the Australian egalitarian ethos essentially violated civilised sensibilities and expressed a primitive vision of progress and democracy,

The coexistence of ... humanism and nihilism, democracy and violence, the open smile and the broken bottle, is not paradoxical. It is expected amongst people in a ‘new’ country many whose settlers had, like the convicts, never really been part of the parent civilisation, or like the free settlers driven here by penury, ambition or sheer discontent, had more or less scorned it. Never having enjoyed and in any case being either unwilling or unable to live the British or European way of life... the Australians, or rather the Australianists, persuaded themselves that all they needed was their own good nature. (1962:3)

Coleman, like other conservative commentators, staked their respectability on the connection to Britain and viewed Australia as derivative of Britain, and, hence, second best. The Union movement was not so much an institution, but another violent expression of working class culture.

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force through popular participation and consent. The memorials commemorate those who have fallen in wars for Australia, but not in Australia. The war memorials and cenotaphs memorialise and commemorate in the public sphere those who have died in the service of the nation fighting for the nation. Such memorials occupy a privileged place in most urban and rural communities that were in existence at the time of the Great War. These commemorations revolve around ANZAC Day and the battle fought by Australian and New Zealand troops in Turkey, but more generally addresses all those who have died in war. The memorials held a consecrated place, as Frame suggests,

... because of the feelings they evoke. Sensations of sadness, sorrow and anguish together with thoughts of courage, bravery and duty undergird the thousands of memorials scattered across the continent of Australia to the men and women killed in war. They allow us to enter the world of comrades who survived the horrors of war and the grief of the families who mourned their deaths. (2005: v)

Frame's evocation underscores the point that ANZAC commemorations functioned as local rituals of loss, of mourning.

The assumption that the ANZAC myth and nationalism can be measured only by their alignment with political values and beliefs, or represent dominant ruling class values, underestimates the power of myth and of nationalism. The utility of myth depends upon how it addresses the specific conditions of history that give shape to the collective aspects of life of a particular people. In this, myth encodes traces of affective life. Cassirer makes the point that myth does not arise from solely intellectual processes, but from deep human emotions (1979:43). As he continues,

Myth cannot be described as bare emotion because it is an *expression* of emotion. The expression of feeling is not feeling itself—it is emotion turned into an image. This very fact implies radical change. What hitherto was dimly and vaguely felt assumes a definite shape: what was a passive state becomes an active process. (1979: 43) (original emphasis)

Myth is a symbolic form that if it arises from human emotions cannot be reduced to them. Symbolically, it is open to new import. In this, the ANZAC myth does not simply 'represent' the historical event of Gallipoli, although it is shaped, in part, by that experience and transmits it. It is as much about its aftermath and the social responses to the human consequences of the Great War as to the event itself. It can never be a representation. Indeed, as Kapferer has argued, Bean's objective was never

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simply about representation, but always more as he consciously engaged in the construction of war history as a myth of nationalism

In the period directly after the Great War, ANZAC nationalism and the production of war memorials across Australia fulfilled a more immediate function. The memorials were not simply sites of commemoration and remembrance, but, for many, the principal locus of their mourning. The thousands of memorials that sprang up all over Australia were a testimony to the numbers of the dead. As Winter points out, over 330,000 Australians served in the First World War (the Great War), and approximately 60,000 were killed in active service (1995:35). This was a casualty rate at or above that suffered by the major protagonists, the British, French and German armies (1995:35). The statistics give some sense of scale to the tide of grief that engulfed the small nation state as a result of the deaths of so many in the war. Unlike Germany and France, the Australian landscape bore none of the scars of war, as the men died some 12,000 miles from Australia. Only one body of an Australian soldier was returned home in the war (Inglis, 2005: 75, Bean, 1981: 129,130).⁸

In Australia, the importance of the war memorial gained increased significance, as the sites were the only place where one could grieve and engage in some form of personal as well as public commemoration. Many of the early ceremonies, especially in small country towns were more like funerals as those assembled were often the families of those who had died (Inglis, 2005: 214). As the rural *Wagga Gazette* described in 1922,

Grey haired mothers and fathers, widows and their fatherless children, and broken hearted sweethearts advanced from the portion of the enclosure that had been reserved for them, and laid floral tributes at the base of the monument. With that sad rite, the last barrier of self-control was broken down, and many wept, openly and unashamed, and were unable to discern the name, engraved on the stone, of the lost love one that they would see no more.” (cited Inglis, 2005: 215)⁹

⁸ The body of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges was brought home and buried near the Royal Military Academy, Duntroon, where he had been the first commandant (Inglis, 2005:75-76). Bridges was the General Officer Commanding the Australian Imperial Force until fatally wounded inspecting his troops in Shrapnel Gully, at Gallipoli (Clarke, 2005:72).

⁹ In 1923 the ANZAC parade was officially gazetted as a commemorative day in line with the recommendation of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia (RSSILA) (Lake, 1988:220). The Victorian Parliament legislated for ANZAC Day to be a public holiday in 1925 and established an ANZAC Day Commemorative Committee ‘made up almost entirely of RSSILA members to organise the day’s activities’ (Lake, 1988:220).

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The remains of their loved ones were interned and given commemoration on battlefields distant from Australia. The cemeteries with endless crosses were unlikely to be visited by most Australians and so the emotional focus of their grief and mourning was centred on the war memorial, which bore the names of all those who served and those who had fallen. In these affective connections to the trauma of war the emergence of ANZAC takes part of its form in local responses to tragedy.

The war memorial sites were set apart from the spaces of everyday life, as sites of passive secular reverence. They become the active locus of attention and emotional focus on the one day set aside in April for the commemoration of ANZAC Day. In this sense, ANZAC operates in terms of contemporary notions of the sacred thoroughly embedded in modernity (Durkheim, (1915) 1965). The sacred is separated from the profane, as the focus of a nationalist rite. Unlike other nations, however, such commemorative rituals became the central ceremony for expressions of Australian nationalism. ANZAC became a vehicle of social integration, establishing common bonds and purpose and a shared national experience to formally separate settler colonies in terms of nation and nationalism.

As a vehicle of national integration, nevertheless, ANZAC becomes no less an 'apparatus of capture' fostering the sovereign effects and essentially deterritorialising anti-state sentiments. In Deleuzian terms, the memorials are mechanisms of capture in that they spring up in local communities in ways that people deal with the disaster of distant death, but they are then, through the state fostered memorials in state capitals, linked into the territorializing dynamic of the State and the exercise of sovereign power. The state captures the people as it were and ties them into its purpose. The logic of ANZAC is one that in effect specifies this. In ANZAC, the rhizomic and the hierarchical are intertwined, as ANZAC is constituted in an historical process whereby the rhizomic is folded into the hierarchical (Kapferer, pers. comm). The initial opposition between state and people progressively becomes a synchrony of state and people interest.

Nevertheless, ANZAC commemorations and the war memorials must be distinguished from more common expressions of State nationalism.¹⁰ In Australian nationalism, the relations that exist between nation, the people and the state are

¹⁰ Indeed, all too often, it is as if ANZAC was simply created by the manipulations of the state, and that the deaths were simply incidental and grist to the mill of politics and nationalism (White, 1981, McQueen, 1984, Seal, 2004).

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complex rather than simple. *Legends* has powerfully argued that Australian nationalism contains anti-state elements that emerge from within ANZAC. The volumes written on the ANZAC campaign and the Australian contribution to the war effort in Europe celebrate the anti-authority disposition of Australian troops, which is no less a construction. This is a nationalism not simply authored by the State, but captured by the state nonetheless in a continuing dynamic of capture.

A more effective analytical focus of ANZAC as productive of nationalism is to consider the subjects and objects of reverence it produced. The meaning of ANZAC inheres as much in its practices, which began as a vehicle of national and social integration, but also from new imaginings of social possibility, redefining pre-existing social and state relations. This involved the coming together of disparate local elements into assemblages that sought to stabilise, but also could destabilise this emergent social entity (see below). ANZAC's nationalist imaginary reflected as much new political sensibilities in which social order is a negotiated order. In the aftermath of the Great War, local committees and organisations formed across the nation in cities and towns. Above all, as Inglis suggests, the cost and the construction of war memorials bore the imprint of the circumstances of the local community (2005: 128). Yet, I would argue, it did more than this. The striking feature was that the local communities facilitated, funded and co-ordinated the construction of commemorative sites. The ANZAC memorials were created from the bottom up through local participation rather than through the offices of the State.¹¹ The commemorative sites were not always spontaneous events of collective purpose, as single-minded cooperation stood cheek and jowl with conflicting social interests and multiple priorities. The means to best represent the fallen, in what form, in what place and with what symbolic representations were ever-present questions that could become contentious and contested issues. In ANZAC's nationalist imaginary, as is also evident in the egalitarian ethos, as suggested earlier, natural competition is integral to society, and a sensibility that social order is a negotiated order.

The commemorative monuments also symbolised a major shift in public sentiment. In the proliferation of memorials commemorating the war dead and war veterans alike, there occurred a profound democratisation of the civic landscape.

¹¹ No official number exists, but the RSL has estimated that there are over three thousand memorials in New South Wales.

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ANZAC commemorative practices shared a critique of deference shown to social superiors that produced new social domains of action. As Davidson points out,

“The unknown Australian soldier became the prototype of a more democratic form of monumental history, for increasingly it was the representative type of soldier, working man, women, athlete, rather than the heroic individual, who was honoured in Australian statuary.” (2000: 46, 47)

This is the ordinary man as hero. Previously, as Davidson (2000: ch.3) shows, public statutory of great men had served a didactic function as a source of patriotic instruction, community pride and public gratification. Indeed, the egalitarian logic of the prototype mutated into a general opposition to public statues and their replacement by something ‘more useful’. From the 1940s onwards, the demands for ‘useful’ memorials, such as hospitals, schools, playing fields, swimming pools, halls and parks, gathered greater force (Davidson, 2000: ch.3, Inglis, 2005: 352-358).¹² The stress on the public utility of ‘living memorials’ enriched public culture in a way that affirmed an egalitarian ethos and served commemorative purposes of remembrance as a secular living practice.

The ANZAC commemorative sensibility occurred as part of the democratisation of public culture and social practice in Australia. They reflected more ‘rhizomic’ modes of experience that were egalitarian in outlook and decentred in social practice rather than the hierarchical and grid-like forms of State practice.¹³ The overall role of the State forms of governance was limited. Local committees, local enmities, regional and local rivalries evolved and came to fruition, as did those projects based upon undivided local support. The formation and expression of nationalist sensibility as expressed through the ANZAC memorials, so central to the ANZAC commemoration, retained an egalitarian form of local expression rather than a bureaucratic imprint of the State. The social formation of ANZAC did not simply celebrate a more egalitarian ethos, but shaped and transmitted it across a range of sites and through a range of social practices. In particular, the eastern colonies of Australia had driven political reforms based on the notion of political enfranchisement that had brought access to the institutions of representative

¹² The RSL’s publication *Reveille* stated in 1947 that ‘If the fallen died that we might live, and have life more abundantly, they cannot adequately be commemorated in the cold bronze statue or the lifeless monuments of yesteryear’ (cited Inglis, 2005:353).

¹³ Deleuze and Guattari begin their book, *a thousand plateaus* with the paradigmatic distinction between ‘rhizomic’ and ‘arborescent’ modes of experience.

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government. Indeed, as Thompson suggests, because of the early democratic reforms, Australia was conceived as the most advanced laboratory of democratic experiment in the English-speaking world and ‘inspired imitation in other English speaking countries and beyond’ (1994:11).¹⁴ In Australia such democratic institutions moved beyond the political and took on social forms so as to actualise new connections and new ways for people to act and respond.

The memorials are no less sentinels marking the ‘bitter earnestness’ in which people grappled with their sense of loss and the reasons why these men had laid down their lives. The ceremonies and monuments that sprang up in the aftermath of the Great War were in some ways an overcoming of a profound loss on a national scale. Yet, the beginnings of the ANZAC commemorative practices are part of a line of social mutations that released new powers and capacities that were part of a democratisation of public culture. These new assemblages were grounded in an egalitarian order, which contested *the exercise of unilateral power and replaced it by a sensibility that social order is a negotiated order*. It is set in opposition to a hierarchically ordered society in which social status was explicitly linked to the performance of prescribed institutional roles and claims to ascribed authority through privilege or status are denied. In the ANZAC commemorative rite this is accurate up to a point and reflects the double voiced ambivalence inherent in the internal logic of ANZAC. In the ANZAC rite egalitarianism and hierarchy are not realized as oppositional but as mutually affirming (See Kapferer, 1988). ANZAC, indeed, can be seen to subvert the radical dynamics of egalitarianism.

Sectarian Discord and Social Integration

The power of nationalism through ANZAC was not a social balm that automatically organise all classes, faiths and creeds into a collective nationalist unity. The major source of social discord that developed in the post-war period reflected a deeper pre-existing social and sectarian division that existed between Anglican and Protestant faiths, on the one hand, and the Roman Catholic faith on the other. The form of representation the ANZAC ceremonies should take vexed many communities. The catalyst for these differences over ANZAC occurred, in part,

¹⁴ As Thompson states, in the United States of America, Liberals opposed to democratisation dubbed voting by secret ballot, ‘Kangaroo voting’, and is still referred to as the ‘Australian Ballot’ (1994:11).

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during the war and continued in its aftermath. The Australian government and Opposition party both had unanimously supported England's war effort. The execution of the war brought conflict when attempts were made to introduce conscription. In the dominions of New Zealand, Canada, and in Britain itself, conscription was unproblematic (Inglis, 2005: 114). The opposition to conscription was unique to the Australian war effort. In the emergent nationalism of Australia, the right of the State to command its citizens to war was defeated. Conscription was an attempt by the State to maintain recruitment levels, after the initially significant numbers of volunteers at the outset of the war began to wane.¹⁵ Two referendums were held and lost.¹⁶ In the first referendum an estimated seventy five per cent of the soldiers serving in Belgium and France voted 'no' in the referendum, which was taken as evidence that members serving in the AIF believed that the army should remain an all volunteer army (Inglis, 2005:116).¹⁷ The defeat of the referendums was also attributed to Irish Catholic disloyalty to the war effort and, hence, to the British Empire (Inglis: 2005:116-118).

The ANZAC commemorations highlighted and intensified sectarian divisions. The Roman Catholic Church's opposition to participation in the ANZAC religious services was long standing and firm (in Sydney, 1962 and Melbourne 1938). As Monsignor John Lonergan (Melbourne) stated in 1938, 'It is strictly forbidden to Catholics... to participate in any form of worship or service other than their own where the religious element is involved' (cited, Luttrell, 1999:5). In that year, Melbourne's Returned Soldiers League (RSL) conceded to Catholic sensibilities that the service remove every religious element (Luttrell, 1999: 5). In response, Anglican and Protestant clergy boycotted the changed ceremony (1999:12). Furthermore, the devout Anglican, General Harry Chauvel, refused to lead the march to Melbourne's Shrine of Remembrance (Inglis, 2005:465). Chauvel had commanded the famous Light Horse Brigade in the Great War. He denounced the changes on the grounds that the service had been 'deChristianised to accommodate Catholic sensibilities' (Inglis,

¹⁵ 80,000 men enlisted in the Australian Imperial Forces between the outbreak of the war and the Gallipoli landing and the Gallipoli campaign stimulated more volunteer recruits (Inglis, 2005:113).

¹⁶ On October 28, the voting pattern showed majorities in favour in Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia and those against in New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia (Inglis, 2005:115).

¹⁷ In Batemans Bay, New South Wales, the opponents of conscription unveiled an obelisk on December, 26th, 1917, shortly after the second referendum, inscribed with Batemans Bay and District Volunteers, 1914-1917 AIF, which recorded 74 names to make the political point that these men had enlisted under the voluntary system. (Inglis, 2005:119).

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2005:465). The control of the commemorative rite and its symbolic expression not only created division but, on occasion enflamed them. In Sydney, the impasse was not resolved until 1962 with meetings between the RSL and the Roman Catholic Church. The common practice for Roman Catholics was to participate in the ceremony up to the united religious service. As Luttrell states, the marchers entered the Sydney Domain, but Catholics were expected 'to leave the march and take part in a Solemn High Mass for the fallen' in nearby St. Mary's Cathedral (1999:4-5). A new format was devised, so that prayers were to be conducted by lay person and the clergy would give the commemorative address, which was to be patriotic rather than religious, and to be rotated between denominations (Luttrell, 1999:12).

Despite the sectarian discord, generations have assembled on this date and at the time of the first landing to participate in Dawn Services that honour the ANZAC's at Gallipoli and, later, all Australian men and women who served in other theatres of war. ANZAC Day, has remained the most significant day of nationalist commemoration, in contrast to Australia Day, which is commemorated with little nationalist fervour (Kapferer, 1988:131). Until recently, the day and date of Australia Day were moved to maximise holiday agendas. ANZAC Day is only ever held on the 'one day of the year' and commercial and leisure activities do not open until midday, after the ANZAC ceremonies and religious services have ended. ANZAC Day is considered more a holy day, as the flow of everyday life is suspended. The nation state and people joined in homage to the fallen. In the commemorative march, the veterans assemble at dawn and join their service units in civilian clothes and medals, declaring an absence of rank or hierarchical authority, a civilian army of volunteers. The streets are symbolically given over to the veterans and the public forgo their personal pursuits and pleasures as homage to the dead, for those who sacrificed their lives for the living. In this way, ANZAC Day is separated from other legal holidays as a ceremony that is both sacred and secular.¹⁸

Benedict Anderson, in his book, *Imagined Communities*, draws out the deeper associations in the religiosity of nationalism present in nationalist imaginings with their preoccupations with death and mortality share affinities with religious thought (1983:18-19). In as much as religious thought transforms fatality into continuity, it provides a link between the living, the dead and the yet unborn. The commemoration

¹⁸ The Federal Parliament added ANZAC day to the calendar of legal holidays in an Act passed in 1923 (Luttrell, 1999:2).

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of nations' war dead provides for a secular transformation of sacrifice/fatality into continuity, as the contingency of one's existence is linked to the destiny of the nation. In nationalist ideologies, fatality/sacrifice affirms a link between the living, the dead and the yet unborn, as it does in religious thought. In Deleuzian terms, we are dealing with the changing of the relations without the terms changing (2002: 55). In a similar way, this secular ceremony, commemorating an historical event, takes a ceremonial form that invokes association with the Christian myth of rebirth through suffering and death. Fundamentally, in *Legends*, the ANZAC myth provides the charter of Australian nationhood, expressed symbolically as a blood sacrifice. It is here that Kapferer's application of sacrifice, separation and rebirth provides a powerful analysis. The sacrifice of the ANZAC soldiers is a consciously overt symbol of rebirth.

The religiosity of the ceremony is most apparent in the ANZAC rite itself. At the Dawn Service, the participants congregate before dawn at a central memorial or cenotaph. The Service begins before dawn and ends after the sun has risen bringing in the new day. Symbolically, the ANZAC rite is organised in Kapferer's sense around the Christian themes of death, sacrifice and rebirth. The theme is repeated at the end of the Service with a symbolic reversal as the bugler plays the Last Post¹⁹ first then the Rouse or Reveille.²⁰ The symbolism is reiterated in the reciting of the fourth stanza of the Ode that follows,

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them...²¹

In ANZAC, the self is transcended through sacrifice ('they shall grow not old') and central to the empowerment of a community of peers: 'we who are left (to) grow old'.

¹⁹ The Last Post is the bugle call that signifies the end of the day's activities. It is also sounded at military funerals and commemorative services such as ANZAC Day to indicate that the soldier has gone to his final place of rest. The incorporation of the 'Last Post' into funeral and memorial services symbolises that the duty of the dead is over and that they can rest in peace.

²⁰ Reveille is the bugle call used to wake soldiers in the morning. On ANZAC Day, in the Dawn Service, Reveille is associated with the Last Post. After a minutes silence has been observed, the flag is raised from half-mast to the masthead and Reveille is sounded. Reveille symbolises the awakening to a better world for the dead and reminds the living of their ongoing duties and responsibilities to the memory of the dead.

²¹ The Ode comes from a poem by the English poet and writer Laurence Binyon, 'For the Fallen'. It was first published in London in 1914.

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The ANZAC commemorative ritual is deeply set in Judeo-Christian thought that through sacrifice comes the possibility of new life. The war dead in ANZAC are a kind of secular holy within Australian nationalism.²²

The Unknown Soldier and Egalitarian Individualism

In the contemporary period, the major shift in the meaning of the ANZAC commemorative rites makes apparent the historical trajectory of ANZAC as an apparatus of capture. The hierarchical encapsulation of ANZAC is more clearly apparent in the ongoing history of the rite. The changes impact upon the ideal of egalitarian individualism that has been so central to the meaning and ethos of the rite. In part, they reflect the changing status of nationalism and a more encompassing position of the State. The anti-authority elements discussed in *Legends* have been progressively removed. The first of these changes has been to legislate to make legal what had been illegal. The playing of ‘two-up’, a unique Australian form of gambling, had been synonymous with ANZAC Day. The widespread and frequent playing of ‘two up’ by ANZAC troops in the Great War, generated a revitalisation of its popularity, which gave rise to its historical and symbolic importance on ANZAC Day. Gaming Laws passed at the turn of the century had made it illegal. Despite being an activity banned by the State, it was nevertheless tolerated on ANZAC Day, played in full public view, in RSL’s Clubs, in hotels, hotel car parks, where ‘rings’ would form wherever people assembled. The version of the game played on ANZAC Day involves a ‘spinner’ who spins the coins, two pennies, in the air with a piece of wood called a ‘kip’. He occupies the centre of a ‘ring’ of players who bet against each other (side bets) in the ‘ring’ as to whether the ‘spinner’ will toss either ‘heads’ or ‘tails’ (one head and one tail is a ‘no throw’). The police were expected to, and did, turn a ‘blind eye’ to this public transgression of State laws. Symbolically, the liminal nature of ‘the one day of the year’ was affirmed, as the veterans, and, hence, the people, were granted full reign, and the State took an unaccustomed low profile. Yet, in the late 1980s, State governments progressively legalised the playing of ‘two-up’ on ANZAC Day, thereby stripping it of its symbolically transgressive power and its anti-

²² See Kapferer’s analysis, situated in Canberra, which sets out the overall structure of the ceremony and organisational elements in its relation to public/state dynamics and the playing out of the anti-state aspects of the commemorative rite.

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authority status as homage to veterans and the people on that day.

The most significant change, however, has occurred in the composition of the commemorative rite itself, which now incorporates regular soldiers to fill the depleted ranks of the march left by the death of the veterans through the years. In the last decade of the 20th century, the attrition rate through old age and death overtook the veterans of the Great War and increasingly cut into the number of the Second World War veterans, who had swelled the ranks from the late 1940s. The descendants of the veterans increasingly march in their place. It became commonplace for enfeebled veterans to march assisted in wheelchairs or in motor vehicles. In the 1980s, the incorporation, after initial rejection, of the Vietnam veterans, an army of regulars and conscripts, filled the marching ranks. Importantly, the final change in the composition of the march is the inclusion of members of the regular Army, Navy and Airforce in the ranks of those marching today. The basis of national distinctiveness emphasised in Bean's rendering of Australian egalitarian individualism was the existence of a volunteer army. Army regulars and conscripts are not volunteers, as they act involuntarily and not as independent individuals. In effect, the ANZAC rite has undergone significant changes in meaning, which involves the suppression of many of its previous anti-state sentiments.

Perhaps, more significantly, politicians, and, hence, the State, increasingly have taken a more prominent role in ANZAC remembrance. Throughout the 1990s, the public, politicians and media began to take a greater interest in Gallipoli and ANZAC. The eminent death of the remaining veterans of the Gallipoli campaign, and Federal and State governments began to take on a major interest in their lives and commemorating their deaths.²³ Ted Mathews was the first of the remaining veterans, an ordinary soldier, to be given a State funeral, authorised by the Prime Minister (King, 2003:204). A number of State funerals followed, culminating with the death of the last Gallipoli veteran, Alec Campbell, on 20th May, 2002 (King, 2003:208). As King points out, the public accolades that were poured on a humble water carrier were befitting of a military commander (2003:209). The Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Governor-General and the Minister for Veteran Affairs all presented their eulogies setting out the

²³ Jonathan King (2003) interviewed all the remaining veterans (nine in all) (see also Stephens, 2003).

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contributions of the ANZAC's to Australian history (King, 2003:207). Alec Campbell, who had lived anonymously for most of his life, became a national celebrity in his final years and death. These were funerals not to commemorate these men as individuals or their military careers, but as symbols of an inclusive past and ANZAC as the source of Australian nationalism. In the early 20th century, the focus on ANZAC concentrated on defining and expressing a national identity and culture, on building a new society. By the late 20th century the emphasis was to maintain the 'tradition' that ANZAC has established.

ANZAC Day has moved beyond a day of homage to the fallen and mourning rite for their sacrifice to take on a broader significance. Historically, in the renewed interest, we witness the movement of ANZAC from living public memory of the veterans to its reliance on historical documents and the way it should be interpreted. In more recent times, a major emphasis is increasingly placed on a recognition of the importance of the ideals and values of ANZAC in guiding and preserving the nation. The preservation of these ideals and values is defined as what unified the original ANZACs and what the succeeding generations of servicemen and women fought for. ANZAC Day, according to Prime Minister Howard, is about 'those great values that unite us as Australians— values of mateship, courage, initiative and determination' (25th April, 2002). These abstract values transcend time and individual difference. Those surviving veterans of the Great War became the symbolic bearers of the spirit of the ANZAC tradition, the cultural ancestors of ANZAC and the nation.

What has increasingly developed is that ANZAC has been progressively incorporated into the sphere of the State. Gallipoli, as a site of national importance, has increased as a focus of nationalism (see Scates, 2006). ANZAC Day at Gallipoli has become a nationally televised event in which politicians could make their public pronouncements on Australian Nationalism. The commemorations at Gallipoli, however, are negotiated between Nation States rather than the RSL and are accompanied by the nationalist speeches by politicians that reflect their respective political agendas. The first significant event took place in 1990, when the 75th anniversary was commemorated. Both Prime Minister Robert (Bob) Hawke and Margaret Thatcher gave addresses. Hawke gave two speeches one at Lone Pine, where he revived C.E.W. Bean's reference to Australian mateship, 'the mettle of the men'. His second speech, in the Dawn

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Service focused on what it meant to Australia today. While Hawke heaped high praise on Australia's former enemy, Turkey, referring to Gallipoli as central to the birth of both nations and noting the 'brilliant defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula', he also injudiciously reproduced more critical evaluations of Britain. The comments made prior to the commemorative services were reported in the press (MacLeod, 2004:241). In this, he characterised the British military hierarchy, especially Winston Churchill and Ian Hamilton for their 'unbelievably inept planning' of the Gallipoli campaign (2004: 241). In effect, he reproduced the anti-authority, anti-British sentiments long evident in Australian nationalist narratives of Gallipoli.

ANZAC became incorporated into Nation state agendas in a way that it had never been before. In contrast to Hawke and, more recently, to John Howard, Paul Keating, as Prime Minister, privileged a republican Australia, and, on ANZAC Day (1992) gave his speech at Port Moresby, in Papua New Guinea. The series of battles along New Guinea's Kokoda Track directly involved defending Australia from Japanese invasion in the Second World War and a more suitable site of commemoration of Australian nationalism for a republican Australia, rather than fighting for Britain on the other side of the world. National attention was drawn back to Gallipoli after the election of the conservative and monarchist, John Howard, as Prime Minister and leader of Liberal and National Party Coalition. On April 25, 2005, John Howard, his New Zealand counterpart, Helen Clark and Prince Charles attended the televised event of the Dawn Service at the Gallipoli before tens of thousands of Australians and New Zealanders assembled to mark the Anzac Cove landings 90 years before. In perhaps the final irony, Howard said the ANZACs had 'changed forever the way we saw our world and ourselves, they bequeathed Australia a lasting sense of national identity, they sharpened our democratic temperament and *our questioning eye towards authority*' (my emphasis). In defining 'the tradition', Howard effectively acknowledged and, simultaneously, reshaped the 'questioning eye towards authority', reinventing it anew. Egalitarianism is reduced to a general individual attitude that removes the specificity of its historical meanings at the same time as it is commemorated. It is the State that is now in control throughout and the organised power of the State that now dominates.

These shifts are most aptly demonstrated in the return of the 'unknown

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soldier'. In 1993, the Australian government approached the Commonwealth Graves Commission with a request to bring back an unknown Australian soldier from the western front cemetery, which had been his resting place since the end of the Great War. This 'unknown soldier' was to be interned in the Hall of Memory at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. On the 2nd November, 1993, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission duly passed the remains, exhumed from an unknown soldier's grave in Adelaide Cemetery, *Villers-Bretonneux*, France and transported to Australia. *Villers-Bretonneux Somme* was the scene of a major battle in 1918 that involved 'the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, with units of the 8th and 18th Divisions' (<http://www.diggerhistory.info>). The village had fallen to the German advance of tanks and infantry in 1918 and was recaptured by the combined Australian Divisions on the 23rd April, 1918, 'so that by ANZAC Day it was under Allied control' (<http://www.diggerhistory.info>). The remains lay in state at Old Parliament House until November 11, 1993, Remembrance Day, when a funeral service was held and the soldier was finally interned in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

The rite is conceived as homage by the State and the People to the fallen and the occasion when the State pays homage to the People. In symbolic terms, the State in honouring the fallen asserts a complementarity of identity exists between the People and the State. In other words, a complementarity of identity, People and the State realised symbolically through the Anzac ritual. As Prime Minister Paul Keating's famous eulogy makes clear,

We do not know this Australian's name and never will. We do not know where he was born, or precisely how and when he died, We do not know where in Australia he had made his home or when he left it for the battlefields of Europe. We do not know his age or his circumstances—whether he was from the city or the bush; what occupation he left to become a soldier; if he was married or single. We do not know who loved him and whom he loved. If he had children, we do not know who they are. His family is lost to us as he was lost to them. We will never know who this Australian was... One in the 100,000 Australians who have died in wars this century. He was all of them. And he is one of us.

The 'unknown soldier' is the most explicit symbol of that ideal of complementarity between nation, state and people. The absence of differentiating marks of social status and rank, of local, regional and state affiliation, and religious and political association, the 'unknown soldier' embodies

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quintessentially the egalitarian ideal of modern nationalism. Both individual and collective identity is rendered the same— and, in the eyes of the State, the unmediated relationship between individual and nation, between the people, the nation and the State, are rendered synonymous. Yet, at another level, such an honouring violates the Australian egalitarian ethos. In this view, the ‘unknown soldier’ should have been left with his mates with whom he fell and died, rather than disturbed and appropriated by the State. In effect, the tensions between individual agency and potency explicit in egalitarianism become subsumed within the collectivist anti-difference dimension of Australian nationalism (Kapferer and Morris, 2003).

At another level, the return of the ‘unknown soldier’ addresses the major paradox of Australian nationalism. The paradox exists in a form of a nationalism that takes its beginnings based upon acts of war waged on a foreign shore. The internment of the dead and their commemoration in foreign lands had profound effects on the beginnings of ANZAC commemorations. It had significant affects in shaping of a nationalism of Australia, but is situated elsewhere. ANZAC nationalism is grounded in an act of separation that is situated elsewhere and seemingly infinitely connected to Europe. Bringing the body home is a symbolic act of closure, a completion of identity. For a republican nationalism, with the return of the ‘unknown soldier’, Australian nationalism breaks its European connection to become self-enclosed and independent.

It is not coincidental that the 1990s we should also see the restructuring of the Nation State in Australia in terms of neo-liberal polity. Neoliberal polity defeats the objectives of ANZAC and changes its meaning. In the earlier versions of ANZAC, the self is transcended through sacrifice (they shall grow not old) in relation to a community of peers that is central to the empowerment of ‘we who are left (to) grow old’. It is deeply set in Judeo-Christian thought that through sacrifice comes the possibility of new life in which the dead in ANZAC are a kind of holy social or secular holy within Australian nationalism. In the neo-liberal version, (the radical individualism ascribed to) the self is self enclosed and independent and augments the State, transcending the social by refusing the submersion of the self into a community of peers. The central values of mateship and egalitarianism have radically shifted. The socially empowering aspects of egalitarianism that found expression in dispersed and decentred social practice are

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replaced by an ideology that embraces individual acts of empowerment in the absence of reference to the social.

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Nationalism makes the political religious and places the nation above politics. The nation is created as an object of devotion and the political forces which become focused upon it are intensified in their energy and passion. The religion of nationalism, wherein the political is shrouded in the symbolism of a "higher" purpose, is vital to the momentum of nationalism. This momentum, which if anything is on the increase, has been among the most liberating, but also among the most oppressive and destructive, political energies of this century. The following analysis is built around the rites of Anzac Day, held every year on April 25. The rite has received much descriptive attention in scholarly literature and is widely covered in the newspapers and the press.

1. Morris B. The Social genesis of ANZAC nationalism. The social genesis of ANZAC nationalism In B Kapferer (Ed) Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia. 2012:344. In-text citation. Place this part right after the quote or reference to the source in your assignment. Template. 1. Example. Download Citation on ResearchGate | On Sep 1, 2016, Michael Kenny and others published The Genesis of English Nationalism. We use cookies to offer you a better experience, personalize content, tailor advertising, provide social media features, and better understand the use of our services. To learn more or modify/prevent the use of cookies, see our Cookie Policy and Privacy Policy. Accept Cookies. top.