Mobilizing the People of God: 
How Religion is Changing Brazilian Democracy

Amy Erica Smith 
Associate Professor 
Department of Political Science, Iowa State University 
aesmith2@iastate.edu

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Note: This manuscript has now been accepted. I am placing online the introduction and conclusion. Note that these are versions submitted for final review; they will be revised before publication.
PART I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter One. Introduction

On November 7, 2017, conservative opponents of “gender ideology” burned the American feminist theorist Judith Butler in effigy on the street in front of the art institute Sesc Pompeia in the city of São Paulo, while Butler herself was inside giving a lecture. As protesters hoisted a life-sized doll in a pink brassiere and witch’s hat over their heads and lit it on fire, they chanted, “Burn the witch!” The protest apparently included both conservative Catholics and evangelicals. Though Catholic crucifixes were on prominent display during the protest, evangelical groups built much of the momentum behind the protests. In the days leading up to the talk, a Facebook group and website led by Assembly of God clergy from the city of Ilha Solteira (São Paulo state) drove traffic to an online petition that gathered 366,000 signatures opposing Butler’s visit (J. Gonçalves 2017). While the protest was cast in the media as an attempt to shut down the conference, a survey conducted with protesters at the event itself found that most did not aim to stop Butler’s talk (Calegari 2017). Rather, they hoped they could stimulate a debate over gender, sexuality, and the role of public schools in sexual education.

Gender and sexuality have become perhaps the most important issue driving a recent period of religiously-motivated democratic conflict in Brazil—what I term Brazil’s “culture wars.” Protestant clergy, congregants, and representatives have been reliably far more conservative than Catholics on questions such as transgender rights or public school sexual education. Religious conservatives and secular voters likewise battle over whether to entirely outlaw or fully legalize abortion, which is presently legal only under special circumstances in Brazil. On this issue, it is evangelicals who sometimes take the liberal position. Finally, Catholics, evangelicals, and the non-religious each take opposing stances on the third major
issue: the rights and responsibilities of religious communities in the context of a formally secular state.

However, one typical source of religious and political division is conspicuously absent: partisanship. Brazil’s highly fragmented party system—with 28 parties elected to the lower house of Congress, the Chamber of Deputies, in 2014—is known for its weakness at both mass and elite levels. Commentators often note that evangelical elites’ alliances are “pulverized” across a very large number of candidates and parties—ones chosen based more on personalistic ties, than clear ideological criteria (Dantas 2011; Freston 1993; Lisboa 2010). As Power and Rodrigues-Silveira put it, “in partisan terms, Pentecostals are highly diasporic” (n.d.). At the mass level, religious and party affiliation are largely uncorrelated, despite the fact that the center-left PT was strongly tied to the Catholic left in its early years (Keck 1992; Mainwaring 1986; Samuels and Zucco 2018). Since 2015, the older linkage between partisanship and religious affiliation has resurfaced to a limited extent. In the midst of the enormous Operação Lava-Jato corruption scandal (“Operation Car Wash,” after one money laundering site), a wide-ranging set of investigations that have exposed endemic corruption across almost all parties, the PT lost about half its mass-level support. With the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff of the PT, evangelicals were somewhat quicker to jump off the PT bandwagon than were Catholics and adherents of other religions.¹ Still, the extreme weakness of the renewed Catholic-PT association—in 2017 11% of Catholics but 7% of Protestants/evangelicals identified with the party—only underscores the general absence of religious-partisanship linkages.

This lack of religious ties to parties contrasts markedly with the case of the United States. Hunter (1992) first popularized the term “culture wars” to describe a period of heightened

¹ Between the 2012 and 2017 AmericasBarometer waves, support for the PT dropped from 17% to 9%.
cultural tension in the United States initially triggered by political and cultural changes of the 1960s. While Hunter saw the combatants in this “war” as “orthodox” and “progressive” religious groups, subsequent scholarship shows that intensifying polarization and the rise of the Christian Right have been driven by politicians and parties; citizens have followed political elites’ leads (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Hetherington 2001; Layman and Carsey 2002; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Layman and Green 2006; Mason 2015). Today, issues such as abortion and gay marriage polarize US citizens into two partisan camps relying on distinct values and frames (Goren and Chapp Forthcoming; Jacoby 2014; Koleva et al. 2012; Putnam and Campbell 2011).

I define “culture wars” as pervasive and prolonged democratic conflicts within polities, between social groups who perceive their worldviews as fundamentally mutually incompatible.2 By “democratic” conflict, I mean that culture warriors stage their battles primarily using the arenas and weapons of contemporary democratic politics: elections, policy debates among elected officials, and strategies to influence public opinion. This does not preclude occasional outbreaks of physical violence resulting from heightened social tensions, but violence is usually peripheral and non-strategic. By “pervasive and prolonged,” I mean that an isolated skirmish does not constitute a culture war. Rather, many social groups in society choose sides, levels of hostility or negative inter-group affect are elevated, and the conflict extends across various battles. Different parties may perceive the aim to be the ultimate dominance of their social group or its worldview, or instead more discrete policy change.

2 The second half of this definition is similar to that of Hunter (1992), in the emphasis on competing groups defined by fundamental worldviews. However, thinking about the culture wars in comparative context reveals assumptions that were likely implicit in Hunter’s definition. To wit, I differ from Hunter in emphasizing the methods—democratic politics—and the extension of the conflict.
The competing worldviews that drive culture wars are typically delineated by religions—by which I mean sets of ideas and practices communities develop to describe transcendent forces beyond the reach of human senses, and to derive prescriptions for human behavior. In the contemporary era, culture wars have most often been defined by two poles on a continuum of religious devotion, ranging from “secular” to “religious conservative.” However, culture wars can also occur between members of different religious communities—for instance, evangelicals and Catholics, or Muslims and Christians. In the Brazilian case, the culture wars have taken place on two fronts simultaneously: between religious and secular citizens, and between evangelicals and Catholics. These worldviews do not necessarily need to define points of conflict on all issues; opponents often agree about many issues. Rather, culture wars are often fueled by disagreement on a relatively small number of issues, on which competing groups’ views are deeply held and expressed in sacred and dualistic, or Manichaean, terms: for instance, abortion or the ability to proselytize. When positions on such issues break down along the lines of identity groups such as religious communities, and one or both sides frame the debate in stark terms—perceiving existential threats or a struggle against supernatural evil forces—we have the raw material of culture wars. In the Brazilian case, issues related to homosexuality and church-state-relations are the most important drivers of the culture wars, while abortion sometimes also plays a role. Sometimes Catholics and evangelicals are allies in a contest against non-Christians, and at other times the two major religious groups are in conflict.

This book addresses two puzzles. First, how have Brazil’s culture wars developed, absent partisan leadership? Second, how have they affected Brazilian democracy in the post-1985 democratic period? These are urgent questions, as the intensification of Brazil’s culture wars in
the past decade has coincided with a decline in many indicators of the quality and sustainability of Brazilian democracy.

To explain Brazil’s religiously motivated conflict, I take a clergy-centered approach. Clergy rather than politicians drive Brazil’s culture wars. Two shocks triggered their activism. First, as in the United States, is a leftward shift in Brazilian society and public policy on issues related to sexuality, gender, and family roles. Conservative religious leaders have perceived policies such as the high court’s legalization of same sex marriage in a pair of decisions in 2011 and 2013 as deeply threatening to social order. The second shock entails increasing fragmentation of the religious landscape—a shift away from monolithic Catholicism, toward both religious non-adherence and evangelicalism—that has intensified inter-religious competition for what I will term “souls and money.”

Both religious ideas and group interests motivate Catholic and evangelical clergy. On the one hand, the experimental evidence presented in Chapter Four shows that Catholics and evangelicals both hold inflexible stances on one all-important issue, homosexuality, anchoring Catholics to the center and evangelicals to the right on this issue. On the other hand, the imperative of attracting and keeping souls affects clergy behavior. In the two-front culture wars, Catholic clergy contend with both secularism and evangelicalism; strategic calculations in response to the threat of membership loss sometimes push Catholics to de-emphasize certain “culture war” issues. At other times, membership pressures draw both evangelicals and Catholics into activism, or repress both evangelical and Catholic speech when clergy fear controversy.

The culture wars play out differently when driven by religious leaders. Sometimes the moral authority and iterated relationships clergy develop with congregants heighten their influence. However, citizens’ secular democratic norms also lead them to resist political
influence from clergy. As a result, clergy are highly influential on issues citizens see as core moral and religious concerns (ones Layman and Green 2006 would identify as “logically constrained” by religious doctrine), but relatively ineffective in guiding citizens on other political issues. This uneven influence shapes patterns of representation by inhibiting citizens’ ideological learning. In classic models of elite opinion leadership, party leaders should contribute to citizens’ development of ideology by helping them understand “what goes with what” (Converse 1964). Citizens who follow clergy views on only some issues will exhibit lower levels of ideological constraint. Congregants follow voting cues from clergy and fellow worshipers, and clergy effectively mobilize citizens to take part in behaviors such as turnout that are consensually supported by elites. Still, in the early 2000s, even leaders of the most highly politically effective and influential Pentecostal denomination, the UCKG, projected that only 20 percent of “their” voters will support the in-group candidate (Conrado 2001)—notable, but far from the fidelity rates typically found for partisans.³ Finally, religious guidance only occasionally affects partisanship. The partial nature of congregational influence could ultimately have social benefits, reducing ideological and partisan polarization at the mass level and dampening the tenor of the culture wars among citizens.

By contrast, clergy and religious denominations have substantial leverage over politicians whom they choose to support. In Brazil’s highly permissive party and electoral systems, hundreds of candidates run in most legislative districts, and religious leaders have great latitude to get their chosen candidates onto ballots. Furthermore, religious candidates attribute their electoral support more to their grassroots religious base than to mass partisanship, elite party

³ For example, in the 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study, 73% of people who identified as petistas (PT supporters) in June 2014 voted for Dilma Rousseff in the October 2014 first-round election, while just 39% of those who did not identify as petistas in June voted for her in October.
organization, or ties to wealthy social groups. Thus, when religious candidates get elected, they are beholden to religious patrons. Religious institutions’ influence is intensified when “their” elected representatives are themselves religious professionals.

The strong influence of clergy on elected representatives has troublesome implications for representation. Religious politicians are arguably better representatives of the clergy who constitute middlemen than of the religious citizens who voted for them. Still, in the context of the massive Lava-Jato corruption scandals, those religious middlemen have positive externalities for Brazilian democracy. Reliance on clergy as electoral intermediaries can reduce the need for large campaign donations from wealthy individuals—the kinds of transfers that feature prominently in corruption scandals, and that lead to overrepresentation of business interests.

How do Brazil’s culture wars affect citizens’ attachment to democracy? Religious politicking has strong benefits for Brazilian democracy, yet can also erode democratic quality. As citizen confidence in democracy, the political system, and elections plummets, continued trust in religious authorities who are themselves invested in the rules of the democratic game is helping to maintain the stability of the democratic system. Clergy constitute local civil society elites, who convey their own support for democracy to citizens, helping to boost the legitimacy of the political system. Moreover, clergy encourage many forms of electoral and non-electoral participation, contributing to a robust civil society. Over time, the declining credibility of politicians could lead citizens to give greater credence the political views of clergy, increasing the importance of clergy support for democracy. Nonetheless, clergy sometimes also erode democratic commitments among citizens. Clergy who perceive the political system as biased against their religious ingroup undermine their congregants’ confidence in that system. In
addition, clergy who promote dualistic, good-versus-evil visions of social conflict can contribute to intolerance of common religious outgroups, such as atheists and gays.

Finally, the clergy-driven nature of Brazil’s culture wars likely shapes the broader party system, exacerbating partisan fragmentation and extreme multipartisanship in Congress. When each religious leader has his (or occasionally her) own built-in base of support, there are few incentives for coordination. Evangelical organizers recognize the benefits they could achieve through collective action, especially the ability to win elections to executive office, where one needs to assemble majority coalitions of voters. Every election cycle features many calls for evangelical unity, and even for creating unified evangelical parties. However, the “pulverization” of evangelical candidate support reflects the “pulverization” of evangelical religious institutions. The problem is not just that there are no incentives for resolving the evangelical collective action problem. Rather, the nature of evangelical institutions actually creates disincentives for coordination, since religious groups that subordinate their own identity or “brand” to a broader evangelical collective may hurt their own long-term prospects for competitive church growth.

This insight has implications for a long debate among scholars of comparative politics over the causes of multipartisanship. In broad strokes, the debate has revolved around two potential explanations: one focused on the nature and number of fundamental social cleavages (e.g., Sartori 1976), and the other on the mechanical functioning of electoral institutions, as well as the incentives they create for strategic behavior (e.g., Duverger 1972). I do not assume that social cleavages automatically create parties. Nonetheless, I suggest that when competing civil society organizations are not simply allies to pre-existing parties, but actually coordinate candidacies, the organizations’ incentives for disunity at the level of civil society can undermine
incentives to electoral collective action. This argument thus brings together elements of both cleavage-based and competitive incentive-based approaches to understanding party systems.

More generally, this book contributes to our understanding of the causes and consequences of the culture wars by examining how such conflicts developed in a very different institutional and religious context from those studied until now. The great majority of academic work on the culture wars has focused on the United States. Some scholars have also examined the international activism of U.S.-based religious conservatives, particularly in Africa (e.g., Bob 2012; Kaoma 2014). More germane to the present study, a rich but relatively small literature traces how parties, religious activists, and political elites shape policy debates on issues such as abortion and homosexuality in a wide range of wealthy, highly institutionalized democracies (Ang and Petrocik 2012; Bean 2014b; Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen 2013; Grzymała-Busse 2015; T. A. Smith and Tatalovich 2003; Studlar and Burns 2015). A key conclusion emerges from this latter body of work: party institutions and political elites strongly affect the outcomes of potential religious and cultural conflicts. When political parties, elected officials, or high-level bureaucrats largely ignore orthodox-progressive cleavages in the electorate, those cleavages are less likely to shape policy. By contrast, when one or more groups of elites ally themselves with orthodox or progressive forces, latent issue cleavages are more likely to manifest in electoral divides or policy changes.

However, this insight poorly explains the Brazilian case, where political parties have largely failed to build strong linkages to religious groups, with the important exception of the PT in an earlier period. Furthermore, in Brazil’s secular, pluralistic policy-making context, no faction of bureaucrats has captured the policy process to benefit a single religious group. The clergy-driven approach I develop in this book better explains Brazil’s recent period of political
and social conflict. At the same time, it suggests broader lessons about how religious divides orient democratic politics. Just as parties can capture and exacerbate potential social cleavages for electoral gain, in countries with permissive party systems such as that of Brazil, religious groups can use the tools of democratic politics to aid in inter-religious competition.

Finally, this book contributes to scholarship on comparative religion and politics, synthesizing approaches in several domains. First, prior scholarship has tended to distinguish between “demand-side” and “supply-side” explanations of clergy behavior—that is, between explanations focusing on the social and political conditions stimulating doctrinal changes, and those focusing on the strategic calculations of clergy. By contrast, I argue that explaining clergy political activity requires considering the interaction between the religious supply- and demand-sides; the strategic calculations of clergy respond to changes in social and political conditions. Second, scholars debate the relative explanatory power of theologically-based policy ideas and institutional interests as incentives for clergy behavior. I argue, however, that both ideas and institutional interests matter to clergy. Moreover, ideas shape calculations of group interests by constraining the range of alternatives that can be considered. Third, the richest studies of religion and politics in Latin America have generally developed micro-level explanations of the political behavior either of Catholic or of Protestant clergy; rarely have scholars incorporated these two groups’ motivations and behaviors within a single study. Fully understanding how the ideological and institutional incentives clergy face affect their behavior, however, requires incorporating the two groups within a single theoretical framework.

But before we go further, let us introduce the actors who are the protagonists of this story. What are Brazil’s major religious groups? Which citizens join which groups? The next section takes up these questions.
The Protagonists: Evangelical and Catholic Individuals and Groups

Winds of change. At the large, middle class Vila Bela Methodist Church, a visiting African preacher was giving a sermon on a Wednesday night. The congregation was full. Doors were open to the street. Electric fans located high along the walls near the ceiling kept a cool breeze circulating through the room, and breathed some life into the colorful pendants decorating the congregation in honor of the guest. At the end of the preacher’s hour-long sermon on fighting the devil, he called all the congregants up to the front of the room for individual blessings. Long, single-file lines snaked through the sanctuary as ecstatic music played, pendants waved, and the visiting preacher blessed each person. About ten people fell to the floor in shaking trances when they were blessed. Attendants, obviously at the alert, jumped up each time a person fell to make sure he or she was arranged comfortably and was securely out of the way of foot traffic. [CO2]

A few weeks earlier, about thirty people had met for a prayer group in the sanctuary of the São Ignácio Catholic Parish in a working class neighborhood of Juiz de Fora for two-plus hours on a Thursday night. There was no formal service or preacher, though one of the participants stood up to give a long reflection on how the Holy Spirit had changed his life. Mostly, though, the group just sang and prayed, hands stretched upward. About an hour in, a breeze picked up through the open doors and windows, a relief on a hot night in the middle of a drought. And then there was a crack of thunder, and the sudden onslaught of rain drumming on the roof, and the dusty smell of ozone refreshed the air. As the prayer group ended, the rain let up a bit, but by the time I got down to the hill to my bus stop, I was thoroughly wet. [CO28]

This is not your grandmother’s Methodism, and it’s not your grandfather’s Catholicism. Methodism is typically classified as a “mainline Protestant” denomination in the United States,
and the common image of both Catholic and Methodist worship services is fairly staid. A month before the visiting preacher’s sermon at the Vila Bela Methodist Church, though, I had asked an affiliated Methodist pastor how he classified the congregation, whether as “traditional Protestant” or “evangelical” or “Pentecostal.” He responded that, “most people see our church as a traditional Protestant church, but today it’s very Pentecostal.” The pastor had come to believe Pentecostalism is more “Biblically justified.” He pointed out that Pentecostalism had changed even Catholicism. [CO23]

So what are these groups? Throughout this book, I follow Brazilian usage in applying the term “evangelical” (“evangélico”) to Brazil’s largest and most politically important religious minority. This highly diverse set of religious communities includes ones termed historical Protestant, evangelical, and Pentecostal. Historical Protestant denominations—often called “Mainline Protestant” in the United States—are ones arising from the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent fragmentation of denominations over the course of several centuries. Examples include Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Anglicans, Congregationalists, and Baptists. More recently, some Protestant congregations choose to be non-denominational.

Academics also use the term “evangelical” in a narrower sense, to refer to a subset of Protestants identified instead by their beliefs and behavior. Bebbington (1989) influentially defined evangelicalism based on four beliefs: “conversionism” (belief in the need to have an

Note: The note on fragmentation of denominations and the organization of some traditions within the Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A. (PCUSA) and the Presbyterian Church of Brazil is a detailed explanation of the complexity within these religious traditions. It highlights the diversity within Protestant denominations and the organizational structures that can vary greatly even within a single tradition. The example of the Church of England illustrates the territorial organization of national denominations within a global umbrella body, maintaining a unified identity and sharing much of its doctrine.
adult affirmation of religious commitment); “crucicentrism” (emphasis on Jesus’ death and resurrection to save humanity); “Biblicism” (special regard for the Bible); and “activism” (belief in the need for actively expressing faith and converting others). Robbins (2004) further discusses two distinctive behavioral commitments: moral asceticism, or emphasis on conservative codes of behavior; and continuous evangelism (“activism” in Bebbington’s scheme). Protestant individuals, congregations, and denominations may or may not be evangelical. In Brazil, the overwhelming majority of Protestant clergy, both ones in non-denominational congregations and those affiliated with historical Protestant traditions, adhere to these traits. They also emphasize supernaturalist aspects of Christian faith, and envision the divine as an agentic, interventionist presence in society (Bohn 2004; Mariz and Machado 1997; Pew Research Center 2006).

Figure 1 shows that the sporadic censuses of the 19th century registered extremely few evangelicals. At the time of Brazil’s independence from Portugal, Roman Catholicism officially constituted a religious monopolist, in that it was the religion of state. This is not to say everyone was Catholic in practice. Many people were non-observant, of course. More significantly, many practitioners of African-influenced, traditional and syncretic slave and former slave religions such as Umbanda and Candomblé told census-takers they were Catholic. Still, the census numbers tell the story of Roman Catholicism’s political and social power.

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5 Robbins discusses these as defining traits of Pentecostalism and charismatic Protestantism. However, they apply to evangelicalism more broadly.
Through most of the twentieth century, the proportion of the population identifying as Roman Catholic slowly fell, while waves of Protestant, evangelical, and Pentecostal missionaries gradually established footholds in various parts of the country (Mendonça 2006; Oro 2006). In the last three decades of the twentieth century, though, the pace of change quickened. As global Christianity’s “center of gravity” shifted southward in recent decades (Jenkins 2002, 2), Pentecostalism and evangelicalism swept across Brazil along with the developing world (Freston 2004; A. B. Fonseca 2008; Garrard-Burnett 2009; Pew Research Center 2006).

Figure 1 depicts a striking demographic change that observers generally date to about 1970—a sustained shift away from Roman Catholicism and toward evangelical, Pentecostal, and Protestant denominations (Levine 2009, 2012). An observer in the 1990s claimed that ten thousand Brazilians were abandoning Catholicism each day (Stockwell 1995). In 1970, 90 out of every 100 Brazilians told the Census they were Roman Catholics; forty years later, only 65 out
of every 100 did so. In the same time period, the number of evangelicals, Protestants, and Pentecostals quadrupled. Thus, there were 18 Catholics for every Protestant, evangelical, or Pentecostal in Brazil in 1970; in 2010, there were three. While Catholics will continue to outnumber Protestants in Brazil for many years, simply extrapolating the trend lines suggests that the 2020 census may register about two Catholics for every Protestant in the country.

The earliest Protestant missionaries were non-Pentecostal revivalists and evangelicals. Much of Protestantism’s growth in the 20th century, though, came from Pentecostalism. Pentecostalism arose out of revivalist movements in the United States in the early 20th century (Robbins 2004). Theologically, Pentecostals emphasize the immediate presence of the Holy Spirit, and promote spiritual “gifts” or miracles such as healing, casting out the devil, and speaking in tongues (Chesnut 2003b; Gaskill 2002; Pew Research Center 2006; Steigenga and Cleary 2007). The term derives from a miracle described in the Book of Acts in the Bible, in which Jesus’ disciples spoke in tongues on the Jewish feast day of the Pentecost, shortly after Jesus’ death. In practical terms, Pentecostal worship services are very lively affairs. Two early waves of Pentecostal conversions in the early and mid-20th century were associated with relatively slow growth (Anderson 2004).

Beginning in the 1970s, neo-Pentecostal denominations—a further off-shoot of Pentecostalism—such as the UCKG began to spread rapidly. In the 1970s and 1980s, neo-Pentecostalism made further theological contributions to global Christianity. First, “prosperity theology” holds that believers will be divinely rewarded with material blessings, including physical and mental health as well as financial prosperity; the doctrine generally has a greater emphasis on the supernatural in poorer countries (Autero 2015; B. Martin 2006; Mora 2008; Offutt 2015). This doctrine is highly controversial even within Pentecostalism, and many older
Pentecostal denominations reject it forcefully. Second, the notion of “spiritual warfare” posits that daily struggles result from encounters with locally contained evil spirits or demons, who can be cast out (Robbins 2004). Deities of non-Christian religions—including, in the Brazilian case, those of Umbanda and Candomblé—are often reframed as evil spirits.

Technically speaking, some Pentecostal individuals and congregations are not evangelical, in the narrower sense just defined (Løland 2015; Pew Research Center 2011). For practical purposes, though, we will see that Pentecostal and evangelical/mainline Protestant clergy tend to think and act in very similar ways. In surveys of citizens it is hard reliably to distinguish historical Protestants/evangelicals from Pentecostals because many adherents use these terms inconsistently or consider themselves to be a part of both groups.

Such has been the success and cultural importance of Pentecostalism that both non-Pentecostal Protestant groups and parts of the Catholic Church have become “Pentecostalized” (Bom 2015; Chesnut 2003a, 2003b). The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR) constituted the Church’s most successful new product in response to Pentecostalism (Chesnut 2003b; A. R. de Souza 2007). Chesnut estimated that by 2000, more than half of practicing Catholics were charismatics (2009). The movement was responsible for almost all of the Church’s rapidly expanded media presence, oriented around popular musician priests such as the handsome Padre Marcelo Rossi (Carranza 2006; Mariz 2006). This is the transformation to which the pastor cited in the introduction to this section was referring. Worship services in Pentecostalized religious traditions have become livelier, and there is a greater emphasis on miracles and the immediacy of ecstatic, spiritual experiences. Meanwhile, some historical Protestant groups have also adopted prosperity theology.
Yet another reason evangelicalism and Pentecostalism have impacts beyond what their proportion of the population might suggest is the relative devotion of their followers. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer surveys, 56% of evangelicals/Pentecostals said they attended worship service more than once a week, while just 14% of Catholics did so. Fully 80% of evangelicals/Pentecostals were in church at least weekly, compared to 37% of Catholics. Based on these numbers, Smith (Forthcoming) estimates that the average evangelical spends well over twice the number of hours a year in church as the average Catholic.

Beyond the two major groups of Christians considered in this study, the analysis includes an extremely diverse category of “other religions,” incorporating under just under 5% of the Brazilian population in 2010. This category includes two very small non-Protestant branches of Christianity, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Latter Day Saints; plus other major world religions such as Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. The largest proportion of “others,” though, belong to syncretic religions that are largely local creations, including Spiritism, Candomblé, and Umbanda. These last two African-influenced religions developed in slave communities and are culturally important in Brazil, yet their representation is low, in part because many practitioners also claim adherence to Christianity. With the rising political power of evangelicals, these religions have increasingly been the target of discrimination from evangelicals (Phillips 2015). Finally, the rate of the religious non-adherence has been slowly rising in Brazil; 8% of respondents in the 2010 census reported having no religion. Still, the overwhelming majority of people in this group say they believe in God, and some even attend church very regularly.

Demographers conclude that Brazilians of all ages and generations are becoming more evangelical and less Catholic (Coutinho and Golgher 2014; Jacob, Hees, and Waniez 2013). Still, change has been particularly accelerated among young people—a leading indicator. In the 2007
AmericasBarometer, 65 percent of 16-25 year olds identified as Catholic. Just seven years later, the 2014 AmericasBarometer recorded that only 51 percent of them did so. In the year the majority of the data presented in this book were collected, Catholicism was on the cusp of becoming a minority religion among its young adults. By 2017, 45 percent of that age group identified as Catholic, as did 44 percent of 26-35 year olds.

Who chose an affiliation other than Catholicism? The answer will be helpful in the following chapters, as we seek to understand how the need to attract and keep members affects religious leaders’ behavior. Figure 2 analyzes data from the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2017 rounds of the AmericasBarometer. Along the side of the figure are the independent variables—the characteristics of individuals, their places of residence, and the survey year that may influence what religious affiliation a person reported. All independent variables here (and throughout the book) are coded on a scale from 0 to 1 to make it easier to compare the relative sizes of the effects of each variable. When the dot corresponding to each independent variable is to the right of the 0 line, that independent variable makes it more likely for someone to report the given religious affiliation, rather than Catholic; when the dot is to the left of the 0 line, it makes it less likely for them to choose that affiliation over being Catholic. The lines surrounding the dot (or whiskers) represent 95% confidence intervals. When the 95% confidence interval does not overlap the 0 line, we say that the variable is statistically significant.
Context—geography, time, and age group—is the most important factor shaping who chooses a religious affiliation other than Catholicism. The top row of coefficients in the figure shows that over these nine years, respondents became much more likely to report that they were all three religious affiliations, other than Catholic. Age group is coded in categories from “16-25” to “over 65,” and then recoded to run from 0 to 1. Older people were less likely to say they were Protestant, Pentecostal, evangelical, or non-religious rather than Catholic; they were more likely to be members of other religions. The region of the country also strongly influences religious affiliation. And switching away from Catholicism is a decidedly urban phenomenon—people living in larger localities were much more likely to choose all three non-Catholic religious affiliations than people living in small and rural areas.
The bottom variables in the figure include a series of demographic characteristics and personal attitudes. These variables are relatively unimportant in determining who switched away from Catholicism. Women were a bit more likely than men to choose Protestantism, Pentecostalism, and other religions over Catholicism, while they were less likely than men to say they did not have a religion. People who identified as Afro-descendants were slightly more likely to identify as Protestant/Pentecostal, over Catholic Household wealth did not matter, but those with university educations were a bit more likely to say they were non-religious or were a member of some other religion. Finally, those who switched away from Catholicism held similar general political and social attitudes as those who remained; ideological identification, trust in other people, and political interest did not matter much for one’s choice of religion.

The Drama

*Political Activism among Evangelicals and Catholics Under Brazil’s Democratic Regime*

Though evangelicals and Catholics have been present in Brazil for centuries, the curtain lifts on the present story in 1986. Two events, or shocks, in the 1970s and 1980s set the stage. First, in the late 1970s a burst of religious creativity produced neo-Pentecostalism, and led to the establishment of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. This innovation forced other religious groups to adapt in order to compete. Second, Brazil returned to democracy in 1985, following a 21 year military regime. While the Brazilian state had long been constitutionally secular in that there was no official religion, the competitive conditions religious groups face have increasingly been open and relatively even. In Brazil’s increasingly free religious marketplace, the political positions clergy adopt and promote have been driven by strategic
competition among Catholic and evangelical congregations for adherents and financial resources—what I term “souls and money” in the next chapter.

For most of their history in Brazil, until about the time the curtain lifts, Brazil’s evangelicals had been viewed as clientelistic and apolitical (Burdick 1993a; Chesnut 1999; Corten 1999; A. D. Fonseca 2014; Garrard-Burnett 2009; Pierucci and Prandi 1995; Robbins 2004; Santos 2009). In the 1980s and 1990s, however, a classic evangelical saying that “Believers [evangelicals] don’t mess with politics” gave way to a new political slogan: “Brother votes for brother” (Freston 1993). Evangelicals emerged as a political force in the November 1986 elections to the National Constituent Assembly (held 1987-1988), which wrote Brazil’s current democratic constitution (Bohn 2007; Freston 1993; Mariano and Pierucci 1992; Oro 2006). The Constituent Assembly included 18 Pentecostal and 15 non-Pentecostal evangelical representatives (out of 559 total), prominently featuring members of the oldest and largest Pentecostal denomination, the Assembly of God. This first cohort began for the first time to function as a “bancada evangélica” (evangelical caucus) promoting evangelical positions (Dantas 2011). Subsequently, in the 1990s the UCKG began to develop a highly disciplined method of campaigning within congregations, utilizing religious symbolism as well as keen electoral strategizing to maximize the denomination’s electoral impact (Conrado 2001; Oro 2003a, 2003b).

The trajectory of political activism of the Roman Catholic Church in Brazil differs markedly from that of evangelical groups. At Brazil’s transition to democracy, Catholicism was known for leftist political activism. Though the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil had initially supported the military regime, it quickly turned against the regime and served as the

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6 In Portuguese, “Crente não mexe em política” and “Irmão vota em irmão.”
most important opposition force in civil society. Not only did Catholic leaders campaign actively for democracy, but priests inspired by liberation theology organized “ecclesiastical base communities” (comunidades eclesiais de base, or CEBs) to promote political consciousness and organizing among the poor (Bruneau 1980, 1982, Gill 1994, 1998; Mainwaring 1986). Some scholars suggest that this activism was a response to incipient competition from Protestants (Gill 1994, 1995; Hagopian 2008). As Gill argued, “To prevent nominal Catholics from choosing competitors, the episcopacy has advocated (or at least tolerated) innovative reforms that better serve these individuals” (1995, 405). It was during this period that the Catholic Church developed its historical ties to the PT (Keck 1992; Mir 2007; Tuñón 2018).

Following the transition to democracy, however, the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil became more quiescent. Gill (1995) argues that this transition, too, was stimulated by institutional pressures, as the Catholic hierarchy realized that it needed favors from the state to fund its substantial institutional overhead. Catholic leaders today avoid overtly partisan stances. Norms enforced throughout the Church hierarchy prohibit clergy from running for office and discourage explicit politicking during campaigns, though pastoral letters in Brazil commonly promote nonpartisan civic norms such as turnout and informed voting. The Catholic Church has also quietly maintained positions of political power behind the scenes. The Church has been the guiding force behind the interfaith National Forum for Religious Education, which advocates policy related to public religious education under the 1988 Constitution (L. A. Cunha 2009).

The Battle Lines: Issues and Positions

Conflict over gender and sexuality in large part drives Brazil’s culture wars. One area of contention has been public school curricula. In 2011, center-leftist President Dilma Rousseff was
forced to cancel plans for what opponents derided as a “gay kit”: a curriculum to promote
tolerance of homosexuality in high school sexual education materials. Nonetheless, the issue
remained at the top of public agendas, as the protester interviews suggest. In December 2017, the
Ministry of Education adopted a new National Common Curricular Base, which—after much
lobbying from all sides—ultimately eliminated all discussion of gender and homosexuality in
earlier drafts: both anti-homophobia language and provisions for religious education on gender
and sexuality (Ferreira and Mariz 2017). Beyond education policy, clergy, legislators, and
citizens also debate issues ranging from anti-hate speech legislation, to same sex marriage and
adoption (Dantas 2011; Vianna 2015). As one indicator of growing intolerance, murders of
LGBT individuals resulting from homophobia spiked 30% to an all-time high of 445 between
2016 and 2017, among the highest in the world (Cowie 2018; Jacobs 2016).

Evangelicals are often far to the right of Catholics on matters of gender and sexuality, as
illustrated in an anecdote of local activism. Participants in two different focus groups discussed
their congregations’ participation in a recent lobbying effort against the city’s annual “Miss Gay”
pageant. Local papers had simply announced that entire event had been canceled in 2014 due to a
“lack of public funds,” but the participants knew the roles their congregations and clergy had
played. As one participant said, “It was the union of evangelical churches that prevented Juiz de
Fora from becoming a gay city.” Another remarked, “the whole evangelical community prayed a
lot for it.” [FG3, FG4]

Abortion constitutes another issue motivating religiously-tinged political participation.
Here, though, evangelicals’ views have been more diverse than those of Catholics. For instance,
Edir Macedo, the founder and head of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG),
Brazil’s most politically important Pentecostal denomination, declared to his biographers, “I’m
in favor of a woman’s right to choose….Yes, I’m in favor of abortion. The Bible is too” (Lemos and Tavolaro 2007). Yet despite the UCKG’s tremendous growth, Bishop Macedo appears to have persuaded few citizens of his position on abortion. In Brazil, abortion is legal only under conditions of rape or threat to the mother’s life, and fewer than one in ten citizens—under one in twenty evangelicals and Pentecostals—think the law should be liberalized.7 Most evangelical leaders also disagree with Bishop Macedo, as does the Roman Catholic National Conference of Bishops of Brazil. Even clergy within Macedo’s own denomination tend to disagree. Macedo’s nephew, UCKG Bishop Marcelo Crivella, affirmed his opposition to abortion in successful campaigns for senator from the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2002 and 2008, and then for mayor of the city of Rio in 2016. Crivella has also asserted that botched abortions produce homosexual children (Polêmica Paraíba 2016).8 Macedo has found more support for his abortion views among politicians from the center-left Workers’ Party (PT, or Partido dos Trabalhadores), which he supported between 2002 and 2014.

A third policy issue regularly polarizing religious groups’ discussions of politics involves the public roles and rights of religious groups (Mariano 2011; Ranquetat Júnior 2016). Restrictions on evangelization are a frequent irritant. As just one example, in 2014 Federal Senator Magno Malta, a Baptist pastor, led a successful charge against a proposed regulatory change that would have prohibited churches from proselytizing to participants in publicly funded drug treatment programs (Malta 2014). At the same time, members of Afro-Brazilian religions increasingly fear persecution on the part of evangelical elected officials. For instance, the aforementioned mayor of Rio, Bishop Marcello Crivella, has been accused of implementing new

7 Results from the 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study. See Chapter Six for further discussion.
8 A further example of UCKG clergy disagreement with Macedo’s stance is found in [CO42].
rules related to scheduling events that would enable him to discriminate against events sponsored by Afro-Brazilian religious groups. Religious groups also fight over tax policy. For instance, in 2015, evangelical legislators succeeded in negotiating churches’ exemption from a controversial financial tax known as the CPMF (Neto 2015); meanwhile, secular groups question churches’ exemption from income, social security, and sales taxes.

Another anecdote of local evangelical activism illustrates this priorities. An evangelical focus group participant recounted the story of her friend’s Methodist congregation in a different city. A neighboring congregation (likely Catholic) had begun constructing a moderately large crucifix outside their property. The members of the Methodist congregation were offended by the image of Jesus on the cross, which violated their religious sensibilities. The members of the congregation organized, and were able to get city council to prevent the construction of the crucifix, on the grounds that it would be a traffic hazard. [FG3]

Beyond the triumvirate of abortion, homosexuality, and church-state relations, other issues sporadically become salient. For instance, in May 2017 the Mackenzie Presbyterian University announced that it would open a research center promoting the theory of intelligent design; support came from the Discovery Institute, a think tank known for anti-evolution activism in the United States (Demartini 2017). This institute’s opening could be the harbinger of future religious conflicts over education policy.

The 2010 and 2014 Presidential Elections

The 2010 national presidential campaign mobilized both evangelical and Catholic communities. In the final month of the first round campaign, videos surfaced of an interview in which the front-runner PT candidate Dilma Rousseff appeared to support decriminalizing
abortion. The information quickly spread through evangelical and Catholic media, sermons, DVDs distributed in houses of worship, chain emails, and YouTube videos (Lisboa 2010; Moraes 2010). Though Dilma had looked to be a shoo-in to win the October 3 first round election outright, she unexpectedly came in with less than an outright majority of the popular vote, while Marina Silva, a born-again member of the Assemblies of God, had an unexpectedly strong showing at 19%. The campaign went into a second round runoff against José Serra from the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB).

In the weeks leading up to the October 31 runoff, the Pope weighed in, directing bishops to instruct Catholics to consider carefully candidates' stances on abortion (Lisboa 2010). Violating electoral law, a popular Catholic television station played a sermon preaching against voting for Dilma (Abril.com 2010; Borges 2010). Yet other religious groups—prominent among them, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG)—endorsed Dilma. In the Folha Universal, the church’s weekly newspaper distributed in congregations nationwide, the UCKG accused the Catholic Church of “trying to interfere” in the elections, and of “taking part in an aggressive and defamatory campaign against Dilma” (Folha Universal 2010, 13). The same newspaper featured a prominent pull-out quote from former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB, implying that his co-partisan Serra might be subject to supernatural evil forces: “Serra has some demons in him that sometimes even he can’t control” (2010, 16). As clergy endorsements poured in on both sides, Dilma met with top religious leaders, promising not to legalize abortion (Sant’Anna 2010). On October 31, she handily won the second round.

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9 I adopt the Brazilian custom of referring to most politicians by their first names. Polling results from "Tracking Vox Populi/Band/iG: Dilma tem 53% dos votos válidos." Último Segundo. October 2, 2010.
10 FH Cardoso almost certainly intended the word “demon” metaphorically, but the UCKG authors of this newspaper article very likely intended for the word to be taken literally, given UCKG cosmology. Thanks to Taylor Boas for sharing this newspaper, which he found in the Columbia University archives.
Much of the analysis in this book is based on a case study of the 2014 national election. The campaign for Brazil’s October 2014 general election was officially launched in July, though politicians had begun preparing months previously and civil society groups had begun to kick into gear in June. Media outlets widely described the legislative elections as a watershed for evangelicals. At the presidential level, two evangelicals were candidates: Marina Silva, a born-again member of the Assembly of God with a long history of leading leftist and environmentalist movements; and Pastor Everaldo Dias Pereira, a much more conservative member of the Assembly of God. Incumbent President Dilma Rousseff remained comfortably in the lead throughout the campaign. Outside of first place, though, there was a great deal of volatility, stimulated in part by the tragic death of socialist candidate Eduardo Campos in a plane crash a month and a half before the first round election. The evangelical Marina Silva, his running mate, quickly rocketed into second place when the Socialist Party confirmed her as his replacement. The candidate Aécio Neves from the center-right Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) overtook her in the last few days before the election, however, and only Dilma and Aécio went on to the second round. Dilma won the second round three weeks later. At the legislative level, 2014 saw a 47% rise over 2010 in the number of congressional candidates running using titles indicative of evangelical religious leaders, such as “pastor” (Tavares 2014). Evangelicals’ legislative success was exemplified by the election of Eduardo Campo, a member of the Sara Nossa Terra denomination, as president of the Chamber of Deputies in January 2015.

Evangelicals’ growing political presence was also felt among campaign activists and voters. Clergy and citizens seeking to campaign in church skirted the 2014 electoral rules, which prohibited some forms of electoral propaganda and formal campaigning on church property (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2014). More specifically, the Superior Electoral Tribunal forbade
campaigns’ use of loudspeakers or amplifiers within 200 meters of church property “when [the churches are] in operation” (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2014, 205). In addition, churches were covered by rules prohibiting the “transmission of political advertising” such as signs, flags, or banners in “goods of common use” such as churches, parks, and public gymnasiums (206). Nonetheless, penalties for violation were minor or non-existent. Electoral law stipulated that churches caught using loudspeakers or amplifiers would simply be made to turn them off (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2012). Those caught posting illegal advertising would have 48 hours to remove the advertising before facing a fine ranging between R$2,000 and R$8,000 (about US$1,000 to US$4,000 at the then-current exchange rate).

Nonetheless, as in other recent elections, many high-profile pastors made their preferences with respect to presidential and legislative candidates known in the media. The media also widely reported on informal campaigns within evangelical congregations (Mali 2014). Fines were minor. Clergy communicated their preferences in both subtle and overt ways, and co-religionist candidates often attended services. Evangelicals highlighted the need to elect coreligionists and to combat legislative initiatives involving gay and transgender rights threatening the traditional family (S. D. de Souza 2013, 2014). Still, evangelical influence was hampered by the fact that evangelicals were far from united in candidate choice. In addition to many endorsements of the two evangelical candidates, pastors also endorsed both Dilma Rousseff and Aécio Neves.

11 “Nos bens...de uso comum...é vedada a veiculação de propaganda de qualquer natureza, inclusive pichação, inscrição a tinta, fixação de placas, estandartes, faixas e assemelhados.”
By the time of the 2014 election, the fabric of the Brazilian polity was showing unmistakable signs of fraying edges. A long period of sustained economic growth had ended in the early 2010s, leading to growing pessimism about the Workers’ Party and dissatisfaction with the performance of incumbent President Dilma Rousseff. In June 2013, what Brazilians still know as the “June Protests” began, as citizens nationwide took to the streets—many for the first time in their lives—to take a stand in favor of public funding for social services and basic infrastructure, and against large public works projects in preparation for the World Cup (Alonso and Mische 2016; M. Moseley and Layton 2013). These protests were marked by rejection of parties and partisanship (Alonso and Mische 2016). Then in late 2014, hints of the Operation Car Wash corruption scandal began to appear. In this context, the incumbent president squeaked over the finish line in first place in the second round election of October 2014.

Within the first year of Dilma Rousseff’s second term in office, a movement for her impeachment arose in the National Congress. The long political, partisan process culminated in seven-month proceedings that polarized civil society. On the streets of most big cities in the country, red-clad petistas protesting what they called a rightist “coup” clashed with pro-impeachment protesters decked out in the colors of the Brazilian flag. People who made the mistake of wearing the color red without political intent sometimes found themselves the target of public ire. In April 2017, nine months after the completion of the impeachment, Brazilians remained highly polarized over the legitimacy of the proceedings. In that month, the AmericasBarometer asked Brazilians whether they thought it had been fair. Responses were bimodal. More than half of respondents gave the impeachment the very highest or very lowest rating: 21% reported a “1,” indicating they strongly disagreed, and 32% reported a “7,”
indicating that they strongly agreed that the impeachment was fair. While there were small
differences between religious groups—with evangelicals on average slightly more supportive of
impeachment than Catholics, and the non-religious slightly less supportive—responses were
bimodal within every religious group, indicating high levels of polarization.

In September 2016, President Michel Temer, Dilma’s former vice president and one of
the masterminds of the impeachment proceedings, took office already highly unpopular. In 2017,
his fiscal austerity policies and labor reforms once again became the impetus for protest. By June
of that year, the country had spent nearly two years in a state of constant elite-level political
crisis. The Operation Car Wash corruption scandal continued to expand to engulf a large
percentage of elected politicians. Thus, in 2017, when the LAPOP AmericasBarometer went
back into the field and I revisited many congregations for follow-up interviews, Brazil was in
many ways a changed country.

Brazil’s democratic troubles registered in many quantitative indicators. For instance, the
Varieties of Democracy project noted a drop in Brazil’s “Liberal Democracy Index” from 2.98 to
2.26 between 2015 and 2016 (the latest year available). Democratic indices from Freedom House
and the Economist have likewise registered small but important declines in the level of Brazilian
democracy since 2015. Meanwhile, public support for democracy among Brazilian citizens
appears to have eroded even more rapidly. In 2012, 69% of Brazilians agreed with the statement
that “democracy may have problems, but it is better than the alternatives”—a level of support
that had been essentially constant in 2007, 2008, and 2010. By 2014, support for democracy had
dropped to 63%, and by 2017 to 52%.12 Meanwhile, an index of citizens’ perceptions of the

12 Data on support for democracy and the legitimacy of the political system are from the AmericasBarometer. In the
AmericasBarometer, the legitimacy of the political system is based on responses to five questions asking about
legitimacy of the political system dropped from 0.50 on a 0 to 1 scale in 2010, to 0.45 in 2012, and 0.38 in 2014. By 2017, legitimacy had dropped further to .34. Moreover, levels of both partisanship overall and petismo (sympathy for the PT) have declined in tandem with the legitimacy of democracy and the political system.

What role have clergy, congregations, and other religious actors played in the weakening of democracy? Have they bolstered the political system? Or have the culture wars contributed to the slow, partial erosion of the Brazilian democracy? Throughout the book, we will find that clergy at times play important roles in bolstering the legitimacy of the political system among citizens. At the same time, clergy engagement in partisan politics and clergy grievances against the political system can also weaken congregants’ attachment to democracy and tolerance for fellow citizens.

Plan of the Book

The next chapter outlines the argument that motivates the book. What has produced Brazil’s culture wars? And what are the consequences for democracy? After considering two approaches developed to explain the culture wars in other countries—namely, international rightist movements and the actions of party elites—the chapter takes up a clergy-centered explanation. Religious leaders, I argue, are rational actors who seek to maximize a combination of theological and material institutional objectives related to financial resources and membership bases. Those institutional objectives at times push clergy into political activism, and at other times cause them to exercise self-restraint in expressing theological and political views. That citizens’ perceptions that the courts, institutions, and political system generally protect basic rights (see discussion in Appendix C).
self-restraint reduces clergy influence on citizens, and ultimately mutes the stridency of the
culture wars at the citizen level. However, clergy have stronger influence over the views of in-
group candidates, in part because they select the candidates. The implications for Brazilian
democracy are mixed.

Chapter Three then describes the book’s empirical strategy, which triangulates evidence
from a large number of surveys. Much of the evidence comes from a series of studies in the city
of Juiz de Fora. In 2008/2009, I conducted five months of dissertation field work surrounding the
mayoral elections in the city of Juiz de Fora in the southeast region of the country, in the state of
Minas Gerais. A lesbian university professor opposed by evangelical groups took first place in
the first round election but was defeated in the second round. Data from a survey of citizens
conducted in November 2008 provide insight into political learning and mobilization in
congregations. I returned to the same city in July–November 2014 and June 2017 for an in-depth
study of mobilization within congregations in the run-up to the presidential election. The
fieldwork included quantitative surveys of clergy across the city (augmented with surveys of
clergy in Rio de Janeiro and Fortaleza); a citizen-level survey within eight congregations and
nearby health centers; participant observation within congregations; and focus groups examining
congregant norms regarding congregational politicking.

Throughout the book, I use survey experiments to attempt to get a better handle on how
congregational politicking works. A rapidly growing new body of work applies experimental
methods to core questions in religion and politics. Experiments improve on individuals’ self-

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13 This city has become a focus for a number of academic studies of social influence, analogously to the US political
socialization studies focused on South Bend (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006; A. E. Smith 2016).
14 For a sampling of this new field, see Albertson (2011); Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche (2015); Boas
(2014); Djupe and Calfano (2014); Glazier (2013); McClendon and Reidl (2015); Weber and Thornton (2012).
reports of what their clergy say; they enable researchers to tease apart potential causal mechanisms for observed correlations; and they can improve causal inferences. The present study is among the first to apply survey experimental methods to study religious elites (see also Calfano and Oldmixon 2016; Calfano, Michelson, and Oldmixon 2017; Calfano, Oldmixon, and Suiter 2014). Experimental methods are especially revealing in studying religious elites because clergy are particularly likely to self-censor, given that their public leadership roles entail moral suasion. For instance, though very few clergy openly admitted to declining membership, priming clergy to think about the threat of competition nonetheless affected the way they responded to subsequent questions.

Beyond these studies, the book also includes evidence from nationally representative studies of Brazilian adults by the AmericasBarometer, Pew Forum, and 2010 and 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Studies (Ames et al. 2013, 2016); a panel study of political socialization in two cities between 2002 and 2006 (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006); two survey experimental studies recruiting opt-in, online samples through Facebook (Boas and Smith 2015); and the Brazilian Legislative Surveys, which examined legislators’ attitudes (Power and Zucco 2012). These above-mentioned data sets are not described in Chapter Three, but rather briefly introduced in the chapters in which they are used. Further details on each dataset are presented in Appendix C.

The “meat” of the book centers around six chapters describing how religious elites, congregants, and politicians construct the culture wars and shape Brazilian democracy. Part II focuses on clergy ideas and behavior. Chapter Four examines what clergy think and say about policies ranging from same-sex marriage to the environment. Chapter Five considers how clergy engage in politics, and encourage their congregants to do the same. Clergy broadly agree that churches should encourage democratic participatory norms: not only going to the polls, but also
making careful and non-clientelistic vote choices. However, most clergy avoid taking stances on candidates, largely due to sensitivity to congregants’ social norms. I argue that both perceived policy threats within the larger society and institutional pressures to attract and retain members shape what we might call the “political agenda” in congregations. Clergy speech on political and public matters is also driven by their democratic commitments and their doctrinal approaches.

Part III then turns to citizens. Chapter Six studies what congregants think about policy issues such as the abortion or the environment. At the mass level, Brazil’s culture wars drive religious gaps on just a few issues, most importantly homosexuality, the rights and responsibilities of churches, and abortion. Analysis of the congregational study reveals that congregations develop distinctive political cultures; secular norms inhibit influence, while doctrinal conservatism enhances it. Chapter Seven deals with congregational influence on congregants’ electoral behavior. Evidence indicates that church-goers who are exposed to civic messages in church are more likely to go to the polls, and that evangelical clergy campaigning can sway evangelical voters. However, clergy influence is far from automatic: influence is stronger among those who adhere less strongly to secular norms, and in congregations with higher levels of doctrinal conservatism. Chapter Eight argues that religious groups have multivalent, ambivalent impacts on congregants’ attachment to democracy. On the one hand, clergy political speech often bolsters congregants’ support for the political system and stimulates many forms of political participation, bolstering a democratic system that is in peril. On the other hand, religious groups erode support for the political system when clergy tell congregants their groups are unfairly treated; religious attendance also exacerbates intolerance of the civil liberties of disliked groups, especially among evangelicals.
Part IV then examines how clergy and congregant interactions around political issues in Brazil’s representative democracy. Chapter Nine finds that evangelical legislators improve representation in certain policy areas, since elected legislators as a whole have generally been unrepresentative of the Brazilian population at large on issues such as homosexuality and abortion. However, evangelical legislators deviate from the interests of evangelical citizens in some issue areas, promoting conservative positions on economic policy and race that are not aligned with the evangelical base. In these areas, the views of evangelical legislators more closely resemble those of clergy. These policy deviations may be facilitated by personalistic ties forged between politicians and citizens forged in church, and perhaps by clientelism.

In the concluding chapter I review the findings in light of the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Two. I consider the lessons from this case for scholars of comparative politics and religion and politics more broadly. Finally, I speculate on the likely future of religious politics in Brazil during a period of ascendance of the ideological right.
PART IV. REPRESENTATION
Chapter Ten. Conclusion: Mobilizing the People of God

On January 9, 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that, per the American Convention on Human Rights, Costa Rica must legalize same-sex marriage—a ruling that the court held applied to all 22 signatory countries in the region. Costa Rica has long been perceived as one of the most stably democratic countries in the region, with high levels of citizen support for democracy and the political system. Nonetheless, the ruling was highly unpopular among Costa Ricans, the majority of whom oppose same-sex marriage. It upended the campaign for the first round presidential elections, which were to be held February 4. Almost instantaneously, the evangelical preacher Fabricio Alvarado from the tiny National Restoration Party began a meteoric ascent in the polls, rising from somewhere between 3 and 5% of vote intentions in the week of the ICHR ruling to take first place with 25% of the vote three weeks later (BBC News 2018). In the process, he crowded out the centrist candidate Antonio Álvarez, from one of the largest and oldest parties in Costa Rica, who had previously been polling in first place. In the April 1 second round, Fabricio Alvarado faced off against Carlos Alvarado (no relation), from the small, relatively new center-leftist Citizens Action Party—a contest the center-leftist handily beat. Thus, the ICHR ruling was transformational: it polarized the presidential election, boosted the profile of the religious right, and may have dealt the death blow to Costa Rica’s ailing traditional party system. The impacts promise to extend throughout Latin America. As gay rights advocates prepare to bring domestic court cases on the basis of the ICHR ruling in countries such as Panama, Guatemala, and El Salvador, the religious right will certainly begin to mobilize as well (The Economist 2018).
Across Latin America, religious demographics are changing, following patterns that parallel the shifts found in Brazil. Analyzing regional trends in the AmericasBarometer between 2004 and 2012, Boas and Smith find that “the Catholic Church has lost a significant share of identifiers in every country but Argentina, El Salvador, and Venezuela” (2015, 101). Between 2010 and 2016/2017, new AmericasBarometer analysis indicates that the percentage of the population identifying as Catholic dropped from 60% to 49%; the majority of Catholicism’s loss contributed to swell the ranks of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism. The percentage identifying as evangelical/Pentecostal in the 2016/2017 round of the AmericasBarometer ranged from 43% in Guatemala to 9% in neighboring Mexico. Meanwhile, the percentage reporting that they did not have a religion ranged from 39% in Uruguay to 2% in Uruguay and Paraguay.

We also find many instances of evangelicals flexing political muscle. Guatemala, with the highest percentage of evangelicals in the region, has now had three evangelical presidents. Most prominent among them is the strongman General Efraín Ríos Montt, whose 17-month administration prosecuted a genocidal war against highlands indigenous villages in 1982 and 1983. Under democracy, Guatemala’s evangelical presidents include Jorge Serrano Elías (1991–1993), and the entertainer Jimmy Morales (who took office in 2016). In Colombia, evangelical mobilization is widely credited with derailing the government’s 2016 referendum to approve a peace deal negotiated with the FARC rebel group. Though the referendum itself did not touch on matters of gender or sexuality, rightist political leaders were able to link the peace deal in the public imagination with the April 2016 approval of same sex marriage, and with the government’s efforts to support gay and transgender students in public schools. And across Latin America, we find a growing number of evangelical parties: for instance, Visión con Valores...
It might seem obvious that the former set of changes—demographic shifts—trigger the latter—rising incorporation of evangelicals into politics. Nonetheless, this connection is less clear cut than one might assume. Evangelical presence in the population does not necessarily translate into evangelical might in the voting booths, much less evangelical representation in the halls of power. Chile dramatically illustrates the sometime disconnect between evangelical conversion and evangelical ingroup voting. In 2016, the AmericasBarometer registered that 21% of Chileans identified as evangelical—a figure not far from the evangelical presence in Brazil in 2010. Yet Boas notes no evangelical party has formed in Chile, and that since its democratic transition in 1990, “Chile has had, on average, only two evangelical representatives in Congress,” while few evangelicals run for office (2018, 3). At the mass level, Chilean evangelicals are largely disengaged from the political sphere (Fediakova 2012). Comparing Chile to Brazil, Boas notes that,

Like their Brazilian counterparts, Chile’s evangelicals have gained inclusion…. Mainstream Chilean politicians treat evangelicals as an important interest group, offering policy commitments during campaigns and making a show of attending an annual inter-denominational service of thanksgiving organized by evangelical churches. Yet inclusion has taken very different forms in the two countries. In Brazil, evangelicals have sought and achieved influence within the halls of power, whereas in Chile, they have remained primarily on the sidelines. (2018, 3-4)

The case of Costa Rica constitutes yet another puzzle. Though evangelicals and Pentecostals constituted 26% of respondents in the 2016 AmericasBarometer, evangelical candidates have historically received only a small fraction of that vote. In fact, one observer marveled that legislative candidates from evangelical parties had received 8% of the 2016 vote—admittedly, a dramatic rise from 3% in the 1998 elections (Salazar 2017). It is also worth remembering that
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Amy Erica Smith

until the surprise event of the ICHR ruling, fewer than one in twenty likely voters in Costa Rica intended to support the evangelical candidate.

Thus, thinking about the broader Latin American context brings the questions and theories driving this book into new relief. In this chapter, we revisit the book’s central questions. First, what explains religious groups’ entry into politics and the polarization of politics along religious lines? Second, what are the consequences for Latin American democracy?

Toward an Explanation of the Culture Wars in Latin America

Why the sudden success of evangelical politicians in Costa Rica? Or to turn the question on its head, what explains evangelicals’ mediocre performance in Costa Rica until the turning point of January 9, 2018? More generally, why do evangelicals enter politics in some times and places but not others?

In broad terms, there are two possible answers. Evangelicals fail to enter politics because either (a) they don’t want to; or (b) they can’t. To put it another way, religious groups enter politics when they have both the motivation and the opportunity and resources to do so. All three—motivation, opportunity, and resources—are necessary; absence of any one prevents a group from entering politics.

Two types of threats appear to motivate candidates with religious linkages to run for office, and also to motivate voter support for religiously-linked candidates and causes (as in, for instance, the case of the Colombian referendum). First, actual or threatened liberalization of policies related to sexual and family traditionalism often precipitates vehement religious mobilization. In Latin America, same-sex marriage appears to have been a particularly powerful trigger, perhaps because public policy has moved leftward much more quickly on this issue than
on other touchy issues such as abortion. Thus, we have seen that legalization of gay marriage in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Colombia provoked a conservative backlash in each country. Corrales argues that evangelicals and Pentecostals have been the most important group resisting LGBT rights in Latin America (2017). Yet abortion has at times also stimulated mass mobilization among both evangelicals and Catholics (e.g., Heumann and Duyvendak 2015 on Nicaragua).

Second, perceived threats to the religious ingroup also motivate political action. Such threats sometimes come from the state. For instance, Boas (2018) argues that the careful separation of church and state in Chile explains the puzzle identified above—the dramatic political under-performance of evangelicals, especially relative to their coreligionists in Brazil. In Brazil, following separation of church and state in the 19th century, the Catholic Church gradually recovered many privileges in the early 20th century that became sources of grievance for evangelical congregations seeking to expand. Brazilian evangelical mobilization in the 1980s was oriented precisely to dismantle those privileges, and was ultimately successful. By contrast, Boas (2018) argues that Chilean evangelicals failed to enter politics simply because they saw no need to do so, as the state did not threaten their rights and privileges. This was particularly the case because of Catholic politicians’ conservatism on matters of sexual and family traditionalism. Since 2010, and accelerating in the past two years, however, Chilean public policy has begun to move somewhat leftward on abortion and same-sex marriage. One might expect that real and threatened policy changes would trigger increasing political activism among Chilean evangelicals. Nonetheless, the staunch conservatism of the Chilean Catholic Church—especially in contrast to the Brazilian Catholic Church—may head off the need for evangelicals to enter politics. That is, lay evangelicals in the Chilean public may essentially delegate
representation to Catholic conservative candidates whom they believe represent them substantively (i.e., in policy views), if not descriptively (i.e., demographically).

But a purely state-centered approach misses some of the conditions that can motivate political action. Threats from religious outgroups also often motivate religious groups to get involved in politics. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Two, both Trejo (2009, 2014) and Gill (1998) argue that rising competition from Protestants triggered and shaped the course of Catholic political engagement. And in Chapters Five and Six, we found that threats to the membership base led Catholic clergy to pivot toward the left on many issues, likely seeking to appeal to more secular voters, and also to increase their engagement in elections. Meanwhile, reminders of inter-religious threat led evangelical clergy increasingly to emphasize the importance of lobbying elected officials.

Religious groups also need the opportunity to engage in politics. Most basically, secularism and democracy facilitate their political engagement, providing freedoms of conscience, speech, and association necessary for mobilization. Though this point may seem obvious, it is worth remembering in the Latin American context, where evangelical and Pentecostal activism has largely been a phenomenon of third wave (i.e., post-1980) democracies. If Latin America enters a new era in which liberal democratic freedoms erode, the recession of civil liberties could affect the ways religious groups approach the political sphere.

Beyond the impact of regime type, the electoral and party systems can also facilitate or hinder groups’ entry into politics. In Brazil, both have been exceptionally porous, guaranteeing many opportunities for evangelical engagement in electoral politics. The combination of extreme multipartism and high magnitude electoral districts (that is, districts in which many representatives are elected at once) has led party leaders under pressure to fill out their slates on
ballots to accept new (evangelical) blood eagerly. In addition, Brazil’s form of open list proportional representation in high magnitude districts enables candidates to target their mobilization efforts on specific electoral corrals such as congregations (Ames 2001). The significance of these rules is evidenced by the fact that evangelicals have had a much harder time getting candidates elected to executive office or the Senate.

Finally, religious groups need resources: perhaps most importantly, human ones. Demographics are not destiny, but they are correlated with groups’ fortunes. In countries with larger evangelical populations, evangelicals are more likely to succeed in electoral politics, and successfully to mobilize resistance to policy changes such as promotion of LGBT rights (Corrales 2017; Mora Torres 2010). High levels of religious attendance and devotion among evangelicals and Pentecostals increase the value of these human resources. Resources can also be ideational and psychological. When religiously based candidates and clergy campaign, they draw on shared language, theology, religious symbols, and ingroup identities to mobilize ingroup turnout and activism (Albertson 2014; Calfano and Djupe 2009; Chapp 2012; Oro 2003b, 2006).

This discussion highlights at least three important questions that merit future reflection, theorizing, and investigation. First, why are religious groups so readily motivated by these particular sets of issues: policy related to family and sexual traditionalism, and ingroup threats? What is it about abortion and homosexuality that makes them the most common triggers for culture wars across the globe? One possible answer could be that these two sets of issues uniquely violate what many evangelicals and Pentecostals perceive as the core of their religious tradition. In Chapter One, we saw that moral asceticism and frequent evangelism are defining characteristics of these religious traditions. Abortion and homosexuality violate dictates of moral asceticism; encroachment by the state or other religious groups threatens the dictate to
Moreover, the tendency towards a dualistic, good-versus-evil worldview in evangelicalism and Pentecostalism may make adherents more susceptible to mobilization when moral asceticism and evangelism are threatened. This is just one possibility; a good answer to the question will likely need to draw on qualitative and quantitative research in a variety of disciplinary traditions, including political psychology, religious studies, and political behavior.

Second, how do religious groups come to perceive and frame threats either from the state or other religious groups? Scholars can measure religious freedoms, levels of secularism, and state encroachment on religious groups’ rights with a reasonable degree of objectivity. Nonetheless, we know robustly from studies of identity and inter-group conflict that groups often construct their own narratives of deprivation and threat that differ from social scientists’ perceptions. In addition, entrepreneurial civil society and political leaders often manipulate perceptions instrumentally. Perhaps Chilean evangelicals might have come to perceive their group as threatened if community leaders had chosen to convey that message. Throughout this book, we have seen that Brazil’s evangelical and Pentecostal clergy and citizens often feel threatened by the state, in ways that many observers might suspect are exaggerated. Meanwhile, supporters of Afro-Brazilian religions likewise perceive evangelicals as threats to their group. Thus, we need more work on the determinants of perceived religious threat.

Third, recognizing the importance of ideational and psychological resources opens up new questions. How do religious leaders choose which symbolic resources to mobilize? Are some types of resources likely to be effective more effective in mobilizing individuals? Future research should explore these and other questions.
The Democratic Consequences of Religious Engagement in Politics

The broad Latin American context also illuminates the second question driving this manuscript: how do (and how will) the culture wars shape electoral politics and democracy in Latin America? Early studies of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism across the developing world in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s initiated a yet-unresolved debate over the religious tradition’s impact on the democratic dispositions of adherents (Robbins 2004; Steigenga 2003). Some scholars maintain that evangelical and Pentecostal congregations promote conservatism, authoritarianism, and deference to authority (e.g., Bastian 1993; Corten 1999; Rink 2017). Yet proponents of what is often called the neo-Weberian thesis perceive evangelical and Pentecostal congregations as sites where adherents—often society’s excluded—learn civic skills and attitudes critical for democracy (e.g., Burdick 1993b; Lankina and Getachew 2012; D. Martin 1993; Marshall 2009; Stoll 1990). One potential resolution to this disagreement has been to point out that heterogeneous congregations have heterogeneous impacts on heterogeneous individuals. Some congregations are hierarchical, while others are open and democratic; some individuals learn participatory skills at church, while others fail to do so (Ireland 1993, 1999; Robbins 2004).

My approach to this disagreement is slightly different. It is not simply that some people receive the normatively desirable effects of religion, and others the normatively less desirable ones. When congregations get involved in politics, I argue, they often simultaneously integrate citizens into democratic politics and foster rightist conformity and intolerance. These competing stories are not mutually incompatible. Mobilizing the people of God has multivalent impacts in the developing world; the two partial visions both present aspects of a complex reality.
How Congregational Politics Fosters Rightism and Intolerance

Ultimately, as we will see, congregational engagement in the political system incorporates citizens into democratic politics in ways that fundamentally strengthen political systems, particularly ones in crisis. Nonetheless, congregational politics also often reshapes the distribution of political preferences in the electorate, pushing public opinion as a whole in a conservative direction. Furthermore, congregations may exacerbate certain authoritarian impulses among citizens.

Evangelical and Pentecostal church attendance often reinforces and intensifies right-leaning views of congregants on sexual and family traditionalism. Clergy in these religious traditions are, with some exceptions, reliably highly conservative on issues such as abortion and homosexuality. Conservative citizens may self-select into evangelical and Pentecostal congregations; nonetheless, non-conservatives who happen into the congregational milieu are influenced by the dominant ideological tendency. Congregations with doctrinally conservative clergy are most likely to cohere ideologically, and in terms of vote choice. Thus, social influence within evangelical and Pentecostal congregations ultimately leads many participants to adopt the congregational central tendency on core issues. Nonetheless, citizens who more strongly adhere to secular norms are less likely to conform to the conservative views of their congregations.

Rightist views on matters such as abortion and homosexuality are not necessarily politically intolerant or authoritarian. For instance, many citizens simultaneously personally disapprove of homosexuality or same-sex marriage, and believe that gay citizens should be accorded full political and civil rights. However, the conservatism fostered in evangelical and Pentecostal churches may often exacerbate authoritarian impulses, with members seeking to deny political and civil liberties to those of whom they disapprove for religious reasons. Two
aspects of evangelical and Pentecostal congregations contribute to this tendency. Most importantly, sacred language that conveys dualistic, good-versus-evil views of social issues can exacerbate affective polarization, leading citizens to dislike intensely religious and political outgroups. Dualism and notions of spiritual warfare contribute to citizens perceiving outgroups as sinners, as guided by supernatural evil forces, and as existential threats to the religious ingroup. Literal demonization of political opponents is perhaps most vivid in the widespread urban myth that President Michel Temer is a Satanist (see Chapter Eight), and in 2010 UCKG publication implying that José Serra was possessed by demons (see Chapter One). Ultimately, dualistic theology and affective polarization can make citizens unwilling to tolerate the political and civil liberties of religious outgroups. After all, there is no need to compromise with the devil. Furthermore, beyond the impact of dualistic theology and worldviews, evangelical and Pentecostal clergy themselves may fail to bolster or even undermine support for outgroups’ civil liberties. As noted in Chapter Four, despite evangelical and Pentecostal religious leaders’ support for democracy in the abstract, they give low priority to preaching internal or external political tolerance.

This discussion is based on results from a case study of a single country in a limited time period. Does religious politicking necessarily lead to either conservatism or intolerance? Certainly not—not even within this country case during this historical period. Gay-friendly evangelical churches are springing up in the largest Brazilian cities, though they remain novelties that are few in number. And the history of the Catholic Church in some times and places in Brazil (as across Latin America more broadly) indicates that religious communities sometimes actively mobilize leftist action. Beyond these examples, it is easy to imagine religion pushing even more solidly in a leftward direction. Brazil’s Catholic left has historically been very liberal
on socioeconomic issues, but centrist or even center-rightist on matters of sexual and family
traditionalism. Meanwhile, Brazil’s gay-friendly evangelical churches may accept gays yet foster
certain other aspects of religious conservativism.

Yet this discussion leaves important questions remaining. For instance, why do right-
leaning religious communities often seem to grow and mobilize in politics more effectively than
do left-leaning ones? And under what circumstances do left-leaning religious communities
effectively mobilize? Again, approaches from political psychology, religious studies, and
political behavior will be needed to address these questions. The results presented in this book do
suggest one reason the religious left may struggle: theological liberalism may make congregants
less likely to follow the direction of clergy, or to seek to conform to the political beliefs of their
congregations.

*How Congregational Politics Pushes Elite-Level Politics to the Right*

Politicking within churches can also push legislative bodies—indeed, elite level
representation in general—in a conservative direction. Recall that in Brazil’s evangelical and
Pentecostal congregations in Latin America, clergy are aligned with their congregants on matters
of sexual and family traditionalism, yet they are more reliably conservative than their
congregants on other issues. At the mass level, evangelicals and Catholics have identical views
on issues such as economic policy, race, and the environment. However, at the level of clergy,
there are significant gaps in the importance evangelicals and Catholics place on such issues.

Evangelical and Pentecostal forms of political organizing will tend to privilege the issue
priorities of clergy over those of their constituents, as discussed in Chapters Two and Nine. That
is, clergy’s role as brokers—choosing candidates and mobilizing voters—enables them to
capture policy “rents.” As a result, when the political preferences of clergy and congregants diverge, candidates elected with congregational support will tend to be closer to the views of clergy. Religious leaders can control the information that reaches congregants, focusing on issues where candidates and congregants agree, such as abortion and homosexuality. In addition, candidates may be more likely to provide clientelistic side-payments to congregants than to clergy. Finally, the asymmetry in information and sophistication between clergy and congregants will make clergy much more likely to monitor the behavior of in-group candidates in office.

ELECTING RELIGIOUS RIGHTISTS STRENGTHENS THE POWER OF THE RIGHT AT THE ELITE LEVEL MORE GENERALLY. Politicians on the religious right form alliances with other rightist politicians, including those whom Power and Rodrigues-Silveira term the “clientelistic right,” the “law-and-order right,” and the “economic right” (n.d.). The dramatic alignment of evangelicals with other rightist groups in supporting the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff signals the importance of evangelicals to the right at the elite-level more broadly. At the level of civil society, the Free Brazil Movement (MBL, or Movimento Brasil Livre), a large, new libertarian social movement organization, has begun connecting the various facets of rightism. And in Colombia, one finds various rightisms instrumentally linked in the campaign against the peace deal.

Once again, questions remain for future research. For instance, why are clergy more reliably conservative than citizens on so many issues? Tentatively, it seems likely the answer has two parts. First, clergy have more fully absorbed and internalized internationally disseminated doctrine constructed within globalized religious communities that contains ideological assumptions about “what goes with what.” That is, there is no single, logically necessary story connecting, for instance, attitudes on abortion and tariffs. (Indeed, a naïve reading of the issues could even suggest that support for abortion rights and opposition to tariffs should go together.)
However, clergy are more likely than citizens to grasp and accept ideological programs defining “left” and “right,” and constraining support for abortion to be negatively correlated with support for tariffs (e.g., Converse 1964). Second, conservative clergy are likely to be more aware than citizens that in national politics, religious rightists support right-leaning causes more generally.

*How Congregational Politics Integrates Citizens into Democratic Politics*

Yet while religious politicking in Brazil pushes politics to the right, it has an even more fundamental political impact, helping to root and stabilize Brazil’s post-1985 democracy by mobilizing citizens to engage more fully with the political system. Religious communities’ styles of political activism suggest a fruitful comparison with two other major types of institutions that organize mass politics: labor unions and political parties. In Chapter Two, we noted that clergy roles are analogous to those of union bosses; both types of leaders simultaneously guide public opinion and coordinate with candidates (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Religious communities also often perform similar functions as those of political parties, I will argue. However, the appropriateness of the party metaphor varies a great deal across time and place.

In seminal work, Aldrich notes that political parties “are designed as attempts to solve” three problems endemic to electoral democracy (1995, 21–22). The first is the “problem of ambition and elective office seeking” (22); an effective party coordinates candidacies and provides a vehicle for ambition, outlining a path for elite-level political actors to ascend to higher levels of power. Second is the “problem of making decisions for the party and the polity” (22); parties develop policy agendas and coordinate action to pass laws in accordance with the agenda. The third and “most pervasive” problem parties are designed to solve is the “problem of collective action” (23). “How do candidates get supporters to vote for them—at least in greater
numbers than vote for the opposition—as well as get them to provide the cadre of workers and contribute the resources needed to win election? The political party has long been the solution.”

(24) The task of coordinating collective action involves many pieces. Parties parse and package disparate, complex issues that often lack a necessary logical connection. In so doing, they explain to elites and masses “what goes with what” and persuade citizens to adopt one package over another (Converse 1964). Further, parties continuously evolve brands to sell those bundles of issues and candidates to the mass public (Lupu 2013). Last, they mobilize political participation, raise resources, and allocate those resources to candidates.

Thinking about parties from the perspective of Latin America reveals a fourth core problem of democracy that political parties help to solve. One of the most fundamental challenges of electoral democracy is maintaining legitimacy among elites and citizens who may (quite reasonably) dislike the messy, conflictual business of electoral politics, and who often—as much as 49.99% of the time, on average—end up on the losing end of political contests (C. J. Anderson et al. 2005). A long literature on transitions to and from democracy suggests that disgruntled elites or masses might not only stop participating, but even potentially destabilize the system. Parties can help to address these legitimacy problems. By giving elites and citizens a team to identify with and root for, parties help extend time horizons beyond an immediate loss, to the possibility of a win in the next match. In addition, party leaders convey legitimacy to the political system when they express confidence in it, and muster followers to keep going. This leader-driven process can bolster psychological engagement with and understanding of the major issues of the day.

In contrast to parties, congregations were certainly not purpose-built to solve any of these four democratic problems. Nonetheless, I argue that in the Brazilian case, religious communities
have evolved forms of activism that happen partially to address all three problems Aldrich identifies, as well as the problem of legitimacy. Beyond the Brazilian case, congregations often help to solve the third and fourth problems.

Congregations are potentially natural fits for tackling Aldrich’s third “problem.” As civil society entities in which local elites with strong theological/political views maintain frequent, sustained contact with large numbers of citizens, congregations readily coordinate collective action. Thus, one of the primary jobs of clergy is precisely to bundle policy issues (in combination with theological stances) for congregants. Clergy help the faithful understand “what goes with what,” and persuade them to adopt the religious ingroup’s theological/ideological package. Religious identity group labels can also be considered brands, in ways not dissimilar to party brands. Though many religious communities choose not to use those brands to market bundles of candidates and issues, religious communities themselves or entrepreneurial politicians sometimes do so. The danger, of course, is that, as de Tocqueville warned, parties that do so increase their “power over some and [lose] the hope of reigning over all” (2010, 484). Finally, congregations are also distinctively good at mobilizing human and financial resources, which they do sometimes turn to political ends. Thus, in many democracies, congregations provide a supportive infrastructure that complements the party system in coordinating citizens to take part in politics.

Intriguingly, Chapter Eight shows that congregations can similarly bolster the legitimacy of the political system. Clergy typically have higher levels of support for democracy and the political system than do their congregants, and they communicate those supportive attitudes to their flocks. When they preach on public issues, clergy implicitly legitimize the public fora in which those issues are debated, while bolstering psychological engagement among citizens.
Perhaps most importantly, clergy can help congregants cope psychologically with political losses, while legitimizing the political system. Take, for example, Pastor Willian in the first scene of Chapter Eight—encouraging his congregants to see themselves as “winners” after receiving disappointing election results, and to focus simultaneously on the races where they got news, and on the long haul. Such motivational rhetoric, with perhaps somewhat fewer biblical references, would not have been out of place in a speech given by party leader facing losses on election night.

At the same time, Chapter Eight also reveals that clergy influence cuts both ways. Clergy can legitimate the political system in numerous ways, yet they can also erode citizens’ perceptions of the political regime’s legitimacy. Evangelical and Pentecostal clergy are much more likely than Catholic clergy to perceive that the political system and current office-holders harm their religious groups, as demonstrated in Chapter Four. Such perceptions rub off on congregants. Citizens are less likely to perceive democracy and the political system as legitimate when they attend churches where religious leaders believe the political system harms their group.

In the particular context of Brazil, some congregations have also, as competitive strategies, evolved methods of organizing that address the first and second democratic problems Aldrich identifies. First, many evangelical and Pentecostal congregations help to provide a vehicle for would-be elites’ political ambition. Within Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal denominations such as the Assembly of God and the UCKG, religious leaders themselves directly coordinate candidacies. In other evangelical and Pentecostal congregations, arrangements are more informal. Second, religious hierarchies—especially in certain well-organized denominations—help to coordinate legislative platforms for “their” representatives, at least on core issues. Thus have Brazil’s clergy-driven culture wars evolved.
Religious communities have developed these functions in the Brazilian case for a few reasons. We can follow the framework outlined in the first section of this chapter to identify the forces that enabled the unusual insertion of evangelical religious groups into electoral politics in Brazil. First, perceived threats from both the state and other religious groups initially motivated congregations to get directly involved in coordinating candidacies. Second, Brazil’s exceptionally open electoral and party systems created the opportunities that permitted and enabled this mobilization. Third, high levels of religious adherence and swelling congregations provided human resources, in addition to the doctrinal and symbolic resources provided by the religions themselves.

Nonetheless, it likely goes without saying that even Brazil’s best organized Pentecostal and evangelical congregations do not fully substitute for parties in the first two dimensions. In the clergy-driven culture wars, congregations do not effectively coordinate elite ambition to reach the most coveted positions in the halls of power. Nor do they create full legislative platforms on all issues, or effectively coordinate voting (despite some corralling of legislators on certain issues). Moreover, to the extent that religious communities substitute for some party functions in contexts were parties have little presence in the mass public, congregations create incentives for partisan fragmentation that may ultimately weaken Brazilian democracy.

This discussion leaves many open questions. For instance, when, how, and why do clergy deliberately seek to boost the legitimacy of the political system? And to pick up a theme from earlier in the chapter, what drives clergy perceptions that the system hurts their ingroup? Results from Chapter Four indicate that intolerance triggers grievances against the political system, suggesting that some clergy disappointment with the political system might be driven more by
their own outgroup attitudes than by what social scientists would perceive as objective harms. Nonetheless, much future research remains to be done.

The Present and Future of Religious Politics in Brazil

Brazilians encounter each other on the streets, at the bus stop, in supermarkets, in work and school, and in church. In millions upon millions of interactions throughout their daily lives, they come to understand Brazilian democracy and the nation-state, and they make choices together about how and when to take part in democratic politics. Religious communities often enter this national conversation, driven by membership pressures, theological and political beliefs, and commitment to Brazilian democracy in the abstract. They play two roles in this ongoing process of political socialization. First, congregations *congregate*. That is, churches are a site where people interact with others whom they often do not know well, including politicians, in regular, structured encounters. Congregational leaders set aside important time to talk about serious topics; clergy often touch on not just what people should be doing to prepare for the afterlife, but how they should be interacting with their fellow citizens in the here-and-now. Second, congregations mobilize God’s people. By integrating citizens into Brazilian democracy, religious groups play a critical role in the context of sustained political crisis. Yet at the same time, Brazil’s culture war politics are on balance more conservative, and sometimes more intolerant, as a result of the work of churches.

What does the future hold for Brazilian democracy and religion? Ever-advancing waves of crisis have, since 2014, hollowed out Brazil’s electoral democracy. Trends as of early 2018 are alarming: dramatically declining support for democracy; simultaneously, the bottoming out of partisanship; and at the elite level the apparent difficulty of coalescing around new
presidential candidates capable of taking Lula’s place in popular loyalties and competing
effectively with far-rightist Jair Bolsonaro. Brazilian democracy may need a refounding—not a
constitutional one, but a refounding in the organizational infrastructure that mobilizes ideas and
action to solve collective problems. Brazilian churches can serve as one cornerstone of this
refounding, as clergy and congregants organize—not only for the afterlife, but in pragmatic hope
for the here-and-now.

But stopping here would be Pollyanaish. Despite churches’ important democratic roles,
religious politicking also contributes to a growing threat to the very existence of Brazilian
democracy. As nostalgia for the 1964–1985 military dictatorship grows on the Brazilian right,
evangelical support for far-rightist, sometime-evangelical presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro,
as well as other right-leaning candidates, could ultimately tip the balance of the vote to the far
right in October 2018 or beyond. If so, political engagement in churches could end up helping to
bring to power the very elites who will destroy democracy from within.

Nonetheless, there are reasons to hope that most churches will, despite their rightist
proclivities, avoid mobilizing behind the anti-democratic far right. Clergy support for democracy
in the abstract will reduce enthusiasm for overtly authoritarian options. Perhaps even more
importantly, religious groups’ engagement in electoral politics gives clergy who might be
tempted by authoritarian options a stake in the electoral game. Moreover, incentives to electoral
disunity—the very incentives that prevent evangelical denominations from functioning
effectively as a partisan front—may also prevent a unified evangelical coalition behind any
particular politician who promised to rig the game to ingroup advantage. If so, Brazil’s clergy-
driven culture wars could ultimately help to stabilize democracy.
APPENDIX A. LIST OF FOCUS GROUPS AND CHURCH OBSERVATIONS

Unless otherwise noted below, all interviewee and church names used in the book are changed for the purpose of anonymizing the qualitative data. Quotation marks in the third columns below indicate that a congregation’s name has been changed.

Focus Groups:

<table>
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<th>Citation</th>
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<th>Location/Description</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>[FG1]</td>
<td>October 22, 2014</td>
<td>“São José Parish”: Large Catholic congregation in a middle-class neighborhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>[FG3]</td>
<td>October 18, 2014</td>
<td>“Vila Bela Methodist Church”: Large, middle-class Methodist congregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[FG4]</td>
<td>October 19, 2014</td>
<td>“Good News Baptist Church”: Large, middle-class Baptist congregation</td>
</tr>
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<td>[FG5]</td>
<td>October 19, 2014</td>
<td>“Hope Church of the Nazarene”: a small, store-front Nazarene church in a low-income neighborhood</td>
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<td>[FG7]</td>
<td>October 24, 2014</td>
<td>Focus group for non-religious respondents recruited through community advertisements; held at the Federal University of Juiz de For a</td>
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Church Observations:

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<th>Location/Description</th>
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<td>[CO1]</td>
<td>August 10, 2014</td>
<td>Low-income, Pentecostal store-front congregation</td>
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<td>[CO2]</td>
<td>October 12, 2014</td>
<td>“Vila Bela Methodist Church”: Large, middle-class Methodist congregation</td>
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<td>August 18, 2014</td>
<td>“Santa Rita Community”: Large Charismatic Catholic community</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 22, 2014</td>
<td>“São José Parish”: Large Catholic congregation in middle-class neighborhood</td>
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<td>August 22, 2014</td>
<td>“UCKG of Santa Emélia”: Large, low-income UCKG congregation</td>
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<td>August 24, 2014</td>
<td>“Hope Church of the Nazarene”</td>
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<td>August 29, 2014</td>
<td>Session at meeting of pastors</td>
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<td>October 5, 2014</td>
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<td>October 5, 2014</td>
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<td>Interview, “Vila Bela Methodist Church”</td>
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<td>[CO38]</td>
<td>June 22, 2017</td>
<td>Interview, deacon, large middle-class Catholic parish</td>
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<td>[CO41]</td>
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<td>Interview, priest, “São José Parish”</td>
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<td>[CO43]</td>
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<td>[CO44]</td>
<td>June 25, 2017</td>
<td>Interview, “Pastor Willian,” “Good News Baptist Church”</td>
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APPENDIX B. FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL

In the fictitious city of Bela Vista (RJ), in a universe not very far away, the following things happen....

1. In an evangelical church, Pastor Sérgio distributes a pamphlet instructing church members on the importance of voting.

2. In another evangelical church in the city, Pastor João preaches to church members, “Politics isn’t for believers.” He’s waiting for the End Times and says they should concentrate on saving souls.

3. In a Catholic church in the Santo Tomás neighborhood, Father Luiz often talks about the sin of homosexuality and the PT in the Catholic formation class, saying that the PT is very misguided in its legislative activism.

4. In an evangelical church in the same neighborhood, Pastor Eunice is collecting signatures for a popular initiative law to define marriage as between a man and a woman.

5. In the Catholic Cathedral in the center of the city, Father Flávio has a private meeting with some deacons he knows well. He tells them that he supports Dilma and is opposed to the ideology of the PSDB.

6. In an evangelical church in the city, an evangelical candidate asks Pastor Ricardo for his support. The pastor tells the candidate that he personally supports him, but that he can’t campaign for him inside the church. The candidate stays outside the church after service distributing materials.

7. At the end of May, a Catholic church in the São Leopoldo neighborhood organizes a march against crime. At the march, Father José Luiz preaches to the participants that the mayor isn’t doing enough to combat crime.

8. In a Four-Square Baptist church in the city, Pastor William strongly supports the presidential candidate Marina, a state deputy, and a federal deputy. He puts posters for them outside the church.

9. In the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in downtown Bela Vista, at worship service on the day of the election, Pastor Carlos asks all the people in attendance to repeat the name and electoral code of his candidate for state deputy.
10. In a Catholic church in a neighborhood close to the university, Father Carlos lets a gay couple participate actively in church activities. When some church members object to the couple’s participation, the priest responds that, “We are all children of God.”
APPENDIX C. VARIABLE CODING AND INFORMATION ON STUDIES
REFERENCES


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Amy Erica Smith


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Religion and Brazilian Democracy book. Read reviews from world’s largest community for readers. As Brazilian democracy faces a crisis of legitimacy, poli...Â Start by marking â€œReligion and Brazilian Democracy: Mobilizing the People of God (Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics)â€ as Want to Read: Want to Read saving… Want to Read. Religion and Brazilian Democracy - by Amy Erica Smith March 2019.Â Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings. Cancel. Log in. Â—. Â—. Home. Only search content I have access to. Â Religion and Brazilian Democracy. Mobilizing the People of God. Chapter. Chapter. Aa. Aa. Get access. Buy the print book. Check if you have access via personal or institutional login. Â§ 89. Why religion and communism are incompatible. 'Religion is the opium of the people,' said Karl Marx.Â Religious propaganda, belief in God and in all kinds of supernatural powers, find their most grateful soil where the institutions of social life are such as to incline the consciousness of the masses towards supernatural explanations of the phenomena of nature and society.Â The Catholic Church and Social Democracy; Bebel, Christianity and Socialism; Stamler and Vandervelde, Social Democracy and Religion; Lafargue, The Origin of Religious Belief; Danilov, The Black Army; Kilver, Social Democracy and Christianity; Bukharin, Church and School in the Soviet Republic; Burov, What is the Meaning of the Law concerning Freedom of Conscience?